prisoner hearing in Florida

21 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1887–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

Case	Followed	Cited
Steele v. Kehoegreen fla · 1999 · cited in 8 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2000–2014 2 sentences 2014P. 3.850(b)(3); see also Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931, 934 (Fla.1999) (“[D]ue process entitles a prisoner to a hearing on a claim that he or she missed the deadline to file a rule 3.850 motion because his or her attorney had agreed to file the motion but failed to do so in a timely manner.”). 2004In Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court held that when a prisoner claims his attorney agreed to file a post-conviction motion but failed to do so in a timely manner, the matter should be presented to the trial court in a petition for writ of habeas corpus and that due process entitles the prisoner to a hearing to determine the validity of the claim.	4	8
Sanders v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1963 · cited in 3 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1963–1990 2 sentences 1964Additionally, the trial court may, in its discretion, "adopt any appropriate means for inquiry * * * in order to ascertain all possible grounds upon which the prisoner might claim * * relief." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 22 , 83 S.Ct. at 1081 (1963), cited approvingly in State v. Weeks, supra; Webster v. State, Fla.App. 1963, 156 So.2d 890 and Sampson v. State, supra. In the instant case, Dixon based his claim for relief on a theory of denial of the right to counsel. 1964Additionally, the trial court may, in its discretion, "adopt any appropriate means for inquiry * * * in order to ascertain all possible grounds upon which the prisoner might claim * * relief." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 22 , 83 S.Ct. at 1081 (1963), cited approvingly in State v. Weeks, supra; Webster v. State, Fla.App. 1963, 156 So.2d 890 and Sampson v. State, supra. In the instant case, Dixon based his claim for relief on a theory of denial of the right to counsel.	1	3
State v. Weeksgreen fla · 1964 · cited in 2 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1964–2001 2 sentences 2001Cf. Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931, 934 (Fla. 1999) (holding that "due process entitles a prisoner to a hearing on a claim that he or she missed the deadline to file a rule 3.850 motion because his or her attorney had agreed to file the motion but failed to do so in a timely manner"); State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892, 896 (Fla.1964) (holding that due process requires the appointment of counsel in postconviction proceedings if the trial court determines that the petitioner's claims are meritorious and if the potential complexity of the hearing warrants the appointment of counsel and concluding tha 1964Additionally, the trial court may, in its discretion, "adopt any appropriate means for inquiry * * * in order to ascertain all possible grounds upon which the prisoner might claim * * relief." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 22 , 83 S.Ct. at 1081 (1963), cited approvingly in State v. Weeks, supra; Webster v. State, Fla.App. 1963, 156 So.2d 890 and Sampson v. State, supra. In the instant case, Dixon based his claim for relief on a theory of denial of the right to counsel.	1	2
O'Connor v. Stategreen · 1860 · cited in 2 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1974–1982 2 sentences 1982O’Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 228-29 (1860); Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768 (1889); Walden v. State, 319 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Shelby v. State, 301 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Knee v. State, 294 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Kennick v. State, 107 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.350; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.310. 1974It has been held in this state that `it was the right of the prisoner to retract his acceptance and object to a juror at any time before he is sworn in chief.' O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215 .	1	2
Harris v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025Harris v. State, 133 So. 3d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). 5 Circuit Courts.	1	1
Salser v. Stategreen fladistctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 1 sentence 2004See also Salser v. State, 792 So.2d 693 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Fla. R.Crim.	1	1
Ford v. Wainwrightgreen scotus · 1986 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997These difficulties, together with the fact that the issue arises only after conviction and sentencing, convince me that the Due Process Clause imposes few requirements on the States in this context. 477 U.S. at 429 , 106 S.Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 1997These difficulties, together with the fact that the issue arises only after conviction and sentencing, convince me that the Due Process Clause imposes few requirements on the States in this context. 477 U.S. at 429 , 106 S.Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).	1	1
Lanza v. New Yorkgreen scotus · 1962 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1977–1977 2 sentences 1977See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 , 82 S.Ct. 1218 , 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (dictum); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). 1977See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 , 82 S.Ct. 1218 , 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (dictum); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

Case	Negative	Cited
Graham v. Stategreen fla · 1979 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 1 sentence 2000But see Graham v. State, 372 So.2d 1363 (Fla.1979) (holding that due process dictates appointment of counsel in certain postconviction proceedings).	1	1

Also cited on this issue (16)

