open and obvious doctrine in Ohio

2025As such, the open-and-obvious test “‘properly considers the nature of the dangerous condition itself, as opposed to the nature of the plaintiff’s conduct in encountering it.’” Id., quoting Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 79 , 2003-Ohio-2573 , 788 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 13 . . . . ...

2025As such, the open-and-obvious test “‘properly considers the nature of the dangerous condition itself, as opposed to the nature of the plaintiff’s conduct in encountering it.’” Id., quoting Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 79 , 2003-Ohio-2573 , 788 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 13 . . . . ...

2024The Lang Court ultimately held, “The open-and-obvious doctrine may be asserted as a defense to a claim of liability arising from a violation of the Ohio Basic Building Code.” Lang, 2009-Ohio-2495 at syllabus.

2024Cooke contended that the platform violated Ohio Building Code provisions, which she argues prohibits the application of the open and obvious doctrine because it was negligence per se. {¶27} In Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, Inc., 2009-Ohio-2495 , the issue before the Ohio Supreme Court was “whether a violation of an administrative building code provision prohibits application of the open and obvious doctrine and precludes summary judgment on a negligence claim.” Lang at ¶ 1 .

2025Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 644 , 1992- Ohio-42. “‘Thus, the owner or occupier may reasonably expect that persons entering the premises will discover those dangers and take appropriate measures to protect themselves.’” Fabian at ¶ 9 , quoting Simmers at 644 . {¶10} Therefore, when courts apply the open-and-obvious doctrine: [T]hey must focus on the fact that the doctrine relates to the threshold issue of duty.

2023Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 644 , 597 N.E.2d 504 (1992). {¶ 16} The Supreme Court of Ohio has cautioned that when courts apply the open- and-obvious rule, “they must focus on the fact that the doctrine relates to the threshold -7- issue of duty.

2026Sheriff’s Office, 2017-Ohio-9128, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.) (where one argument under an assignment of error is dispositive, the remaining arguments raised under the same assignment of error are moot and the appellate court need not address them); Carnes v. Siferd, 2011-Ohio-4467, ¶ 31 (3d Dist.) (both the open and obvious doctrine and the two-inch rule relieve a landowner of a duty to warn of certain hazards, and “[w]here there are no issues of material fact with regard to the applicability of the open and obvious doctrine but issues of material fact with regard to the two-inch rule, or vice versa, t

2020See also Mayle v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 09AP- 541, 2010-Ohio-2774 , ¶ 22 (finding darkness to not be an attendant circumstance where the plaintiff admitted he was not looking down at the ground at the time of the accident despite his belief that the area was poorly lit); McCoy v. Kroger Co., 10th Dist. No. 05AP- 7, 2005-Ohio-6965, ¶ 14-16 (finding darkness was not an attendant circumstance sufficient to avoid the application of the open-and-obvious doctrine where the plaintiff testified that nothing distracted him and he was looking straight ahead instead of at the groun

2007In our judgment, if the violation were open and obvious, the open and obvious nature would `obviate the duty to warn.' See Armstrong , 99 Ohio St.3d at 80 , 788 N.E.2d 1088 ; see Ryan v. Guan , Licking App. No. 2003CA110, 2004-Ohio-4032 [ 2004 WL 1728519 ] (the open and obvious doctrine applied, despite the fact that the plaintiff had lost her balance on a curb ramp flare that was one and one-half times steeper than allowed by the applicable building codes); Duncan v. Capitol South Comm. Urban Redev.

2006See, also, Olivier v. Leaf Vine , Miami App. No. 2004 CA 35, 2005-Ohio-1910 ; and Ryan v. Guan , Licking App. No. 2003CA00110, 2004-Ohio-4032 (both holding an alleged administrative safety violation does not preclude application of the open and obvious doctrine).

