creation privilege in Indiana

2011See id. at 238 , 268 N.E.2d at 99 (mindful “not [to] discount the concern of the Indiana General Assembly that the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship be preserved at the cost of rendering certain evidence inadmissible,” but concluding that a patient waives the privilege “by pursing a course of conduct inconsistent with a continued observance of the privilege”); Terre Haute Reg’l Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306, 1309-11 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (refusing to write-in a good faith requirement or to require a balancing test in the application of the peer review privilege); s

2011See id. at 238 , 268 N.E.2d at 99 (mindful “not [to] discount the concern of the Indiana General Assembly that the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship be preserved at the cost of rendering certain evidence inadmissible,” but concluding that a patient waives the privilege “by pursing a course of conduct inconsistent with a continued observance of the privilege”); Terre Haute Reg’l Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306, 1309-11 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (refusing to write-in a good faith requirement or to require a balancing test in the application of the peer review privilege); s

2011See id. at 238 , 268 N.E.2d at 99 (mindful “not [to] discount the concern of the Indiana General Assembly that the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship be preserved at the cost of rendering certain evidence inadmissible,” but concluding that a patient waives the privilege “by pursing a course of conduct inconsistent with a continued observance of the privilege”); Terre Haute Reg’l Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306, 1309-11 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (refusing to write-in a good faith requirement or to require a balancing test in the application of the peer review privilege); s

2011See id. at 238 , 268 N.E.2d at 99 (mindful “not [to] discount the concern of the Indiana General Assembly that the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship be preserved at the cost of rendering certain evidence inadmissible,” but concluding that a patient waives the privilege “by pursing a course of conduct inconsistent with a continued observance of the privilege”); Terre Haute Reg’l Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306, 1309-11 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (refusing to write-in a good faith requirement or to require a balancing test in the application of the peer review privilege); s

2011See id. at 238 , 268 N.E.2d at 99 (mindful "not [to] discount the concern of the Indiana General Assembly that the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship be preserved at the cost of rendering certain evidence inadmissible," but concluding that a patient waives the privilege "by pursing a course of conduct inconsistent with a continued observance of the privilege"); Terre Haute Reg'l Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306, 1309-11 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (refusing to write-in a good faith requirement or to require a balancing test in the application of the peer review privilege); s

2011See id. at 238 , 268 N.E.2d at 99 (mindful “not [to] discount the concern of the Indiana General Assembly that the confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship be preserved at the cost of rendering certain evidence inadmissible,” but concluding that a patient waives the privilege “by pursing a course of conduct inconsistent with a continued observance of the privilege”); Terre Haute Reg’l Hosp., Inc. v. Basden, 524 N.E.2d 1306, 1309-11 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (refusing to write-in a good faith requirement or to require a balancing test in the application of the peer review privilege); s

2024We “are bound by the General Assembly’s determination of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2404 | September 16, 2024 Page 6 of 9 whether a particular interest is sufficient enough to justify the creation of a privilege and the scope of the protection provided under that privilege.” In re Crisis Connection, Inc., 949 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind. 2011). [11] The General Assembly has provided exceptions to this confidentiality in Indiana Code section 31-33-18-2.

2018See El v. Beard, 795 N.E.2d 462, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that motion for costs and attorney fees was filed in order to permit the creation of a defense on the merits and was not a request for affirmative relief); Omega Painting, Inc., 463 N.E.2d 287 at 293 (finding that interrogatories filed seeking to generate a defense on the merits were not requests for affirmative relief, but that a jurisdictional challenge was nonetheless waived because interrogatories were filed before preservation of the defense). [19] But an action that neither asserts nor is made in preparation of a defense

2018See El v. Beard, 795 N.E.2d 462, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that motion for costs and attorney fees was filed in order to permit the creation of a defense on the merits and was not a request for affirmative relief); Omega Painting, Inc., 463 N.E.2d 287 at 293 (finding that interrogatories filed seeking to generate a defense on the merits were not requests for affirmative relief, but that a jurisdictional challenge was nonetheless waived because interrogatories were filed before preservation of the defense). [19] But an action that neither asserts nor is made in preparation of a defense

2018See, e.g., Allen, 832 N.E.2d at 1096–97 (holding that father in a custody dispute, despite properly preserving objection to trial court’s personal jurisdiction, was nonetheless estopped from challenging it because he filed motions seeking, inter alia, that the child’s grandmother and current guardian be held in contempt and that the trial court make a ruling on his motion for modification of custody); cf. Hotmix & Bituminous Equip., 719 N.E.2d at 830 (holding that while permissive counterclaims are requests for affirmative relief, a compulsory counterclaim Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memoran

1997“The reasons for admitting identification statements as substantive evidence are that out-of-court identifications are believed to be more reliable than those made under the suggestive conditions prevailing at trial, and the availability of the declarant for cross-examination eliminates the major danger of hearsay testimony.” United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir.1981). 5 One of the reasons for the creation of this rule was to remedy the situation where a witness identifies the defendant before trial and then at trial, because of fear or other reasons, recants the previous identif

1997Id.