expedited hearing in Illinois

2017App. 3d 348 , 612 N.E.2d 45 (1993), this court remanded the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an expedited hearing in accordance with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

2017App. 3d 348 , 612 N.E.2d 45 (1993), this court remanded the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an expedited hearing in accordance with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

2017App. 3d 348 , 612 N.E.2d 45 (1993), this court remanded the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an expedited hearing in accordance with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

2017App. 3d 348 , 612 N.E.2d 45 (1993), this court remanded the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting an expedited hearing in accordance with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

2017The Timeline on Remand ¶ 111 As we noted in Kuerth, 2016 IL App (4th) 150519, ¶ 177 , 69 N.E.3d 287 , the appellate court, in other contexts, has remanded a cause to conduct an expedited hearing on a limited issue and imposed specific directions regarding when the trial court was expected to accomplish the appellate court’s direction.

2017The Timeline on Remand ¶ 144 As we noted in Kuerth, 2016 IL App (4th) 150519, ¶ 177 , 69 N.E.3d 287 , the ap- pellate court, in other contexts, has remanded a cause to conduct an expedited hearing on a lim- ited issue and imposed specific directions regarding when the trial court was expected to accom- plish the appellate court’s direction.

2021Jones, 177 Ill.

2021Jones, 177 Ill.

2020“Expedited hearings shall have priority over all other petitions and shall be heard by the Arbitrator and Commission with all convenient speed.” Id.

2019“Expedited hearings shall have priority over all other petitions and shall be heard by the Arbitrator and Commission with all convenient speed.” Id.

1994The court refrained from ruling on the merits until it first determined standing at the January 11 hearing (see McCuan, 176 Ill.App.3d at 425 , 125 Ill.Dec. 923 , 531 N.E.2d 102 ), and then entered the order on February 8, 1994 to grant permanent custody to petitioner based upon the evidence presented at the hearing which it considered "more than sufficient to justify an award of custody to [petitioner]." Respondent further maintains the court improperly entered the order without serving parties not yet before the court who had colorable rights at issue ( i.e., "unknown fathers") pursuant to s

1994The court refrained from ruling on the merits until it first determined standing at the January 11 hearing (see McCuan, 176 Ill.

2021Although a party generally may not supplement the record on appeal by appending documents to its brief (Scepurek v. Board of Trustees of Northbrook Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 2014 IL App (1st) 131066, ¶ 2 ), we may take judicial notice of public records, such as these documents from the Illinois Secretary of State (Maldonado v. Creative Woodworking Concepts, Inc., 296 Ill.

2012We, thus, found that “[w]here there has been an apparent failure to conduct the proper Batson analysis, we are required to ‘remand this cause to the trial court for an expedited hearing for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct the proper Batson analysis.’ ” Id. ¶ 45 (quoting People v. Martinez, 317 Ill.

1991Finally, the statute which compelled the decision in Kaplan was in existence prior to the time claimant in this case requested a section 19(b-1) hearing. *43 While litigants are bound by rules of waiver, the courts are not similarly barred when it may be proper to override them to achieve a just result or maintain a uniform body of precedent in cases of public importance. ( Diversified Computer Services, Inc. v. Town of York (1982), 104 Ill.App.3d 852, 855 , 60 Ill.Dec. 684 , 433 N.E.2d 726 .) We are of the opinion that courts are similarly not bound by the corollary to the rule of waiver unde

1991Finally, the statute which compelled the decision in Kaplan was in existence prior to the time claimant in this case requested a section 19(b-1) hearing. *43 While litigants are bound by rules of waiver, the courts are not similarly barred when it may be proper to override them to achieve a just result or maintain a uniform body of precedent in cases of public importance. ( Diversified Computer Services, Inc. v. Town of York (1982), 104 Ill.App.3d 852, 855 , 60 Ill.Dec. 684 , 433 N.E.2d 726 .) We are of the opinion that courts are similarly not bound by the corollary to the rule of waiver unde

1991The Hooper court stated: “If the [trial] court finds that a prima facie showing of such discrimination has been made, the court is directed to determine whether or not there is a neutral explanation by the State for the exercise of the questioned peremptory challenges.” Hooper, 118 Ill. 2d at 244 .

1987Contrary to Justice Simon’s dissent, People v. Mack (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 103 , does not characterize “claims of systematic racially discriminatory jury selection as ‘emotional arguments.’ ” I authored the Mack opinion and find the language of the dissent to which I refer to be an unfair and incorrect construction of the language used in Mack.

1987Contrary to Justice Simon's dissent, People v. Mack (1985), 105 Ill.2d 103 , does not characterize "claims of systematic racially discriminatory jury selection as `emotional arguments.'" I authored the Mack opinion and find the language of the dissent to which I refer to be an unfair and incorrect construction of the language used in Mack .

1978App. 2d 67 , 225 N.E.2d 698 .) Since the record in this case is now stale, we remand this cause to the circuit court of Madison County for a new and expedited hearing for the sole purpose of evaluating the status of the children at this time.