prisoner bar in Oregon

2024As Mr. Justice Cardozo had occasion to remark, a state rule of law ‘does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at bar.’ ” Id. at 563-64 (quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105 , 54 S Ct 330 , 78 L Ed 674 (1934)).

2024As Mr. Justice Cardozo had occasion to remark, a state rule of law ‘does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at bar.’ ” Id. at 563-64 (quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105 , 54 S Ct 330 , 78 L Ed 674 (1934)).

2015Relying on that passage in Cooke, we concluded in Smith that “the ability to subpoena witnesses is not a requirement for a constitutionally adequate parole consideration hearing under ORS 144.228,” which is a statute that provides for periodic parole review for “dangerous offenders.” Smith, 268 Or App at 469 ; see also Atkinson v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 382 , 390 n 9, 143 P3d 538 (2006) (“Even assuming that some due process requirements were applicable to the board [for a murder-review hearing under ORS 163.105 (1983)], the United States Supreme Court has held that parole release hearing proc

2015Relying on that passage in Cooke, we concluded in Smith that “the ability to subpoena witnesses is not a requirement for a constitutionally adequate parole consideration hearing under ORS 144.228,” which is a statute that provides for periodic parole review for “dangerous offenders.” Smith, 268 Or App at 469 ; see also Atkinson v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 382 , 390 n 9, 143 P3d 538 (2006) (“Even assuming that some due process requirements were applicable to the board [for a murder-review hearing under ORS 163.105 (1983)], the United States Supreme Court has held that parole release hearing proc

2015Relying on that passage in Cooke, we concluded in Smith that “the ability to subpoena witnesses is not a requirement for a constitutionally adequate parole consideration hearing under ORS 144.228,” which is a statute that provides for periodic parole review for “dangerous offenders.” Smith, 268 Or App at 469 ; see also Atkinson v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 382 , 390 n 9, 143 P3d 538 (2006) (“Even assuming that some due process requirements were applicable to the board [for a murder-review hearing under ORS 163.105 (1983)], the United States Supreme Court has held that parole release hearing proc

2001"The Due Process Clause does not, however, require a State to adopt one procedure over another on the basis that it may produce results more favorable to the accused." Medina, 505 U.S. at 451 , 112 S.Ct. 2572 . [9] The dissent also finds support for its rationale in a statement in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 , 114 S.Ct. 2331 , 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994), that an abrogation of a well-established common law against the arbitrary deprivations of property raises a presumption of a due process violation.

2001"The Due Process Clause does not, however, require a State to adopt one procedure over another on the basis that it may produce results more favorable to the accused." Medina, 505 U.S. at 451 , 112 S.Ct. 2572 . [9] The dissent also finds support for its rationale in a statement in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 , 114 S.Ct. 2331 , 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994), that an abrogation of a well-established common law against the arbitrary deprivations of property raises a presumption of a due process violation.

2001"The Due Process Clause does not, however, require a State to adopt one procedure over another on the basis that it may produce results more favorable to the accused." Medina, 505 U.S. at 451 , 112 S.Ct. 2572 . [9] The dissent also finds support for its rationale in a statement in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 , 114 S.Ct. 2331 , 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994), that an abrogation of a well-established common law against the arbitrary deprivations of property raises a presumption of a due process violation.

2001"The Due Process Clause does not, however, require a State to adopt one procedure over another on the basis that it may produce results more favorable to the accused." Medina, 505 U.S. at 451 , 112 S.Ct. 2572 . [9] The dissent also finds support for its rationale in a statement in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 , 114 S.Ct. 2331 , 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994), that an abrogation of a well-established common law against the arbitrary deprivations of property raises a presumption of a due process violation.

1998As Mr. Justice Cardozo had occasion to remark, a state rule of law `does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at bar. '" Id. at 564 , 87 S.Ct. 648 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1933) (emphasis supplied)).

1998As Mr. Justice Cardozo had occasion to remark, a state rule of law `does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at bar. '" Id. at 564 , 87 S.Ct. 648 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1933) (emphasis supplied)).

