parallel federal rule in Massachusetts

2016Cf. Shuman v. The Stanley Works, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 951, 952-953 (1991) (‘“We are . . . guided by judicial interpretation of the parallel Federal rule [of procedure], absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in content”).

2008While no .Massachusetts cases have addressed this issue, “[w]e are . . . guided by judicial interpretation of the parallel Federal rule, absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in content.” Shuman v. The Stanley Works, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 951, 952-953 (1991).

1990See Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 613 (1981) (“In construing Mass. R.

1983The Commonwealth urges that we apply by analogy Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), which it claims “allows such motions to be filed within a ‘reasonable time.’” The construction given that rule and “the parallel Federal rule,” see Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 613 (1981), however, does not provide authority for allowing relief from judicial *88 error 6 eighty-seven days after judgment, a period long after expiration of the time for appeal.

1988See Rollins Environmental Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174, 179-180 (1975). 2 Of the subsections of rule 60(b), the possibility of applying clause (1), which authorizes motions pitched on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” crosses the mind, but wife’s counsel has asserted no “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” Relief is not justified under rule 60(b)(1) for “any garden-variety oversight.” Goldstein v. Barron, 382 Mass. 181, 186 (1980).

1981See Goldstein v. Barron, 382 Mass. 181, 186 (1980).

2000We turn to the question whether relief from judgment was improperly granted under Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), which, in relevant part, is set forth in the margin. 1 Although the judge did not indicate under which clause of the rule he was acting, it appears that only clause (6) is applicable. 2 Under both the Massachusetts rule and the parallel Federal rule “subsection (6) relief is to be granted only in extraordinary circumstances.” Bromfield v. Commonwealth, 400 Mass. 254, 257 (1987), and cases cited.

1995Pentucket Manor Chronic Hosp. v. Rate Setting Comm’n, 394 Mass. 233 (1985) as cited in Bromfield v. Commonwealth, 400 Mass. 254 (1987).

2010See Allright Mo., Inc. v. Billeter, 829 F.2d 631 , 638 n.7 (8th Cir. 1987) (interpreting the parallel Federal rule). 15 As a result of a statute effective July 1, 2004, a plaintiff seeking to maintain a derivative suit on behalf of a corporation must in all cases first make a written demand on the board of directors and no longer can rely on the so-called “futility exception.” See G.

2009See Callahan v. First Congregational Church of Haverhill, 441 Mass. 699, 709 (2004).

2008See Howard v. Burlington, 399 Mass. 585, 589 (1987).

2004See Berman v. Linnane, 434 Mass. 301 , 304 n.5 (2001).

2000For examples of the application of the parallel Federal rule 60(b)(2) to summary judgments, see Alpern v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1535 (8th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel.

2000Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (S.D.

1990A. P. 4 (a) . . . we look at the construction of the parallel Federal rule”); Farley v. Sprague, 374 Mass. 419, 423 (1978).

1988See Rollins Environmental Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174, 179-180 (1975). 2 Of the subsections of rule 60(b), the possibility of applying clause (1), which authorizes motions pitched on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” crosses the mind, but wife’s counsel has asserted no “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” Relief is not justified under rule 60(b)(1) for “any garden-variety oversight.” Goldstein v. Barron, 382 Mass. 181, 186 (1980).

1987In Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950), the Supreme Court noted that rule 60 (b) (6) is not a substitute for appeal and that there “must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved from.” It is, therefore, generally held “improper to grant relief under Rule 60 (b) (6) if the aggrieved party could have reasonably sought the same relief by means of appeal.” Martinez-McBean v. Government of V.I., 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d Cir. 1977).

1987In Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950), the Supreme Court noted that rule 60 (b) (6) is not a substitute for appeal and that there “must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved from.” It is, therefore, generally held “improper to grant relief under Rule 60 (b) (6) if the aggrieved party could have reasonably sought the same relief by means of appeal.” Martinez-McBean v. Government of V.I., 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d Cir. 1977).

1986However, in both civil and criminal Federal cases, the rule is that a timely filed request for reconsideration “render[s] the original judgment nonfinal for purposes of appeal for as long as the [request] is pending.” United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976).

1983See Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 376 Mass. 612, 615 (1978).

1981See Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688 , 700 n.16 (1975). 13 The class representatives argue that, earlier in the Perez litigation, the Reeders and other classs members received adequate notice that the emergency eviction procedure, or something like it, might be adopted.

1981A plea of guilty or a finding or verdict of guilty shall constitute a conviction.” (The parallel Federal rule is referred to in the margin.) 15 In assessing the “intensity” of the prejudice under *81 Chase or matching “probative value” and “unfair prejudice” under such a rule as 609(a), a judge might look to the factors mentioned by Burger, J., in United States v. Gordon, 383 F.2d 936, 940-941 (D.C.