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19 California opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Millardgreen2 sentences2023However, as explained in Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th 7 , “the primary purpose of a victim restitution hearing is to allow the People to prosecute an expedited hearing before a trial court to provide a victim with a civil remedy for economic losses suffered, and not to punish the defendant for his or her crime. 2023However, as explained in Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th 7 , “the primary purpose of a victim restitution hearing is to allow the People to prosecute an expedited hearing before a trial court to provide a victim with a civil remedy for economic losses suffered, and not to punish the defendant for his or her crime. | 4 | 9 |
People v. Harvestgreen2 sentences2023It is not increased “punishment.” ’ ” (People v. Foalima (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1398 (Foalima); see People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 649 [Legislature intended victim restitution as a civil remedy rather than criminal punishment]; see also People v. Smalling (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 11, fn. 10 [denial of victim restitution not harmless because “ ‘[T]he primary purpose of a victim restitution hearing is to allow the People to prosecute an expedited hearing before a trial court to provide a victim with a civil remedy for economic losses suffered….’ [Citation.] This objecti 2015(People v. Wasbotten, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 309 ; People v. Pangan, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 585 ; People v. Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 35-36; see People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 647-650 [victim restitution is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes; "unlike a [restitution] fine, victim restitution is not expressly and statutorily defined as punishment," and it "is compensation, which does not involve an affirmative disability or restraint, and which has not historically been regarded as punishment"].) As our court explained in Millard, the "primary purp | 4 | 5 |
Q-SOFT, INC. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2019(See People v. Bufford (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 966 , 971, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 273 [although a crime victim may file a civil lawsuit against a defendant, that recourse is not an appropriate substitute for the victim's constitutional right to restitution]; accord, Q-Soft, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 441 , 447, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 687 .) 2019(See People v. Bufford (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 966 , 971, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 273 [although a crime victim may file a civil lawsuit against a defendant, that recourse is not an appropriate substitute for the victim's constitutional right to restitution]; accord, Q-Soft, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 441 , 447, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 687 .) | 2 | 2 |
People v. Chappelonegreen2 sentences2013(People v. Pangan (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574, 585 .) Victim restitution is a substitute for a civil remedy so that victims of crime do not need to file separate civil suits; it is not increased “punishment.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1184 (Chappelone); People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 35 [“the primary purpose of a victim restitution hearing is to allow the People to prosecute an expedited hearing before a trial court to provide a victim with a civil remedy for economic losses suffered, and not to punish the defendant for his or her crime”]; a 2013(People v. Pangan (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574, 585 .) Instead, victim restitution is a substitute for a civil remedy so that victims of crime do not need to file separate civil suits; it is not increased “‘punishment.’” (Ibid.; see also People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1185 ; People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 35 [“the primary purpose of a victim restitution hearing is to allow the People to prosecute an expedited hearing before a trial court to provide a victim with a civil remedy for economic losses suffered, and not to punish the defendant for his or her crime”]; ac | 2 | 2 |
People v. Pangangreen2 sentences2015(People v. Wasbotten, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 309 ; People v. Pangan, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 585 ; People v. Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 35-36; see People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 647-650 [victim restitution is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes; "unlike a [restitution] fine, victim restitution is not expressly and statutorily defined as punishment," and it "is compensation, which does not involve an affirmative disability or restraint, and which has not historically been regarded as punishment"].) As our court explained in Millard, the "primary purp 2013(People v. Pangan (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 574, 585 .) Instead, victim restitution is a substitute for a civil remedy so that victims of crime do not need to file separate civil suits; it is not increased “‘punishment.’” (Ibid.; see also People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1185 ; People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 35 [“the primary purpose of a victim restitution hearing is to allow the People to prosecute an expedited hearing before a trial court to provide a victim with a civil remedy for economic losses suffered, and not to punish the defendant for his or her crime”]; ac | 1 | 4 |
People v. Buffordgreen2 sentences2019(See People v. Bufford (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 966 , 971, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 273 [although a crime victim may file a civil lawsuit against a defendant, that recourse is not an appropriate substitute for the victim's constitutional right to restitution]; accord, Q-Soft, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 441 , 447, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 687 .) 2019(See People v. Bufford (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 966 , 971, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 273 [although a crime victim may file a civil lawsuit against a defendant, that recourse is not an appropriate substitute for the victim's constitutional right to restitution]; accord, Q-Soft, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 441 , 447, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 687 .) | 1 | 2 |
Caira v. Offnergreen1 sentence2025(Morrical, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 458 ; Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 26, fn. 8 ; see Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 .) As the parties observe here, “the meanings of the terms ‘trial’ and hearing’ can vary depending on the particular context in which they are used and can, in certain circumstances, overlap.” (Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953, 966 .) Section 709 includes both terms. | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence v. I. N. Parlier Estate Co.green1 sentence2025Parlier Estate Co. (1940) 15 Cal.2d 220, 227 [discussing predecessor statute].) Like other equitable proceedings, section 709 and the authorities from which it derives contemplate an expedited hearing or bench trial. | 1 | 1 |
