creation rule in Florida

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that "equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances," applicable here.

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that “equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances,” applicable here.

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that "equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances," applicable here.

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that “equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances,” applicable here.

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that "equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances," applicable here.

2002Finally, I cannot find North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla.1960), State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla.1981), and Greenhut Construction Co. v. Henry A. Knott Inc., 247 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), relating to the principle that “equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against the state only in rare and exceptional circumstances,” applicable here.

2017There, the court observed that prior to the creation of rule 3.170(g), “[t]he State’s ability to have a breached plea agreement vacated [wa]s not without its limitations.” Id. at 649 .

2014And, most im *100 portant to our holding in this case, the number of possible methods available to the state to offer this proof at trial is strictly limited to two: (1) admission of the “whole record” pertaining to the previous felony conviction, Warren v. State, 74 So.2d 688 (Fla.1954), or (2) a certified copy of the judgment for the prior conviction in substantial conformance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986, Keith v. State, 844 So.2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). 1 Prior to the creation of rule 3.986, the state was required to submit the “whole record” of the prior conviction to pro

2014Lawton, 109 So.3d at 828 .

2010"Implicit in the creation of that exception, however, is the recognition that the person on whom the duty is to be imposed has the ability or the right to control the third party's behavior." Id.

2010“Implicit in the creation of that exception, however, is the recognition that the person on whom the duty is to be imposed has the ability or the right to control the third party’s behavior.” Id.

2004See, e.g., Barnhill v. State, 828 So.2d 405 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (stating that defendant who failed to file 3.170( l ) motion was "constrained ... to limit his [postconviction] challenge regarding the voluntariness of his plea to allegations regarding the ineffectiveness of defense counsel"); Jackson v. State, 801 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (holding that failure to file rule 3.170( l ) motion did *320 not preclude claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to file motion to withdraw plea); see also Dow v. State, 823 So.2d 830, 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (Altenbernd, C.J., concurring) (opinin

2004The supreme court also spoke to the issue of parol evidence: Contrary to respondents’ argument, however, we also agree that in exchange for the creation of a presumption which shifts the burden of proof to the estate under section 90.304, Florida Statutes (1987), and increases the burden to a clear and convincing standard, the estate is entitled to introduce parol evidence. (emphasis added) Id. at 1167 n. 2.

1998Sandarac grounded its analysis on the principle that negligence law is simply not intended to protect economic expectations in the absence of bodily injury or property damages, rather than on a third-party beneficiary standing, and is consistent with Casa Clara Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So.2d 1244 (Fla.1993). [6] Casa Clara only responded to "[t]he issue is whether a homeowner can recover for purely economic losses from a concrete supplier under a negligence theory." (Emphasis added).

1996In Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984), the Florida Supreme Court, in reviewing section 768.40 (renumbered 766.101 in 1988), stated: In an effort to control the escalating cost of health care in the state, the legislature deemed it wise to encourage a degree of self-regulation by the medical profession through peer review and evaluation.

1992NOTES [1] Although the deceased coincidentally had the same last name, this case is unrelated to In re Estate of Gainer, 579 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). [2] Contrary to respondents' argument, however, we also agree that in exchange for the creation of a presumption which shifts the burden of proof to the estate under section 90.304, Florida Statutes (1987), and increases the burden to a clear and convincing standard, the estate is entitled to introduce parol evidence. [3] There is a notation on the card dated December 13, 1984, which states, "Delete Jerry and Dollie." However, petitioners a

1983The most important consideration given for the creation of a presumption of law is probability, i.e., that "proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and time-saving to assume the truth of fact A until the adversary disproves it." [6] Defendant contends here that trial by jury is a fundamental constitutional right, guaranteed an accused, which is forfeited only by a waiver which is voluntary and intelligent, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 , 50 S.Ct. 253 ,

1983The most important consideration given for the creation of a presumption of law is probability, i.e., that "proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and time-saving to assume the truth of fact A until the adversary disproves it." [6] Defendant contends here that trial by jury is a fundamental constitutional right, guaranteed an accused, which is forfeited only by a waiver which is voluntary and intelligent, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 , 50 S.Ct. 253 ,

1983The most important consideration given for the creation of a presumption of law is probability, i.e., that "proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and time-saving to assume the truth of fact A until the adversary disproves it." [6] Defendant contends here that trial by jury is a fundamental constitutional right, guaranteed an accused, which is forfeited only by a waiver which is voluntary and intelligent, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 , 50 S.Ct. 253 ,

1983The most important consideration given for the creation of a presumption of law is probability, i.e., that "proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and time-saving to assume the truth of fact A until the adversary disproves it." [6] Defendant contends here that trial by jury is a fundamental constitutional right, guaranteed an accused, which is forfeited only by a waiver which is voluntary and intelligent, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 , 50 S.Ct. 253 ,

1983Lake County v. Friedel, 387 So.2d 514 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

1983The most important consideration given for the creation of a presumption of law is probability, i.e., that "proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and time-saving to assume the truth of fact A until the adversary disproves it." [6] Defendant contends here that trial by jury is a fundamental constitutional right, guaranteed an accused, which is forfeited only by a waiver which is voluntary and intelligent, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 , 50 S.Ct. 253 ,

1979Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, we do not read Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974), as creating such an exception as indeed the Court therein expressly recognized that a negligence action arising from an automobile accident can be barred by the statute of limitations by the time the no-fault threshold is reached.

1964Mr. Justice Thornal in Thomason v. Miami Transit Company, Fla., 100 So.2d 620 said: "The creation of a presumption would have the effect of making a prima facie case without more.