2025Instead, a business owner has a duty to warn invitees “of actual dangers on the property if [the business owner’s] knowledge of those dangers is superior to that of the invitees.” Francis at ¶ 32 , citing Occhipinti at ¶ 20 . {¶9} Nonetheless, the business owner has no duty “‘to protect a business invitee against dangers which are known to such invitee or are so obvious and apparent to such invitee that [s]he may reasonably be expected to discover them and protect h[er]self against them.’” Fabian v. May, 2021-Ohio-2882, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.), quoting Sidle v. Humphrey, 13 Ohio St.2d 45 (1968), para

2025However, under the open-and-obvious doctrine, a premises owner “is under no duty to protect a business invitee against dangers which are known to such invitee or are so obvious and apparent to such invitee that he may reasonably be expected to discover them and protect himself against them.” Sidle v. Humphrey, 13 Ohio St.2d 45 (1968), paragraph one of the syllabus.

2024See also Simmons, 2005-Ohio-6957 (finding the open and obvious doctrine inapplicable as there was a genuine issue of dispute whether the invitee was injured by the active negligence of another employee moving a dock plate); Wulf at ¶ 23 (finding the open and obvious doctrine did not apply when a waitress backed into the plaintiff while carrying a food tray). {¶ 40} Interestingly, Ohio courts have applied the open and obvious doctrine, depending on the facts, in cases involving falling merchandise.

2019Pacific Ents., L.L.C., 164 Ohio App.3d 763 , 2005- Ohio-6957, 843 N.E.2d 1271, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.), for the proposition that the open-and- obvious doctrine only applies to static conditions, but not to negligent activities conducted on the premises.

2020Much more fundamentally, while attendant circumstances in some instances can "act as an exception that allows a plaintiff to avoid the open and obvious doctrine," Cummin v. Image Mart, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1284, 2004-Ohio-2840 , ¶ 8, citing McGuire v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 Ohio App.3d 494 (1st Dist.1996), Ms. Weinkauf's chasing of the boy was not an attendant circumstance that could trump her actual knowledge here.

2018Cuyahoga No. 89810, 2008-Ohio-3667, ¶ 29 , citing McGuire v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 Ohio App.3d 494, 498 , 693 N.E.2d 807 (1st Dist.1996). 6. {¶ 15} Mrs. Caruso argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because reasonable minds could reach different conclusions as to whether attendant circumstances preclude the application of the open-and-obvious doctrine.

2025As such, the open-and-obvious test “‘properly considers the nature of the dangerous condition itself, as opposed to the nature of the plaintiff’s conduct in encountering it.’” Id., quoting Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 79 , 2003-Ohio-2573 , 788 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 13 . . . . ...

2024Accordingly, the open-and-obvious test ‘properly considers the nature of the dangerous condition itself, as opposed to the nature of the plaintiff's conduct in 7. encountering it.’” Hissong v. Miller, 186 Ohio App.3d 345 , 2010–Ohio– 961, 927 N.E.2d 1161, ¶ 8 , quoting Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 79 , 2003-Ohio-2573 , 788 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 13 .

2009Co. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 642 , 597 N.E.2d 504 ; Anderson v. Ruoff (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 601 , 654 N.E.2d 449 . {¶ 26} The open-and-obvious doctrine provides that a premises owner owes no duty to persons entering those premises regarding dangers that are open and obvious.

2009Co. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 642 , 597 N.E.2d 504 ; Anderson v. Ruoff (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 601 , 654 N.E.2d 449 . {¶ 26} The open-and-obvious doctrine provides that a premises owner owes no duty to persons entering those premises regarding dangers that are open and obvious.