Imperial County Behavioral Health Services v. Joseph W.green1 sentence2025(Morrical, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 458 ; Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 26, fn. 8 ; see Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 .) As the parties observe here, “the meanings of the terms ‘trial’ and hearing’ can vary depending on the particular context in which they are used and can, in certain circumstances, overlap.” (Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953, 966 .) Section 709 includes both terms. | 1 | 1 |
Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc.green1 sentence2025(Morrical, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 458 ; Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 26, fn. 8 ; see Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 .) As the parties observe here, “the meanings of the terms ‘trial’ and hearing’ can vary depending on the particular context in which they are used and can, in certain circumstances, overlap.” (Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953, 966 .) Section 709 includes both terms. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Foalimagreen2 sentences2023It is not increased “punishment.” ’ ” (People v. Foalima (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1398 (Foalima); see People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 649 [Legislature intended victim restitution as a civil remedy rather than criminal punishment]; see also People v. Smalling (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 11, fn. 10 [denial of victim restitution not harmless because “ ‘[T]he primary purpose of a victim restitution hearing is to allow the People to prosecute an expedited hearing before a trial court to provide a victim with a civil remedy for economic losses suffered….’ [Citation.] This objecti 2023(Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 305 .) “No abuse of discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered. ‘ “[T]he standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542 ; 9. see Foalima, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1398‒1399 [“[T]he court’s determination [of restitution] may be established by a preponderance of the evidence. | 1 | 1 |
CPF Vaseo Assocs., LLC v. Graygreen1 sentence2023(Id. at pp. 18–21; see also Gray, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1003–1004 [section 128.5, subdivision (f)’s procedural requirements should be followed to the extent they are compatible with section 128.5’s other requirements].) The court found it would not have been practical for the plaintiff to comply with the safe harbor provision considering the expedited hearing and briefing schedule that generally applies to anti- SLAPP motions. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smallinggreen1 sentence2023It is not increased “punishment.” ’ ” (People v. Foalima (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1398 (Foalima); see People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 649 [Legislature intended victim restitution as a civil remedy rather than criminal punishment]; see also People v. Smalling (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 11, fn. 10 [denial of victim restitution not harmless because “ ‘[T]he primary purpose of a victim restitution hearing is to allow the People to prosecute an expedited hearing before a trial court to provide a victim with a civil remedy for economic losses suffered….’ [Citation.] This objecti | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Quinterogreen2 sentences2013(See, e.g., Thomas, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 650, fn. 11 [under § 527.6 "there is insufficient time in which to conduct discovery"].) Moreover, we likely would not have found an abuse of discretion if the trial court had denied Brzezinski a continuance to allow for discovery—if anything, granting such a continuance might have been an abuse of discretion. 2013(See, e.g., Thomas, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 650, fn. 11 [under § 527.6 "there is insufficient time in which to conduct discovery"].) Moreover, we likely would not have found an abuse of discretion if the trial court had denied Brzezinski a continuance to allow for discovery—if anything, granting such a continuance might have been an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Haendiges
green
1 sentence2026Liberty Interests and Berch Petitioner nonetheless contends that, pursuant to Berch, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 966 , “the issuance of an order which can have the effect of placing the violator thereof in jail is not a ‘subordinate judicial duty.’” In Berch the Court of Appeal held that “revoking parole and committing a defendant to jail for violation of parole are not subordinate judicial duties that may be 4 The commissioner categorized the bail hearing as “a more expedited hearing as to whether [petitioner] poses a flight risk or a danger to public safety.” 11 performed by a commissioner in the | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Nierenberg v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2026Liberty Interests and Berch Petitioner nonetheless contends that, pursuant to Berch, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 966 , “the issuance of an order which can have the effect of placing the violator thereof in jail is not a ‘subordinate judicial duty.’” In Berch the Court of Appeal held that “revoking parole and committing a defendant to jail for violation of parole are not subordinate judicial duties that may be 4 The commissioner categorized the bail hearing as “a more expedited hearing as to whether [petitioner] poses a flight risk or a danger to public safety.” 11 performed by a commissioner in the | 1 | 2026–2026 |
In Re Plotkin
green
1 sentence2026Liberty Interests and Berch Petitioner nonetheless contends that, pursuant to Berch, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 966 , “the issuance of an order which can have the effect of placing the violator thereof in jail is not a ‘subordinate judicial duty.’” In Berch the Court of Appeal held that “revoking parole and committing a defendant to jail for violation of parole are not subordinate judicial duties that may be 4 The commissioner categorized the bail hearing as “a more expedited hearing as to whether [petitioner] poses a flight risk or a danger to public safety.” 11 performed by a commissioner in the | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Tijerina
green
1 sentence2026Liberty Interests and Berch Petitioner nonetheless contends that, pursuant to Berch, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 966 , “the issuance of an order which can have the effect of placing the violator thereof in jail is not a ‘subordinate judicial duty.’” In Berch the Court of Appeal held that “revoking parole and committing a defendant to jail for violation of parole are not subordinate judicial duties that may be 4 The commissioner categorized the bail hearing as “a more expedited hearing as to whether [petitioner] poses a flight risk or a danger to public safety.” 11 performed by a commissioner in the | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Berch
