open and obvious doctrine in Kentucky

2023However, the Kentucky Supreme Court modified the open and obvious doctrine beginning with Kentucky River Medical Center v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385 (Ky. 2010) and its progeny.7 In McIntosh, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the position of the Restatement (Second) of Torts with respect to open and obvious conditions.

2022State Auto determined the fall was Lindsey’s fault because she missed a step, the condition of which was “open and obvious.”[3] A step does not necessarily cause 3 The open and obvious doctrine once existent under contributory negligence was abandoned in Kentucky River Medical Center v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385 (Ky. 2010).

2023That position is stated as follows: A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. . . . 7 See also Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Webb, 413 S.W.3d 891 (Ky. 2013); Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Soc’y, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901 (Ky. 2013); Carter v. Bullitt Host, LLC, 471 S.W.3d 288 (Ky. 2015); and Goodwin v. Al J.

2022As stated in Carter v. Bullitt Host, LLC, 471 S.W.3d 288, 297 (Ky. 2015), The open-and-obvious nature of a hazard is, under comparative fault, no more than a circumstance that the trier of fact can consider in assessing the fault of any party, plaintiff or defendant. [Shelton, 413 S.W.3d at 911-12 .] Under the right circumstances, the plaintiffs [sic] conduct in the face of an open-and-obvious hazard may be so clearly the only fault of his injury that summary judgment could be warranted against him, for example when a situation cannot be corrected by any means or when it is beyond dispute that

2023Belinda further argues the trial court failed to properly consider the Supreme Court’s holding in Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Society, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901 (Ky. 2013), which modified the open and obvious doctrine so that it is no longer an absolute bar to recovery from a land possessor.

2023As explained in Shelton, 413 S.W.3d at 904 , “a court no longer makes a no-duty determination but, rather, makes a no-breach determination, dismissing a claim on summary judgment or directed verdict when there is no negligence as a matter of law, the plaintiff having failed to show a breach of the applicable duty of care.” Thus, “when the open-and-obvious doctrine relieves a defendant of liability, it is not because damages are not recoverable as a matter of policy (as [is] the case -12- with contributory negligence).

2017As we noted in She`lton~, premises owners,. notwithstanding their affirmative duty to provide invitees with safe premises, generally have no duty to warn of obviously dangerous conditions because the condition serves as its own warning Shelton, 413 S.W.3d, at 914 (noting that “the open-and-obvious doctrine . . . eliminates a defendant’s duty to warn because the condition is a warning in itself.`”].

2016In Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Webb, 413 S.W.3d 891 (Ky. 2013), the Court again touched on the open and obvious doctrine, but held that the factual circumstances of that particular case did not give rise to an open and obvious danger: Simply put, the case before us does not present an open-and-obvious hazard.

2013See Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 259 Iowa 542 , 144 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Iowa 1966) (noting that an open or obvious defect might be the equivalent of a trap or pitfall simply because the possessor should be cognizant that the invitee would have no reason to anticipate it, appreciate the hazard, or guard against it). .

2013See Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 259 Iowa 542 , 144 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Iowa 1966) (noting that an open or obvious defect might be the equivalent of a trap or pitfall simply because the possessor should be cognizant that the invitee would have no reason to anticipate it, appreciate the hazard, or guard against it). .

2013"Implicit in the open and obvious doctrine, however, is the assumption that the warning provided by the open and obvious nature of the danger is by itself sufficient to relieve the property owner of its duty to protect visitors from dangerous conditions on the property.” Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 457 Mass. 368 , 930 N.E.2d 142, 151 (2010). .

2013"Implicit in the open and obvious doctrine, however, is the assumption that the warning provided by the open and obvious nature of the danger is by itself sufficient to relieve the property owner of its duty to protect visitors from dangerous conditions on the property.” Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 457 Mass. 368 , 930 N.E.2d 142, 151 (2010). .

2011Perry v. Wil liamson, 824 S.W.2d 869, 875 (Ky.1992).

2010E.g., Harrison, 768 P.2d at 1326 (stating that "[t]he open and obvious danger doctrine, born in the era ... of contributory negligence, has been abolished legislatively through the adoption of I.C. § 6-801," where that statute provides that "[c]ontributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action... to recover damages for negligence").

2010E.g., Harrison, 768 P.2d at 1326 (stating that “[t]he open and obvious danger doctrine, born in the era ... of contributory negligence, has been abolished legislatively through the adoption of I.C. § 6-801,” where that statute provides that “[c]ontributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action ... to recover damages for negligence”).

2010Co., 839 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Ky.1992) (citations omitted).

2010Co., 839 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Ky.1992) (citations omitted).