1996Interpretations of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause and habeas corpus jurisprudence have evolved, however, so that now a prisoner may challenge circumstances that do not reach the severity of "a lingering death" or "barbarity." See, e.g., ORS 34.362 (authorizing challenges on ground of conditions of confinement or deprivation of rights while confined); Bedell v. Schiedler, 307 Or. 562 , 770 P.2d 909 (1989) (challenging conditions of confinement); Penrod/Brown v. Cupp, 283 Or. 21 , 581 P.2d 934 (1978) ( pre ORS 34.362: habeas corpus is available to challenge alleged deprivations of pr

1996Interpretations of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause and habeas corpus jurisprudence have evolved, however, so that now a prisoner may challenge circumstances that do not reach the severity of "a lingering death" or "barbarity." See, e.g., ORS 34.362 (authorizing challenges on ground of conditions of confinement or deprivation of rights while confined); Bedell v. Schiedler, 307 Or. 562 , 770 P.2d 909 (1989) (challenging conditions of confinement); Penrod/Brown v. Cupp, 283 Or. 21 , 581 P.2d 934 (1978) ( pre ORS 34.362: habeas corpus is available to challenge alleged deprivations of pr

1996Interpretations of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause and habeas corpus jurisprudence have evolved, however, so that now a prisoner may challenge circumstances that do not reach the severity of "a lingering death" or "barbarity." See, e.g., ORS 34.362 (authorizing challenges on ground of conditions of confinement or deprivation of rights while confined); Bedell v. Schiedler, 307 Or. 562 , 770 P.2d 909 (1989) (challenging conditions of confinement); Penrod/Brown v. Cupp, 283 Or. 21 , 581 P.2d 934 (1978) ( pre ORS 34.362: habeas corpus is available to challenge alleged deprivations of pr

1996Interpretations of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause and habeas corpus jurisprudence have evolved, however, so that now a prisoner may challenge circumstances that do not reach the severity of "a lingering death" or "barbarity." See, e.g., ORS 34.362 (authorizing challenges on ground of conditions of confinement or deprivation of rights while confined); Bedell v. Schiedler, 307 Or. 562 , 770 P.2d 909 (1989) (challenging conditions of confinement); Penrod/Brown v. Cupp, 283 Or. 21 , 581 P.2d 934 (1978) ( pre ORS 34.362: habeas corpus is available to challenge alleged deprivations of pr

1988State v. Shumway, 291 Or 153 , 630 P2d 796 (1981). 1 In this context, “allocution” refers to a convicted defendant’s opportunity to speak before sentencing, although historically the “allocution” referred specifically to the judge’s solemn question to the prisoner at the bar whether the prisoner knew any reason why judgment should not be pronounced upon her.

1988State v. Shumway, 291 Or 153 , 630 P2d 796 (1981). 1 In this context, “allocution” refers to a convicted defendant’s opportunity to speak before sentencing, although historically the “allocution” referred specifically to the judge’s solemn question to the prisoner at the bar whether the prisoner knew any reason why judgment should not be pronounced upon her.

1953To the same effect see Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US 519 , 96 L ed 541; Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 US 254 , 66 L ed 607; Wall v. Hudspeth, 108 F2d 865; United States v. Farrell, 87 F2d 957; State v. Long, 195 Or 81 , 244 P2d 1033 .

1953To the same effect see Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US 519 , 96 L ed 541; Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 US 254 , 66 L ed 607; Wall v. Hudspeth, 108 F2d 865; United States v. Farrell, 87 F2d 957; State v. Long, 195 Or 81 , 244 P2d 1033 .

1953To the same effect see Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US 519 , 96 L ed 541; Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 US 254 , 66 L ed 607; Wall v. Hudspeth, 108 F2d 865; United States v. Farrell, 87 F2d 957; State v. Long, 195 Or 81 , 244 P2d 1033 .

1953To the same effect see Frisbie v. Collins, 342 US 519 , 96 L ed 541; Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 US 254 , 66 L ed 607; Wall v. Hudspeth, 108 F2d 865; United States v. Farrell, 87 F2d 957; State v. Long, 195 Or 81 , 244 P2d 1033 .