mistake of fact instruction in Hawaii

2013Taylor further cited to Stenger, 122 Hawai'i 271 , 226 P.3d 441 , which was decided after she was convicted, for the proposition that, where some evidence was adduced that the defendant was laboring under a mistake of fact that could negate the state of mind necessary to commit theft, the trial court was required to sua sponte instruct the jury on the mistake of fact defense, and the court’s failure to so instruct the jury was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2013Taylor further cited to Stenger, 122 Hawai'i 271 , 226 P.3d 441 , which was decided after she was convicted, for the proposition that, where some evidence was adduced that the defendant was laboring under a mistake of fact that could negate the state of mind necessary to commit theft, the trial court was required to sua sponte instruct the jury on the mistake of fact defense, and the court’s failure to so instruct the jury was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2010If Stenger had requested the mistake of fact instruction, under State v. Locquiao, 100 Hawai'i 195, 205 , 58 P.3d 1242, 1252 (2002), the trial court would have been required to instruct the jury as to this defense.

2010If Stenger had requested the mistake of fact instruction, under State v. Locquiao, 100 Hawai'i 195, 205 , 58 P.3d 1242, 1252 (2002), the trial court would have been required to instruct the jury as to this defense.

2014The mistake of fact defense, which is a non-affirmative defense, see HRS § 701-115(3), is based upon the defendant’s ignorance or mistake that “is capable of negativing the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense.” Taylor, 130 Hawai'i at 207 , 307 P.3d at 1153 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

2014The mistake of fact defense, which is a non-affirmative defense, see HRS § 701-115(3), is based upon the defendant’s ignorance or mistake that “is capable of negativing the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense.” Taylor, 130 Hawai'i at 207 , 307 P.3d at 1153 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

2013See also State v. Stocker, 90 Hawai'i 85 , 94 n. 10, 976 P.2d 399 , 408 n. 10 (1999) (“To meet his [or her] initial burden of production [on a non-affirmative defense, including mistake of fact], the defendant need only come forward with ‘ “some” evidence, “no matter how weak, inconclusive, or unsatisfactory the evidence may be.” ’ ”) It was no accident that the plurality turned to Locquiao , a ease involving a mistake of fact instruction requested by the defendant at trial but denied by the trial court.

2013See also State v. Stocker, 90 Hawai'i 85 , 94 n. 10, 976 P.2d 399 , 408 n. 10 (1999) (“To meet his [or her] initial burden of production [on a non-affirmative defense, including mistake of fact], the defendant need only come forward with ‘ “some” evidence, “no matter how weak, inconclusive, or unsatisfactory the evidence may be.” ’ ”) It was no accident that the plurality turned to Locquiao , a ease involving a mistake of fact instruction requested by the defendant at trial but denied by the trial court.

2013The plurality concluded that the trial court’s “failure to instruct on the defense of mistake of fact” was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was a “reasonable possibility that the jury, if provided with a separate mistake of fact instruction, could have found that [Stenger] believed she complied with the reporting requirements and, thus, did not knowingly deceive DHS.” 122 Hawai'i at 282-83 , 226 P.3d at 452-53 (following the analytical framework set forth in Nichols, 111 Hawai'i 327 , 141 P.3d at 974 ).

2013The plurality concluded that the trial court’s “failure to instruct on the defense of mistake of fact” was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was a “reasonable possibility that the jury, if provided with a separate mistake of fact instruction, could have found that [Stenger] believed she complied with the reporting requirements and, thus, did not knowingly deceive DHS.” 122 Hawai'i at 282-83 , 226 P.3d at 452-53 (following the analytical framework set forth in Nichols, 111 Hawai'i 327 , 141 P.3d at 974 ).

2008The supreme court concluded in Mainaaupo that the intentional or knowing state of mind applies to the authorization element of the UCPV offense and therefore, a defendant prosecuted for the offense may assert the mistake-of-fact defense with respect to the authorization element, where he [or she] claims that he [or she] mistakenly believed that the person who authorized his [or her] operation of the vehicle was the vehicle's registered owner, because such a belief would potentially "negative the state of mind required to establish the authorization element of the offense." Id. at 251 , 178 P.3

2008The supreme court concluded in Mainaaupo that the intentional or knowing state of mind applies to the authorization element of the UCPV offense and therefore, a defendant prosecuted for the offense may assert the mistake-of-fact defense with respect to the authorization element, where he [or she] claims that he [or she] mistakenly believed that the person who authorized his [or her] operation of the vehicle was the vehicle's registered owner, because such a belief would potentially "negative the state of mind required to establish the authorization element of the offense." Id. at 251 , 178 P.3

2024State v. Kalaola, 124 Hawaiʻi 43, 49, 237 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2010).