2018Common-Law Negligence {¶ 23} "It is fundamental that in order to establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a duty, (2) a breach of duty, and (3) an injury proximately resulting therefrom." Armstrong v. Best Buy Co. , 99 Ohio St.3d 79 , 2003-Ohio-2573 , 788 N.E.2d 1088 , ¶ 8, citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc. , 15 Ohio St.3d 75 , 77, 472 N.E.2d 707 (1984). {¶ 24} "The open-and-obvious doctrine remains viable in Ohio." Armstrong at syllabus (analyzing open-and-obvious doctrine under the common-law duty to warn invitees of latent or hidden

2018Common-Law Negligence {¶ 23} "It is fundamental that in order to establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a duty, (2) a breach of duty, and (3) an injury proximately resulting therefrom." Armstrong v. Best Buy Co. , 99 Ohio St.3d 79 , 2003-Ohio-2573 , 788 N.E.2d 1088 , ¶ 8, citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc. , 15 Ohio St.3d 75 , 77, 472 N.E.2d 707 (1984). {¶ 24} "The open-and-obvious doctrine remains viable in Ohio." Armstrong at syllabus (analyzing open-and-obvious doctrine under the common-law duty to warn invitees of latent or hidden

2014Parsons v. Lawson Co., 57 Ohio App.3d 49 , 566 N.E.2d 698 (5th Dist.1989). {¶8} The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized in Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79 , 2003-Ohio-2573 , 788 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 11-15 , that the open-and-obvious doctrine relates to the threshold issue of duty in a negligence action.

2014Parsons v. Lawson Co., 57 Ohio App.3d 49 , 566 N.E.2d 698 (5th Dist.1989). {¶8} The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized in Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79 , 2003-Ohio-2573 , 788 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 11-15 , that the open-and-obvious doctrine relates to the threshold issue of duty in a negligence action.

2024However, “[t]o serve as an exception to the open and obvious doctrine, an attendant circumstance must be ‘so abnormal that it unreasonably increased the normal risk of a harmful result or reduced the degree of care an ordinary person would exercise.’” Shipman, 2014-Ohio-5092, at ¶ 29 , quoting Mayle v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-541, 2010-Ohio-2774 , ¶ 20. {¶27} Nonetheless, “[t]here is no precise definition of attendant circumstances.” Simms at ¶ 30 .

2023However, “[t]o serve as an exception to the open and obvious doctrine, an attendant circumstance must be ‘so abnormal that it unreasonably increased the normal risk of a harmful result or reduced the degree of care an ordinary person would exercise.’” Shipman, 2014-Ohio-5092, at ¶ 29 , quoting Mayle v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-541, 2010-Ohio-2774 , ¶ 20. {¶31} Nonetheless, “[t]here is no precise definition of attendant circumstances.” Simms at ¶ 30 .

2022The court further observed in Mann that “[i]n Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17 , 2006-Ohio-6362 , 857 N.E.2d 1195 , this court held that a landlord's failure to meet the statutory duty under R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) negates the open-and-obvious doctrine.” Id. -20- {¶ 54} As a result, whether the defect in the sidewalk was open and obvious is not an issue in this case.

2022The court further observed in Mann that “[i]n Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17 , 2006-Ohio-6362 , 857 N.E.2d 1195 , this court held that a landlord's failure to meet the statutory duty under R.C. 5321.04(A)(1) negates the open-and-obvious doctrine.” Id. -20- {¶ 54} As a result, whether the defect in the sidewalk was open and obvious is not an issue in this case.

2026“Under this rule, courts have applied the open and obvious doctrine and denied recovery where a plaintiff seeks to recover against a property owner for injuries sustained as a result of stepping into darkness and sustaining injuries as a result of another object or danger.” Id., citing Rezac v. Cuyahoga Falls Concerts, Inc., 2007-Ohio-703 (9th Dist.); Leonard v. Modene & Assocs., Inc., 2006-Ohio-5471 (6th Dist.).

2017“When applicable * * *, the open-and-obvious doctrine * * * acts as a complete bar to any negligence claims.” Id. {¶40} Darkness has been repeatedly recognized as an open and obvious hazard. “‘Darkness’ is always a warning of danger, and for one’s own protection it may not be disregarded.” Jeswald v. Hutt, 15 Ohio St.2d 224 , 239 N.E.2d 37 (1968), paragraph three of the syllabus.