green
2 sentences2026Liberty Interests and Berch Petitioner nonetheless contends that, pursuant to Berch, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 966 , “the issuance of an order which can have the effect of placing the violator thereof in jail is not a ‘subordinate judicial duty.’” In Berch the Court of Appeal held that “revoking parole and committing a defendant to jail for violation of parole are not subordinate judicial duties that may be 4 The commissioner categorized the bail hearing as “a more expedited hearing as to whether [petitioner] poses a flight risk or a danger to public safety.” 11 performed by a commissioner in the 2026Liberty Interests and Berch Petitioner nonetheless contends that, pursuant to Berch, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 966 , “the issuance of an order which can have the effect of placing the violator thereof in jail is not a ‘subordinate judicial duty.’” In Berch the Court of Appeal held that “revoking parole and committing a defendant to jail for violation of parole are not subordinate judicial duties that may be 4 The commissioner categorized the bail hearing as “a more expedited hearing as to whether [petitioner] poses a flight risk or a danger to public safety.” 11 performed by a commissioner in the | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Morrical v. Rogers
green
1 sentence2025(Morrical, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 458 ; Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 26, fn. 8 ; see Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 .) As the parties observe here, “the meanings of the terms ‘trial’ and hearing’ can vary depending on the particular context in which they are used and can, in certain circumstances, overlap.” (Conservatorship of Joseph W. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 953, 966 .) Section 709 includes both terms. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Gemelli
green
1 sentence2023(Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 305 .) “No abuse of discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered. ‘ “[T]he standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542 ; 9. see Foalima, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1398‒1399 [“[T]he court’s determination [of restitution] may be established by a preponderance of the evidence. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Kennedy Comm'n v. City of Huntington Beach
green
1 sentence2023(Kennedy, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 848 .) The City filed its opposition to the Petition on October 29, 2015. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Luis M. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2023(Luis M. v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 300, 305 .) “No abuse of discretion will be found where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered. ‘ “[T]he standard of proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542 ; 9. see Foalima, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1398‒1399 [“[T]he court’s determination [of restitution] may be established by a preponderance of the evidence. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hester v. United States
green
1 sentence2021To the extent a victim restitution order has the secondary purposes of rehabilitation of a defendant and/or deterrence of the defendant and others from committing future crimes, those purposes do not constitute increased punishment of the defendant . . . .” (Id. at pp. 35-36.) Defendant also cites to Justice Gorsuch’s dissent (joined by Justice Sotomayor) from the United States Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Hester v. United States (2019) ___U.S.___ [ 139 S.Ct. 509 ]. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Wasbotten
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Wasbotten, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 309 ; People v. Pangan, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 585 ; People v. Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 35-36; see People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 647-650 [victim restitution is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes; "unlike a [restitution] fine, victim restitution is not expressly and statutorily defined as punishment," and it "is compensation, which does not involve an affirmative disability or restraint, and which has not historically been regarded as punishment"].) As our court explained in Millard, the "primary purp | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Brown
green
1 sentence2013(People v. Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 35–36; but compare People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1221 .) Moreover, the restitution statute itself characterizes victim restitution awards as civil (see § 1202.4, subd. (a)(3)(B) [victim restitution imposed pursuant to subdivision (f) “shall be enforceable as if the order were a civil judgment”]) and federal cases addressing the issue have likewise concluded that a restitution hearing does not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Villalobos
green
1 sentence2013(See People v. Villalobos (2012) 54 Cal.4th 177, 181 .) “[S]ection 1202.4, subdivisions (a) and (f) require every person convicted of a crime to pay restitution directly to the victim in an amount equal to the economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the defendant’s conduct. . . . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Re Marriage of Feldman
green
1 sentence2011Petitioner’s request that the Court find that Respondent Ken Davenport and his attorneys engaged in a course of conduct that was sanctionable in violation of Family Code 271, 2107 and the case of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470 is DENIED. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Costa v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
green
1 sentence2008In Costa , an electrician filed a claim for benefits with the WCAB and requested an expedited hearing because he was in “ ‘dire need of medical treatment including home care.’ ” (Costa, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1181 .) There, the court considered the constitutionality of provisions in a collective bargaining agreement that required employees to exhaust contractual grievance and arbitration procedures before exercising their constitutional right of review by the WCAB. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Sunset Drive Corp. v. City of Redlands
green
1 sentence2002We denied that motion. 5 The City does not challenge the trial court’s ruling striking the 12th cause of action. 6 Kajima did not raise this argument in either its opening or responding briefs, and, indeed, stated that submission of claims “has nothing to do with the question whether the City’s [amended] [c]ross-[c]omplaint arose out of Kajima’s commencement of this lawsuit, an indisputable exercise of the right of petition.” Although we need not address Kajima’s belated argument (see Sunset Drive Corp. v. City of Redlands, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 226 ), to avoid any unnecessary additional | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.