Barker v. Wingo factors in Georgia

2010See also Bowling v. State, 285 Ga. 43 (1) (a) ( 673 SE2d 194 ) (2009); Jones v. State, supra, 284 Ga. at 323 ; Williams v. State, 282 Ga. 561 (4) ( 651 SE2d 674 ) (2007). 3 A criminal defendant “cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 652 (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992). 4 “[T]he length of delay that will provoke [the inquiry into the Barker v. Wingo factors] is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. . . . [T]he delay that can b

2001See Doggett v. United States, supra (as the delay approaches one year, it generally is “presumptively prejudicial,” requiring an examination of the Barker v. Wingo factors).

2010(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 731 (1) ( 438 SE2d 626 ) (1994). [I]n a case implicating the defendant’s right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is essential for the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the Barker v. Wingo factors outlined herein.

2010(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 731 (1) ( 438 SE2d 626 ) (1994). [I]n a case implicating the defendant’s right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is essential for the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the Barker v. Wingo factors outlined herein.

2015See State v. Alexander, 295 Ga. 154, 160 (2) (d) ( 758 SE2d 289 ) (2014); Jenkins v. State, 294 Ga. 506, 512-513 (2) (b) (4) ( 755 SE2d 138 ) (2014).

2015See State v. Alexander, 295 Ga. 154, 160 (2) (d) ( 758 SE2d 289 ) (2014); Jenkins v. State, 294 Ga. 506, 512-513 (2) (b) (4) ( 755 SE2d 138 ) (2014).

2015See State v. Alexander, 295 Ga. 154, 160 (2) (d) ( 758 SE2d 289 ) (2014); Jenkins v. State, 294 Ga. 506, 512-513 (2) (b) (4) ( 755 SE2d 138 ) (2014).

2015See State v. Alexander, 295 Ga. 154, 160 (2) (d) ( 758 SE2d 289 ) (2014); Jenkins v. State, 294 Ga. 506, 512-513 (2) (b) (4) ( 755 SE2d 138 ) (2014).

2011Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 55 (2) ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008).

2011Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 55 (2) ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008). 1.

2009See Bryant v. State, 265 Ga. App. 234, 236 ( 593 SE2d 705 ) (2004) (“[I]t is essential for the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the Barker v. Wingo factors.”).

2009See Bryant v. State, 265 Ga. App. 234, 236 ( 593 SE2d 705 ) (2004) (“[I]t is essential for the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the Barker v. Wingo factors.”).

2010See also Bowling v. State, 285 Ga. 43 (1) (a) ( 673 SE2d 194 ) (2009); Jones v. State, supra, 284 Ga. at 323 ; Williams v. State, 282 Ga. 561 (4) ( 651 SE2d 674 ) (2007). 3 A criminal defendant “cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 652 (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992). 4 “[T]he length of delay that will provoke [the inquiry into the Barker v. Wingo factors] is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. . . . [T]he delay that can b

2010See also Bowling v. State, 285 Ga. 43 (1) (a) ( 673 SE2d 194 ) (2009); Jones v. State, supra, 284 Ga. at 323 ; Williams v. State, 282 Ga. 561 (4) ( 651 SE2d 674 ) (2007). 3 A criminal defendant “cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 652 (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992). 4 “[T]he length of delay that will provoke [the inquiry into the Barker v. Wingo factors] is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. . . . [T]he delay that can b

2010Layman v. State, 284 Ga. 83 , 663 S.E.2d 169 (2008).

2010Layman v. State, 284 Ga. 83 , 663 S.E.2d 169 (2008).

2024See Veal, 301 Ga. at 168. 10 testified at the motion hearing that he is right-handed and that “[r]oughly a week” before the shootings, he broke his right hand in multiple places in a motorcycle accident.

2024See Veal, 301 Ga. at 168 (3). 10 the tips of his fingers to his elbow, except for his thumb.

