criminal proceeding error (Georgia) · Go Syfert
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criminal proceeding error in Georgia

21 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2022 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Strickland v. Washingtongreen
scotus · 1984 · cited in 11 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1986–2022
2 sentences

2022See Morris v. State, 308 Ga. 520, 24 531 (6) (842 SE2d 45) (2020); see also Weaver, 137 SCt at 1915 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A]n attorney’s error ‘does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 691)).

2022See Morris v. State, 308 Ga. 520, 531 (6) ( 842 SE2d 45 ) (2020); see also Weaver, 137 SCt at 1915 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A]n attorney’s error ‘does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 691 (III) (B))).

711
Goodwin v. Cruz-Padillogreen
ga · 1995 · cited in 6 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1996–2006
2 sentences

2006Applying the Strickland standard, we find that, however unprofessional defense counsel’s conduct might be, nothing in the record suggests that but for this isolated incident the outcome of the proceeding would have been different, as an “ ‘error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’ [Cit.]” Goodwin v. Cruz-Padillo, 265 Ga. 614, 615 ( 458 SE2d 623 ) (1995).

2006Applying the Strickland standard, we find that, however unprofessional defense counsel’s conduct might be, nothing in the record suggests that but for this isolated incident the outcome of the proceeding would have been different, as an “ ‘error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’ [Cit.]” Goodwin v. Cruz-Padillo, 265 Ga. 614, 615 ( 458 SE2d 623 ) (1995).

66
Hammond v. Stategreen
ga · 1995 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1999–2019
2 sentences

2019According to the Appellant’s brief and the trial transcript, the prosecutor’s actual statement at issue is as follows: Whitmore “testified that if [she] didn’t find anything in the interview of the child, [she] would suggest that the case not go 33 See Hammond v. State, 264 Ga. 879, 880 (1) ( 452 SE2d 745 ) (1995) (“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 20 forward.” The Appellant’s characterization of this statement, however,

2019According to the Appellant’s brief and the trial transcript, the prosecutor’s actual statement at issue is as follows: Whitmore “testified that if [she] didn’t find anything in the interview of the child, [she] would suggest that the case not go 33 See Hammond v. State, 264 Ga. 879, 880 (1) ( 452 SE2d 745 ) (1995) (“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 20 forward.” The Appellant’s characterization of this statement, however,

33
Weaver v. Massachusettsgreen
scotus · 2017 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022See Morris v. State, 308 Ga. 520, 24 531 (6) (842 SE2d 45) (2020); see also Weaver, 137 SCt at 1915 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A]n attorney’s error ‘does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 691)).

2022See Morris v. State, 308 Ga. 520, 531 (6) ( 842 SE2d 45 ) (2020); see also Weaver, 137 SCt at 1915 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A]n attorney’s error ‘does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 691 (III) (B))).

11
Morris v. Stategreen
ga · 2020 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
2 sentences

2022See Morris v. State, 308 Ga. 520, 24 531 (6) (842 SE2d 45) (2020); see also Weaver, 137 SCt at 1915 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A]n attorney’s error ‘does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 691)).

2022See Morris v. State, 308 Ga. 520, 24 531 (6) (842 SE2d 45) (2020); see also Weaver, 137 SCt at 1915 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[A]n attorney’s error ‘does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 691)).

11
Taylor v. Stategreen
gactapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Taylor, 301 Ga. App. at 106 (citation and punctuation omitted).

11
CRUSSELLE v. Stategreen
gactapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019Because the appellant failed to proffer the evidence at issue and show that it would have been relevant and favorable to his defense, he was unable to meet his burden of showing prejudice, i.e., that, but for his attorney's failure to present such evidence at trial, there was a reasonable probability that the results of his trial would have been different.). 35 See Hammond v. State , 264 Ga. 879 , 880 (1), 452 S.E.2d 745 (1995) ("An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgm

2019Because the appellant failed to proffer the evidence at issue and show that it would have been relevant and favorable to his defense, he was unable to meet his burden of showing prejudice, i.e., that, but for his attorney's failure to present such evidence at trial, there was a reasonable probability that the results of his trial would have been different.). 35 See Hammond v. State , 264 Ga. 879 , 880 (1), 452 S.E.2d 745 (1995) ("An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgm

11
Woodall v. Stategreen
gactapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006McGruder must therefore show that “a reasonable probability existed that the result of his trial would have been different, but for his defense counsel’s unprofessional deficiencies.” Woodall v. State, 261 Ga. App. 213,214 (582 SE2d466) (2003).

11
Lockhart v. Fretwellgreen
scotus · 1993 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000Moreover, even assuming that the habeas court had made a proper determination as to the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, Bennett still would not be entitled to relief unless he also made a sufficient showing as to the prejudice prong. “ An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’ [Cit.]” Goodwin v. Cruz-Padillo, 265 Ga. 614, 615 ( 458 SE2d 623 ) (1995). “[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the procee

2000Moreover, even assuming that the habeas court had made a proper determination as to the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, Bennett still would not be entitled to relief unless he also made a sufficient showing as to the prejudice prong. "`An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.' [Cit.]" Goodwin v. Cruz-Padillo, 265 Ga. 614, 615 , 458 S.E.2d 623 (1995). "[A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the procee

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
Thomas v. State green
gactapp · 2007
2 sentences

2008“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” (Punctuation omitted.) Thomas v. State, 288 Ga. App. 827 ( 655 SE2d 701 ) (2007), citing Strickland, 466 U. S. at 691 (III) (B).

2008“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” (Punctuation omitted.) Thomas v. State, 288 Ga. App. 827 ( 655 SE2d 701 ) (2007), citing Strickland, 466 U. S. at 691 (III) (B).

12008–2008
Duncan v. State green
ga · 1919
2 sentences

1962The case of Duncan v. State, 149 Ga. 195 ( 99 SE 612 ), where the court held the record of acquittal of the criminal charge of illegal possession of liquor seized in an automobile was admissible in proceedings to forfeit the automobile is distinguishable, for there the criminal and civil proceedings were between the same parties, the State, and the defendant.

1962The case of Duncan v. State, 149 Ga. 195 ( 99 SE 612 ), where the court held the record of acquittal of the criminal charge of illegal possession of liquor seized in an automobile was admissible in proceedings to forfeit the automobile is distinguishable, for there the criminal and civil proceedings were between the same parties, the State, and the defendant.

11962–1962

Statutes the citing opinions construe

GA § 16-6-4 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

OH 214 (1989–2026) TN 59 (1999–2022) IL 59 (1977–2026) TX 23 (1984–2022) GA 21 (1962–2022) AL 19 (1984–2013) UT 19 (2007–2026) NJ 19 (1952–2025) LA 18 (1986–2025) NY 16 (1957–2024) MO 12 (1989–2021) MI 11 (1973–2026) WA 10 (1994–2024) MD 9 (1975–2020) CT 8 (1991–2024) FL 8 (1978–2009) PA 7 (1974–2016) CA 7 (1975–2025) VA 6 (1988–2014) IA 6 (1985–2017) ID 6 (1992–2024) SD 5 (1988–2023) WV 5 (2010–2021) WI 4 (1994–2019) OR 4 (1985–2001) MT 4 (2001–2019) KY 4 (2008–2025) CO 4 (1981–2025) SC 4 (2010–2016) DE 4 (2011–2021) NE 3 (1984–1995) MS 3 (1986–2001) OK 2 (1984–2006) AZ 2 (1984–1984) DC 2 (2001–2004) MA 2 (1992–2014) ME 2 (1997–2001) NV 2 (1993–1996) RI 2 (1993–2010)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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