Case	Cited	Years
Ex Parte Elvin E. Jeffcoat neutral fla · 1933 2 sentences 1988The word "arraign" means to call a prisoner to the bar of the court to answer the matters charged upon him in an indictment Ex Parte Jeffcoat, 109 Fla. 207 , 146 So. 827 (1933). 1988The word "arraign" means to call a prisoner to the bar of the court to answer the matters charged upon him in an indictment Ex Parte Jeffcoat, 109 Fla. 207 , 146 So. 827 (1933).	1	1988–1988
Thacker v. State neutral fladistctapp · 1966 1 sentence 1983Regardless, Thacker v. State, 185 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Walker v. State, 284 So.2d 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); and McCrae v. State, 400 So.2d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), have held that it is fundamentally necessary for a defendant to be present when being resen-tenced.	1	1983–1983
Walker v. State green fladistctapp · 1973 1 sentence 1983Regardless, Thacker v. State, 185 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Walker v. State, 284 So.2d 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); and McCrae v. State, 400 So.2d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), have held that it is fundamentally necessary for a defendant to be present when being resen-tenced.	1	1983–1983
McCrae v. State green fladistctapp · 1981 1 sentence 1983Regardless, Thacker v. State, 185 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Walker v. State, 284 So.2d 415 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); and McCrae v. State, 400 So.2d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), have held that it is fundamentally necessary for a defendant to be present when being resen-tenced.	1	1983–1983
Walden v. State green fladistctapp · 1975 1 sentence 1982O’Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 228-29 (1860); Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768 (1889); Walden v. State, 319 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Shelby v. State, 301 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Knee v. State, 294 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Kennick v. State, 107 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.350; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.310.	1	1982–1982
Knee v. State green fladistctapp · 1974 1 sentence 1982O’Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 228-29 (1860); Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768 (1889); Walden v. State, 319 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Shelby v. State, 301 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Knee v. State, 294 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Kennick v. State, 107 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.350; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.310.	1	1982–1982
Kennick v. State green fladistctapp · 1958 1 sentence 1982O’Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 228-29 (1860); Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768 (1889); Walden v. State, 319 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Shelby v. State, 301 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Knee v. State, 294 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Kennick v. State, 107 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.350; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.310.	1	1982–1982
Shelby v. State green fladistctapp · 1974 1 sentence 1982O’Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 228-29 (1860); Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768 (1889); Walden v. State, 319 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Shelby v. State, 301 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Knee v. State, 294 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Kennick v. State, 107 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.350; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.310.	1	1982–1982
Ellis v. State green fla · 1889 1 sentence 1982O’Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, 228-29 (1860); Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768 (1889); Walden v. State, 319 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Shelby v. State, 301 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Knee v. State, 294 So.2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Kennick v. State, 107 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.350; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.310.	1	1982–1982
Wolff v. McDonnell green scotus · 1974 2 sentences 1977See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 , 82 S.Ct. 1218 , 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (dictum); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). 1977See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 , 82 S.Ct. 1218 , 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (dictum); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S.Ct. 2963 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).	1	1977–1977
Mann v. State green fla · 1887 1 sentence 1974There, the Supreme Court adopted the doctrine as laid down in Virginia in the case of Hendrick v. Com., 5 Leigh 707 , and quoted from the Virginia court as follows: "... this Court is unanimously of opinion that the right of a prisoner to challenge any juror peremptorily is absolute at any time before the juror is sworn, and that no circumstances can bring that right within the discretion of the court so long as it is confined to the number of peremptory challenges allowed by law." The Florida Supreme Court in O'Connor then went on to say: "Holding this ruling of the General Court of Virginia	1	1974–1974
King v. State green fladistctapp · 1963 1 sentence 1969The rule itself provides: “A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring production of the prisoner at the hearing.” In King v. State, Fla.App.1963, 157 So.2d 440 , we pointed out that the prisoner should only be returned for his testimony at a hearing when there are substantial issues of fact as to events in which the prisoner participated.	1	1969–1969
Webster v. State green fladistctapp · 1963 1 sentence 1964Additionally, the trial court may, in its discretion, "adopt any appropriate means for inquiry * * * in order to ascertain all possible grounds upon which the prisoner might claim * * relief." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 22 , 83 S.Ct. at 1081 (1963), cited approvingly in State v. Weeks, supra; Webster v. State, Fla.App. 1963, 156 So.2d 890 and Sampson v. State, supra. In the instant case, Dixon based his claim for relief on a theory of denial of the right to counsel.	1	1964–1964
Hyatt v. People Ex Rel. Corkran green scotus · 1903 1 sentence 1926Hyatt v. State of New York, 188 U. S. 691 ; 47 Law.	1	1926–1926
Beauchamp v. State green · 1842 1 sentence 1887The State, 6 Blackf., 299 , the court held that after three jurors had been accepted by the prisoner it was not error to allow the State to challenge one of the three, saying that “ either party may challenge at any time between the appearance and the-swearing of the jury.” The only case we find seeming to conflict with this rule is Horbach vs.	1	1887–1887
Horbach v. State green tex · 1875 1 sentence 1887The State, 43 Texas, 242 , in which it was-held to be error to permit the District Attorney to challenge jurors after the State' had passed upon them.	1	1887–1887

Where else courts name it

CA 23 (1944–2025) FL 21 (1887–2025) KS 21 (1966–2026) PA 18 (1928–2020) NC 16 (1875–2024) MI 15 (1894–2025) GA 15 (1906–2021) MO 15 (1881–2002) MT 14 (2022–2024) OR 14 (1953–2025) NY 13 (1867–2012) IL 11 (1921–2022) MS 9 (1962–2012) VA 9 (1984–2026) MA 8 (1935–2012) CT 8 (1962–2024) WA 7 (1955–2010) MD 6 (1943–2001) TN 6 (1964–2008) AL 6 (1872–2000) AR 5 (1972–2024) NJ 5 (1951–2016) NM 5 (1964–1997) OH 4 (1922–2014) DE 4 (1942–1990) OK 4 (1925–2011) UT 4 (1997–2025) DC 4 (1988–2004) HI 4 (2000–2014) AZ 3 (1960–1968) NE 3 (1899–2024) WY 3 (1954–1986) RI 3 (1904–2018) NV 2 (1969–1998) AK 2 (1984–2025) IA 2 (1913–2013) SC 2 (1993–2002) TX 2 (1920–2025) ME 2 (1976–1978)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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