open and obvious rule in Indiana

1994The open and obvious rule was articulated in Bemis Co. v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058 , cert. denied (1982), 459 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 , as follows: . the defect must be hidden and not normally observable, constituting a latent danger in the use of the product.

1990A. Open and Obvious Rule The Indiana Supreme Court's recent decision in Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co. (1990), Ind., 551 N.E.2d 437 eliminates the need for discussion of Wards' first two arguments, that Gregg is barred from recovery by reason of the open and obvious rule as set forth in Bemis Co., Inc. *1151 v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 and its progeny, and that Wards had no duty to warn Gregg of the dangers arising as a consequence of mismatching as a matter of law, 1 as well as Gregg's argument on tendered instructions

1994The open and obvious rule was articulated in Bemis Co. v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058 , cert. denied (1982), 459 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 , as follows: . the defect must be hidden and not normally observable, constituting a latent danger in the use of the product.

1990A. Open and Obvious Rule The Indiana Supreme Court's recent decision in Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co. (1990), Ind., 551 N.E.2d 437 eliminates the need for discussion of Wards' first two arguments, that Gregg is barred from recovery by reason of the open and obvious rule as set forth in Bemis Co., Inc. *1151 v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 and its progeny, and that Wards had no duty to warn Gregg of the dangers arising as a consequence of mismatching as a matter of law, 1 as well as Gregg's argument on tendered instructions

1994The open and obvious rule was articulated in Bemis Co. v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058 , cert. denied (1982), 459 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 , as follows: . the defect must be hidden and not normally observable, constituting a latent danger in the use of the product.

1990A. Open and Obvious Rule The Indiana Supreme Court's recent decision in Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co. (1990), Ind., 551 N.E.2d 437 eliminates the need for discussion of Wards' first two arguments, that Gregg is barred from recovery by reason of the open and obvious rule as set forth in Bemis Co., Inc. *1151 v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 and its progeny, and that Wards had no duty to warn Gregg of the dangers arising as a consequence of mismatching as a matter of law, 1 as well as Gregg's argument on tendered instructions

1999Bridgewater, 486 N.E.2d at 488 ; Schooley v. Ingersoll Rand, Inc., 631 N.E.2d 932, 939 (Ind.Ct.App.1994).

1986NIPSCO has conceded that since the trial court's order was entered, the Supreme Court's decision in Bridgewater v. Economy Engineering Co. (1985) Ind., 486 N.E.2d 484 , reh. den. has foreclosed the application of the open and obvious rule in non-product negligence cases.

1986The reasons why the open and obvious rule should not apply to general negligence cases were contained in the dissenting opinion to Law, supra. A portion of that dissent is reproduced here because it addresses the instant issue-the duty of a business invitor in a slip and fall situation.

1985This particular question was most directly presented in Law, supra, wherein the open and obvious principle was applied.

1994In Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co. (1990), Ind., 551 N.E.2d 437 , our supreme court considered the question of whether the open and obvious rule applied to strict Hability product cases.

1990A. Open and Obvious Rule The Indiana Supreme Court's recent decision in Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co. (1990), Ind., 551 N.E.2d 437 eliminates the need for discussion of Wards' first two arguments, that Gregg is barred from recovery by reason of the open and obvious rule as set forth in Bemis Co., Inc. *1151 v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 and its progeny, and that Wards had no duty to warn Gregg of the dangers arising as a consequence of mismatching as a matter of law, 1 as well as Gregg's argument on tendered instructions

1994Bridgewater v. Economy Engineering Co. (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 484, 488 , reh'g denied; McDonald v. Sandvik Process Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1989), 870 F.2d 389, 393 . "'When the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are in conflict, the open and obvious nature of the danger is a question of fact' tH for the jury'" Lilge v. Russell's Trailer Repair, Inc. (1991), Ind.App., 565 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (quoting FMC Corp. v. Brown (1988), Ind.App., 526 N.E.2d 719, 724 , affirmed (1990), Ind., 551 N.E.2d 444 ).

1991But the law is clear that “[w]hen the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are in conflict, the open and obvious nature of the danger is a question of fact for the jury.” FMC Corp. v. Brown (1988), Ind.App., 526 N.E.2d 719, 724 , affirmed (1990), Ind., 551 N.E.2d 444 .

2017Id. at 199 .

1994Bridgewater v. Economy Engineering Co. (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 484, 488 , reh'g denied; McDonald v. Sandvik Process Systems, Inc. (7th Cir.1989), 870 F.2d 389, 393 . "'When the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are in conflict, the open and obvious nature of the danger is a question of fact' tH for the jury'" Lilge v. Russell's Trailer Repair, Inc. (1991), Ind.App., 565 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (quoting FMC Corp. v. Brown (1988), Ind.App., 526 N.E.2d 719, 724 , affirmed (1990), Ind., 551 N.E.2d 444 ).

1991Also subsequent to Koske , but only three weeks later, in Miller v. Todd (1990) Ind., 551 N.E.2d 1139 , the court held that "the relative obviousness of a defect is certainly pertinent to determining whether a product is ... unreasonably dangerous" 551 N.E.2d at 1143.

1991Also subsequent to Koske , but only three weeks later, in Miller v. Todd (1990) Ind., 551 N.E.2d 1139 , the court held that “the relative obviousness of a defect is certainly pertinent to determining whether a product is ... unreasonably dangerous” 551 N.E.2d at 1143.

1985Ha-nas also cites City of South Bend v. Estate of Rozwarski (1980), Ind.App., 404 N.E.2d 19 , as precluding a suit by one fireman against another for alleged negligence dur-img an emergency run based on the open and obvious rule.

1985Hanas also cites City of South Bend v. Estate of Rozwarski (1980), Ind. App., 404 N.E.2d 19 , as precluding a suit by one fireman against another for alleged negligence during an emergency run based on the open and obvious rule.

1985Second, the open and obvious rule adopted in Bemis Co., Inc. v. Rubush, (1981) Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058 [Hunter and DeBruler, JJ., dissenting], cert. denied (1982) 459 U.S. 825 , 108 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 , has been interpreted and applied in diverse ways by the several divisions of the Court of Appeals and requires clarification by this Court.

1981As Judge Neal explained for the unanimous Court: “We are of the opinion that the foregoing application of the open and obvious rule will afford some flexibility in meeting the variety of situations which may present themselves.” Bemis Co., Inc. v. Rubush, supra, 401 N.E.2d at 57-58 .

1981As Judge Neal explained for the unanimous Court: "We are of the opinion that the foregoing application of the open and obvious rule will afford some flexibility in meeting the variety of situations which may present themselves." Bemis Co., Inc. v. Rubush, supra, 401 N.E.2d at 57-58 .