2015Cf. Sosniak, 292 Ga. at 38 (2) (“[Pjretrial denial of a speedy trial claim can never be considered a complete, formal, and final rejection by the trial court of the defendant’s contention; rather, the question at stake in the motion to dismiss necessarily remains open, unfinished and inconclusive until the trial court has pronounced judgment.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 29 As a general rule, “[t]he constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches either at the time of the defendant’s arrest or at the time of his indictment, whichever occurs earlier,” and “[a] delay of more than one ye

2015Cf. Sosniak, 292 Ga. at 38 (2) (“[Pjretrial denial of a speedy trial claim can never be considered a complete, formal, and final rejection by the trial court of the defendant’s contention; rather, the question at stake in the motion to dismiss necessarily remains open, unfinished and inconclusive until the trial court has pronounced judgment.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 29 As a general rule, “[t]he constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches either at the time of the defendant’s arrest or at the time of his indictment, whichever occurs earlier,” and “[a] delay of more than one ye

2015Cf. Sosniak, 292 Ga. at 38 (2) (“[Pjretrial denial of a speedy trial claim can never be considered a complete, formal, and final rejection by the trial court of the defendant’s contention; rather, the question at stake in the motion to dismiss necessarily remains open, unfinished and inconclusive until the trial court has pronounced judgment.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 29 As a general rule, “[t]he constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches either at the time of the defendant’s arrest or at the time of his indictment, whichever occurs earlier,” and “[a] delay of more than one ye

2015Cf. Sosniak, 292 Ga. at 38 (2) (“[Pjretrial denial of a speedy trial claim can never be considered a complete, formal, and final rejection by the trial court of the defendant’s contention; rather, the question at stake in the motion to dismiss necessarily remains open, unfinished and inconclusive until the trial court has pronounced judgment.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 29 As a general rule, “[t]he constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches either at the time of the defendant’s arrest or at the time of his indictment, whichever occurs earlier,” and “[a] delay of more than one ye

2015Cf. Sosniak, 292 Ga. at 38 (2) (“[Pjretrial denial of a speedy trial claim can never be considered a complete, formal, and final rejection by the trial court of the defendant’s contention; rather, the question at stake in the motion to dismiss necessarily remains open, unfinished and inconclusive until the trial court has pronounced judgment.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 29 As a general rule, “[t]he constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches either at the time of the defendant’s arrest or at the time of his indictment, whichever occurs earlier,” and “[a] delay of more than one ye

2015Cf. Sosniak, 292 Ga. at 38 (2) (“[Pjretrial denial of a speedy trial claim can never be considered a complete, formal, and final rejection by the trial court of the defendant’s contention; rather, the question at stake in the motion to dismiss necessarily remains open, unfinished and inconclusive until the trial court has pronounced judgment.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 29 As a general rule, “[t]he constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches either at the time of the defendant’s arrest or at the time of his indictment, whichever occurs earlier,” and “[a] delay of more than one ye

2010See, e.g., Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. 446, 447 ( 689 SE2d 283 ) (2010); Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 106, 109-110 ( 610 SE2d 32 ) (2005).

2010See, e.g., Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. 446, 447 ( 689 SE2d 283 ) (2010); Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 106, 109-110 ( 610 SE2d 32 ) (2005).

2010See, e.g., Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. 446, 447 ( 689 SE2d 283 ) (2010); Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 106, 109-110 ( 610 SE2d 32 ) (2005).

2010See, e.g., Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. 446, 447 ( 689 SE2d 283 ) (2010); Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 106, 109-110 ( 610 SE2d 32 ) (2005).

2008With these four Barker v. Wingo factors in mind, “[t]he question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that [Appellees’] speedy trial rights were violated. [Cit.]” State v. Redding, 274 Ga. 831, 832 ( 561 SE2d 79 ) (2002). (a) Length of the delay.

2008With these four Barker v. Wingo factors in mind, “[t]he question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that [Appellees’] speedy trial rights were violated. [Cit.]” State v. Redding, 274 Ga. 831, 832 ( 561 SE2d 79 ) (2002). (a) Length of the delay.

2006We note that the length of the delay, in addition to being considered separately, is factored into the prejudice prong of the Barker v. Wingo analysis, and “the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies] over time.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Scandrett v. State, 279 Ga. at 633 (1) (a).

2006Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 652, n. 1 (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992); Williams v. State, 277 Ga. at 601 (1); Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 732 ( 438 SE2d 626 ) (1994).