2026“When applicable, however, the open-and- obvious doctrine obviates the duty to warn and acts as a complete bar to any negligence claims.” Id., citing id.

2026“When applicable, however, the open-and- obvious doctrine obviates the duty to warn and acts as a complete bar to any negligence claims.” Id., citing id.

2025The Middletons timely noticed an appeal from this entry. {¶4} In their two assigned errors, the Middletons argue: [1.] The trial court erred in granting Clarky’s motion for summary judgment when evidence was presented which clearly demonstrated that the trial court misapplied the open and obvious doctrine in a situation where plaintiff was rounding a corner at the end of an aisle. [2.] The trial court erred in granting Clarky’s motion for summary judgment when evidence was presented which clearly demonstrated that Terri Middleton did not receive advance warning of the danger from her husband o

2023Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 , 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).

2026We do not need to determine if there was a material question of fact regarding whether the hazard was open and obvious because Oliver failed to introduce any admissible evidence that McDonalds had notice of the dangerous condition. {¶19} To establish a claim for personal injuries caused by a property owner’s negligence, a plaintiff must establish either “(1) that a defendant through its officers or employees is responsible for the hazard complained of; or (2) that at least one of such persons have actual knowledge of the hazard and neglect to give adequate notice of its presence or remove it p

2007Sharp v. Andersons Inc. , Franklin App. No. 06AP-81, 2006-Ohio-4075, at ¶ 9 , citing Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 584 , 589 . {¶ 10} The open and obvious doctrine eliminates a shopkeeper's duty to warn a business invitee of dangers either known to the invitee or so obvious and apparent to the *Page 5 invitee that he or she may reasonably be expected to discover them and protect against them.

2010“This duty [also] includes a responsibility to warn invitees of latent or concealed defects of which the owner has, or should have, knowledge.” Zuzan v. Shutrump, 155 Ohio App.3d 589 , 2003-Ohio-7285 , 802 N.E.2d 683, ¶6 ; Scheibel v. Lipton (1951), 156 Ohio St. 308 , 323, 102 N.E.2d 453 . {¶14} Liability only attaches when an owner has “superior knowledge of the particular danger which caused the injury” as an “invitee may not reasonably be expected to protect himself from a risk he cannot fully appreciate.” LaCourse v. Fleitz (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 209, 210 , 503 N.E.2d 159 . {¶15} The Church

2010“This duty [also] includes a responsibility to warn invitees of latent or concealed defects of which the owner has, or should have, knowledge.” Zuzan v. Shutrump, 155 Ohio App.3d 589 , 2003-Ohio-7285 , 802 N.E.2d 683, ¶6 ; Scheibel v. Lipton (1951), 156 Ohio St. 308 , 323, 102 N.E.2d 453 . {¶14} Liability only attaches when an owner has “superior knowledge of the particular danger which caused the injury” as an “invitee may not reasonably be expected to protect himself from a risk he cannot fully appreciate.” LaCourse v. Fleitz (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 209, 210 , 503 N.E.2d 159 . {¶15} The Church

2025“Ohio adheres to the common-law classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser in cases of premises liability.” Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 315 (1996). “[T]he status of the person who enters upon the land of another (i.e., trespasser, licensee, or invitee) continues to define the scope of the legal duty that the landowner owes the entrant.” Id. {¶ 27} The open-and-obvious doctrine relates to the threshold issue of duty.

2025“Ohio adheres to the common-law classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser in cases of premises liability.” Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 315 (1996). “[T]he status of the person who enters upon the land of another (i.e., trespasser, licensee, or invitee) continues to define the scope of the legal duty that the landowner owes the entrant.” Id. {¶ 27} The open-and-obvious doctrine relates to the threshold issue of duty.