Vargas challenge in California

2025(People v. Fuentes (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1286 , 1291; People v. Puente (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1146, fn. 3 .) When the plea agreement provides for a specified high sentence if the defendant fails to appear or meet certain conditions, it may also be referred to as a Vargas waiver, based on a similar type of agreement approved in People v. Vargas (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1107, 1113 .

2021(See People v. Carr (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 786, 791-792 [finding no violation of due process where defendant who allegedly violated a People v. Vargas (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1107 , waiver had ample notice and opportunity to be heard, and noting that a court is not required to make a detailed statement of reasons for finding defendant in violation of a Vargas waiver].) Moreover, any error is harmless because the jury in the 2014 matter ultimately found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and 11 the victimization for which defendant was convicted in the 2014 case provided the basis for fin

2016The court held a hearing on July 31, 2015, and provided the parties with its tentative ruling, in which it determined that Vargas, supra, 59 Cal.4th 635 applied, and that defendant should be resentenced as a “second striker.” At the outset of the hearing, the court noted that the People argued it should not be addressing the Vargas issue, and it stated, “From a purely technical procedural standpoint, the People may well be right.” The court stated that the case was previously briefed and argued before Vargas was decided; thus, the issue was not raised at the appellate level.

2016The court held a hearing on July 31, 2015, and provided the parties with its tentative ruling, in which it determined that Vargas, supra, 59 Cal.4th 635 applied, and that defendant should be resentenced as a “second striker.” At the outset of the hearing, the court noted that the People argued it should not be addressing the Vargas issue, and it stated, “From a purely technical procedural standpoint, the People may well be right.” The court stated that the case was previously briefed and argued before Vargas was decided; thus, the issue was not raised at the appellate level.

2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap

2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap

2015(People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 .) "Only a single aggravating factor is required to impose the upper term . . . ." (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728 .) We conclude that Vargas has not met her burden to show that the court's imposition of the upper term was irrational or arbitrary.

2015(People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 .) "Only a single aggravating factor is required to impose the upper term . . . ." (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728 .) We conclude that Vargas has not met her burden to show that the court's imposition of the upper term was irrational or arbitrary.

2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap

2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap

2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap

2015(Gonzalez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 752 ["The parties are given an adequate opportunity to seek such clarifications or changes if, at any time during the sentencing hearing, the trial court describes the sentence it intends to impose and the reasons for the sentence, and the court thereafter considers the objections of the parties before the actual sentencing" (second italics added)]; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356 [A meaningful opportunity to object to sentencing can occur "only if, during the course of the sentencing hearing itself and before objections are made, the parties are clearly ap

2015(People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 .) "Only a single aggravating factor is required to impose the upper term . . . ." (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728 .) We conclude that Vargas has not met her burden to show that the court's imposition of the upper term was irrational or arbitrary.

2015(People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 .) "Only a single aggravating factor is required to impose the upper term . . . ." (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728 .) We conclude that Vargas has not met her burden to show that the court's imposition of the upper term was irrational or arbitrary.

2026The court stated Vargas fired, not just “a couple of times as the car drove away,” but 10 times, which was why the court believed the jury found Vargas committed the attempted murders “with premeditation and deliberation.” The court also denied Vargas’s motion under 3 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike his prior serious or violent felony conviction.

2026The court stated Vargas fired, not just “a couple of times as the car drove away,” but 10 times, which was why the court believed the jury found Vargas committed the attempted murders “with premeditation and deliberation.” The court also denied Vargas’s motion under 3 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike his prior serious or violent felony conviction.

2026It observed that unlike cases cited by Vargas’s counsel such as People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510 (Vivar), there were no immigration-safe pleas available to Vargas.

2026The court made credibility findings about their testimony, to which we must defer. ( Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 527-528; People v. Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320.) These findings distinguish this case from others, including Vivar and Espinoza, in which the appellate courts considered a “cold” record consisting of declarations and documentary evidence, and thus were in as good a position as the trial court to decide the moving party’s right to section 1473.7 relief.

2025In making its decision, the court relied on James F. O’Toole Co., Inc. v. Los Angeles Kingsbury Court Owners Assn. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 549 (O’Toole).

2025In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we review the record “to determine whether it discloses reasonable and credible evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” and we “draw all reasonable 2 People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 (Anderson). 7 inferences in favor of the judgment.” (People v. Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102 , 119, fn. 11 (Cardenas).) We do not resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, as that is “the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 .) Instead,

2025A trial court’s determination as to whether there was a breach of the agreement is not the same as making a finding in aggravation or a discretionary sentencing choice . . . . [The trial court] was limited by the plea agreement to resolve any disputed factual contentions as to whether there was compliance with the conditions of release set forth in the plea agreement.” (Rabanales, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 502 .) Further, in the written plea agreement and in court, Miller was advised of, and waived, any Boykin–Tahl rights.

2025In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we review the record “to determine whether it discloses reasonable and credible evidence to allow a rational trier of fact to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” and we “draw all reasonable 2 People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 (Anderson). 7 inferences in favor of the judgment.” (People v. Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102 , 119, fn. 11 (Cardenas).) We do not resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, as that is “the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 .) Instead,

2025(People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 679 .) The same-defense exception applied because Vargas’s defense to all of the charges except vandalism was that Doe was not a credible witness and was not telling the truth.

2025(People v. Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 572 .) For all of these reasons, we reject Vargas’s challenge to the criminal threats conviction. 13 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2023The Court Did Not Commit Prejudicial Error in Excluding Recorded Evidence That Vargas Cried After His Interrogation Ended Evidence Code section 356 provides, “Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given into evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence.” “In the event

2020(See People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335 , 345–346; People v. Pelayo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 115 , 124–125.) The abstract of judgment should be modified to so reflect.

2020(See People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335 , 345–346; People v. Pelayo (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 115 , 124–125.) The abstract of judgment should be modified to so reflect.

2015Generally, a trial court loses jurisdiction “to resentence a criminal defendant after execution of sentence has begun.” (People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1089 .) Where a term of imprisonment is imposed, but execution is stayed, “the trial court retains jurisdiction, during the period a stay is in effect and at any time prior to execution of the sentence, to reconsider the sentence and vacate it or impose any new sentence which is not greater than the initial sentence.” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 352 .) Here, the sentence was not executed until the court held the Vargas he

2015Generally, a trial court loses jurisdiction “to resentence a criminal defendant after execution of sentence has begun.” (People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1089 .) Where a term of imprisonment is imposed, but execution is stayed, “the trial court retains jurisdiction, during the period a stay is in effect and at any time prior to execution of the sentence, to reconsider the sentence and vacate it or impose any new sentence which is not greater than the initial sentence.” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 352 .) Here, the sentence was not executed until the court held the Vargas he

2015Generally, a trial court loses jurisdiction “to resentence a criminal defendant after execution of sentence has begun.” (People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1089 .) Where a term of imprisonment is imposed, but execution is stayed, “the trial court retains jurisdiction, during the period a stay is in effect and at any time prior to execution of the sentence, to reconsider the sentence and vacate it or impose any new sentence which is not greater than the initial sentence.” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 352 .) Here, the sentence was not executed until the court held the Vargas he

2015Generally, a trial court loses jurisdiction “to resentence a criminal defendant after execution of sentence has begun.” (People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1089 .) Where a term of imprisonment is imposed, but execution is stayed, “the trial court retains jurisdiction, during the period a stay is in effect and at any time prior to execution of the sentence, to reconsider the sentence and vacate it or impose any new sentence which is not greater than the initial sentence.” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 352 .) Here, the sentence was not executed until the court held the Vargas he