2023"If there is a reasonable possibility that error might have contributed to a conviction in a criminal case, then the error cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the conviction must be set aside." State v. Klinge, 92 Hawaiʻi 577, 583, 994 P.2d 509, 515 (2000) (citation omitted).

2014(Emphasis added). -56- *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** The mistake of fact defense, which is a non-affirmative defense, see HRS § 701-115(3), is based upon the defendant’s ignorance or mistake that “is capable of negativing the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense.” Taylor, 130 Hawai#i at 207, 307 P.3d at 1153 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

2014(Emphasis added). -56- *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** The mistake of fact defense, which is a non-affirmative defense, see HRS § 701-115(3), is based upon the defendant’s ignorance or mistake that “is capable of negativing the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense.” Taylor, 130 Hawai#i at 207, 307 P.3d at 1153 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

2011The concurring opinion limited the majority’s opinion by asserting that the “specter raised by Justice Nakaya-ma’s dissent of trial courts hereafter being responsible as a matter of law for combing through the entire body of evidence in search of every possible defense theory that may fit is, in my view, not warranted by the specific holding of the majority in this case, based as it is on the specific facts of this case, especially where, as here, the theory at issue formed the very heart of the defense case, rather than some nebulous, barely glimpsed theory on the margins.” Id. at 297, 226 P.

2011The concurring opinion limited the majority’s opinion by asserting that the “specter raised by Justice Nakaya-ma’s dissent of trial courts hereafter being responsible as a matter of law for combing through the entire body of evidence in search of every possible defense theory that may fit is, in my view, not warranted by the specific holding of the majority in this case, based as it is on the specific facts of this case, especially where, as here, the theory at issue formed the very heart of the defense case, rather than some nebulous, barely glimpsed theory on the margins.” Id. at 297, 226 P.

2011The concurring opinion limited the majority’s opinion by asserting that the “specter raised by Justice Nakaya-ma’s dissent of trial courts hereafter being responsible as a matter of law for combing through the entire body of evidence in search of every possible defense theory that may fit is, in my view, not warranted by the specific holding of the majority in this case, based as it is on the specific facts of this case, especially where, as here, the theory at issue formed the very heart of the defense case, rather than some nebulous, barely glimpsed theory on the margins.” Id. at 297, 226 P.

2011The concurring opinion limited the majority’s opinion by asserting that the “specter raised by Justice Nakaya-ma’s dissent of trial courts hereafter being responsible as a matter of law for combing through the entire body of evidence in search of every possible defense theory that may fit is, in my view, not warranted by the specific holding of the majority in this case, based as it is on the specific facts of this case, especially where, as here, the theory at issue formed the very heart of the defense case, rather than some nebulous, barely glimpsed theory on the margins.” Id. at 297, 226 P.

2010Consequently, I agree with Justice Nakaya- ma’s ultimate conclusion that “the trial court’s failure to instruct sua sponte on the mistake of fact defense was harmless because it was not reasonably possible that the issuance of a separate mistake of fact instruction could have supported a finding that Stenger did not knowingly deceive DHS.” Id. at 312, 226 P.3d at 482.

2010Consequently, I agree with Justice Nakaya- ma’s ultimate conclusion that “the trial court’s failure to instruct sua sponte on the mistake of fact defense was harmless because it was not reasonably possible that the issuance of a separate mistake of fact instruction could have supported a finding that Stenger did not knowingly deceive DHS.” Id. at 312, 226 P.3d at 482.

2010See Majority opinion at ___, 226 P.3d at 452-53 . [2] This jurisdiction's standard for defense instructions is rooted in Territory v. Alcantara, 24 Haw. 197 (Haw.Terr.1918), which reviewed whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit to the jury a manslaughter instruction in the defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree.

2010The standard for whether the failure to give a jury instruction is harmless is “whether there is a reasonable possibility that error might have contributed to conviction.” State v. Nichols, 111 Hawai'i 327, 334 , 141 P.3d 974, 981 (2006) (quoting State v. Gonsalves, 108 Hawai'i 289, 292-93 , 119 P.3d 597, 600-01 (2005)).

2010The standard for whether the failure to give a jury instruction is harmless is “whether there is a reasonable possibility that error might have contributed to conviction.” State v. Nichols, 111 Hawai'i 327, 334 , 141 P.3d 974, 981 (2006) (quoting State v. Gonsalves, 108 Hawai'i 289, 292-93 , 119 P.3d 597, 600-01 (2005)).

2008Palisbo was charged with unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS ž 708-836, id. at 347, 3 P.3d at 513 , and he sought to assert the mistake-of-fact defense at trial, id. at 354, 3 P.3d at 520 .

2008Palisbo was charged with unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS ž 708-836, id. at 347, 3 P.3d at 513 , and he sought to assert the mistake-of-fact defense at trial, id. at 354, 3 P.3d at 520 .

2002Id.; see also Adcock v. State, 260 Ga. 302 , 392 S.E.2d 886 , 886 (1990) (holding that reversible error can occur from the failure to give a mistake-of-fact instruction, even if it is not the defendant's sole defense); Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Ky. 1977) (explaining that the defense of mistake of fact, when raised, requires an instruction calling it to the jury's attention), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.1981); Cheser v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Ky. Ct.App.1994) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction rests upon

2002Id.; see also Adcock v. State, 260 Ga. 302 , 392 S.E.2d 886 , 886 (1990) (holding that reversible error can occur from the failure to give a mistake-of-fact instruction, even if it is not the defendant's sole defense); Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Ky. 1977) (explaining that the defense of mistake of fact, when raised, requires an instruction calling it to the jury's attention), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.1981); Cheser v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Ky. Ct.App.1994) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction rests upon

2002Because this is not a ‘legally recognized defense’ under our law, the trial court did not err in denying his request to charge on mistake of fact....”); State v. Molin, 288 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn.1979) (holding that, although a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case when supported by the evidence, “ ‘[t]he court need not give the instruction as requested by the [defendant] if it determines that the substance of that request is contained in the court’s charge.’ ”); Hooper v. State, 95 Nev. 924 , 604 P.2d 115, 116 (1979) (holding that the trial court did not err in refu

2002Because this is not a `legally recognized defense' under our law, the trial court did not err in denying his request to charge on mistake of fact...."); State v. Molin, 288 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1979) (holding that, although a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case when supported by the evidence, "`[t]he *1254 court need not give the instruction as requested by the [defendant] if it determines that the substance of that request is contained in the court's charge.'"); Hooper v. State, 95 Nev. 924 , 604 P.2d 115, 116 (1979) (holding that the trial court did not err in

2002Id.; see also Adcock v. State, 260 Ga. 302 , 392 S.E.2d 886, 886 (1990) (holding that reversible error can occur from the failure to give a mistake-of-fact instruction, even if it is not the defendant’s sole defense); Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Ky.1977) (explaining that the defense of mistake of fact, when raised, requires an instruction calling it to the jury’s attention), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.1981); Cheser v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Ky.Ct.App.1994) (holding that, where the defendant’s conviction rests upon a c

2002Id.; see also Adcock v. State, 260 Ga. 302 , 392 S.E.2d 886 , 886 (1990) (holding that reversible error can occur from the failure to give a mistake-of-fact instruction, even if it is not the defendant's sole defense); Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Ky. 1977) (explaining that the defense of mistake of fact, when raised, requires an instruction calling it to the jury's attention), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.1981); Cheser v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Ky. Ct.App.1994) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction rests upon

2002Because this is not a `legally recognized defense' under our law, the trial court did not err in denying his request to charge on mistake of fact...."); State v. Molin, 288 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1979) (holding that, although a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case when supported by the evidence, "`[t]he *1254 court need not give the instruction as requested by the [defendant] if it determines that the substance of that request is contained in the court's charge.'"); Hooper v. State, 95 Nev. 924 , 604 P.2d 115, 116 (1979) (holding that the trial court did not err in

2002Because this is not a `legally recognized defense' under our law, the trial court did not err in denying his request to charge on mistake of fact...."); State v. Molin, 288 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1979) (holding that, although a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case when supported by the evidence, "`[t]he *1254 court need not give the instruction as requested by the [defendant] if it determines that the substance of that request is contained in the court's charge.'"); Hooper v. State, 95 Nev. 924 , 604 P.2d 115, 116 (1979) (holding that the trial court did not err in

2002An instruction regarding the substantive elements of the offense alone fails to apprise the jury that an alleged victim’s consent must be affirmatively and freely given....”); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 766 A.2d 874, 880 (Pa.Super.2001) (holding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to the mistake-of-fact defense warranted a new trial); Bang v. State, 815 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex.App.1991) (“When an accused creates an issue of mistaken belief as to the culpable mental element of the offense, he is entitled to a defensive instruction on ‘mistake of fact.’ ”).

2002An instruction regarding the substantive elements of the offense alone fails to apprise the jury that an alleged victim's consent must be affirmatively and freely given. . . ."); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 766 A.2d 874, 880 (Pa.Super. 2001) (holding that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to the mistake-of-fact defense warranted a new trial); Bang v. State, 815 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex.App.1991) ("When an accused creates an issue of mistaken belief as to the culpable mental element of the offense, he is entitled to a defensive instruction on `mistake of fact.'").

2002Because this is not a `legally recognized defense' under our law, the trial court did not err in denying his request to charge on mistake of fact...."); State v. Molin, 288 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1979) (holding that, although a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case when supported by the evidence, "`[t]he *1254 court need not give the instruction as requested by the [defendant] if it determines that the substance of that request is contained in the court's charge.'"); Hooper v. State, 95 Nev. 924 , 604 P.2d 115, 116 (1979) (holding that the trial court did not err in

2002Because this is not a `legally recognized defense' under our law, the trial court did not err in denying his request to charge on mistake of fact...."); State v. Molin, 288 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1979) (holding that, although a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case when supported by the evidence, "`[t]he *1254 court need not give the instruction as requested by the [defendant] if it determines that the substance of that request is contained in the court's charge.'"); Hooper v. State, 95 Nev. 924 , 604 P.2d 115, 116 (1979) (holding that the trial court did not err in

2002Because this is not a ‘legally recognized defense’ under our law, the trial court did not err in denying his request to charge on mistake of fact....”); State v. Molin, 288 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn.1979) (holding that, although a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case when supported by the evidence, “ ‘[t]he court need not give the instruction as requested by the [defendant] if it determines that the substance of that request is contained in the court’s charge.’ ”); Hooper v. State, 95 Nev. 924 , 604 P.2d 115, 116 (1979) (holding that the trial court did not err in refu

2002Because this is not a `legally recognized defense' under our law, the trial court did not err in denying his request to charge on mistake of fact...."); State v. Molin, 288 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Minn. 1979) (holding that, although a defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case when supported by the evidence, "`[t]he *1254 court need not give the instruction as requested by the [defendant] if it determines that the substance of that request is contained in the court's charge.'"); Hooper v. State, 95 Nev. 924 , 604 P.2d 115, 116 (1979) (holding that the trial court did not err in

2002See Anderson v. State, 11 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Tex.App. 2000) (recognizing a distinction between statutory and nonstatutory defenses when determining whether a defendant is entitled to an instruction on the mistake-of-fact defense); Bang, 815 S.W.2d at 842 (“Because the Penal Code makes ‘mistake of fact’ a statutory defense, appellant was entitled to have the jury specifically rule upon the defense.”); Cheser, 904 S.W.2d at 242 (reiterating that “the difference between the statutory defenses and a simple denial by the defendant that he committed one or more of the essential elements of the crime i

2002See Anderson v. State, 11 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Tex.App. 2000) (recognizing a distinction between statutory and nonstatutory defenses when determining whether a defendant is entitled to an instruction on the mistake-of-fact defense); Bang, 815 S.W.2d at 842 ("Because the Penal Code makes `mistake of fact' a statutory defense, appellant was entitled to have the jury specifically rule upon the defense."); Cheser, 904 S.W.2d at 242 (reiterating that "the difference between the statutory defenses and a simple denial by the defendant that he committed one or more of the essential elements of the crime i

2002Id.; see also Adcock v. State, 260 Ga. 302 , 392 S.E.2d 886 , 886 (1990) (holding that reversible error can occur from the failure to give a mistake-of-fact instruction, even if it is not the defendant's sole defense); Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Ky. 1977) (explaining that the defense of mistake of fact, when raised, requires an instruction calling it to the jury's attention), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.1981); Cheser v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Ky. Ct.App.1994) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction rests upon

2002Id.; see also Adcock v. State, 260 Ga. 302 , 392 S.E.2d 886 , 886 (1990) (holding that reversible error can occur from the failure to give a mistake-of-fact instruction, even if it is not the defendant's sole defense); Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Ky. 1977) (explaining that the defense of mistake of fact, when raised, requires an instruction calling it to the jury's attention), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.1981); Cheser v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Ky. Ct.App.1994) (holding that, where the defendant's conviction rests upon

2002An instruction regarding the substantive elements of the offense alone fails to apprise the jury that an alleged victim’s consent must be affirmatively and freely given....”); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 766 A.2d 874, 880 (Pa.Super.2001) (holding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to the mistake-of-fact defense warranted a new trial); Bang v. State, 815 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex.App.1991) (“When an accused creates an issue of mistaken belief as to the culpable mental element of the offense, he is entitled to a defensive instruction on ‘mistake of fact.’ ”).

2002An instruction regarding the substantive elements of the offense alone fails to apprise the jury that an alleged victim's consent must be affirmatively and freely given. . . ."); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 766 A.2d 874, 880 (Pa.Super. 2001) (holding that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to the mistake-of-fact defense warranted a new trial); Bang v. State, 815 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex.App.1991) ("When an accused creates an issue of mistaken belief as to the culpable mental element of the offense, he is entitled to a defensive instruction on `mistake of fact.'").