equitable parent doctrine in Michigan

2023The Supreme Court granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal, asking whether and to what extent the equitable-parent doctrine should be extended to provide standing under the CCA to plaintiff and those similarly situated in light of Obergefell v Hodges, 576 US 644 (2015), which invalidated Michigan’s prohibitions on same-sex marriage. 510 Mich 936 (2022).

2023We granted leave to address: 2 The Court of Appeals declined to address Pueblo’s argument that granting defendant’s reconsideration motion was an abuse of discretion on the ground that Pueblo had abandoned the issue, and Pueblo does not resurrect that argument here. 4 (1) whether, in light of Obergefell v Hodges, 576 US 644 (2015), the equitable parent doctrine should be extended to provide standing to persons such as the plaintiff, who, at the time of the parties’ same-sex relationship, was not permitted by Michigan law to legally marry the defendant, and if so, (2) what the parameters of tha

2022Furthermore, we, as well as our Supreme Court, have expressly chosen not to extend the equitable-parent doctrine beyond the context of marriage, Bay Co Prosecutor v Nugent, 276 Mich App 183 , 191 n 2, 740 NW2d 678 (2007); Van, 460 Mich at 330-335 , and to do so only for same-sex couples would be improper, Kolailat v McKennett, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 17, 2015 (Docket No. 328333), pp 2-3 (declining to apply the equitable-parent doctrine to a same-sex couple after the Obergefell decision). [Lake, 316 Mich App at 255-256 .] In Sheardown v Guastella,

2016Furthermore, we, as well as our Supreme Court, have expressly chosen not to extend the equitable-parent doctrine beyond the marriage context with respect to heterosexual couples, Bay Co Prosecutor v Nugent, 276 Mich App 183, 191, n 2 ; 740 NW2d 678 (2007); Van, 460 Mich at 330-335 , and to do so only for same-sex couples would be improper, Kolailat v McKennett, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 17, 2015 (Docket No. 328333), pp 2-3 (declining to apply the equitable-parent doctrine to a same-sex couple after the Obergefell decision).

2022See Featherston v Steinhoff, 226 Mich App 584, 588-589 ; 575 NW2d 6 (1997). 3 This is supported by statements made by plaintiff at the hearing on defendant’s motion, where plaintiff asserted that her complaint was “a way that all non-biological lesbian[s] might be able to finally . . . see their children that they raised,” and that she was “trying to see my children that I raised for ten years[.]” It is also tangentially supported by plaintiff’s motion in the trial court to reassign the case to a different judge because “[t]his is a case about a custody issue . . . .” -3- If plaintiff were rec

2022See Featherston v Steinhoff, 226 Mich App 584, 588-589 ; 575 NW2d 6 (1997). 3 This is supported by statements made by plaintiff at the hearing on defendant’s motion, where plaintiff asserted that her complaint was “a way that all non-biological lesbian[s] might be able to finally . . . see their children that they raised,” and that she was “trying to see my children that I raised for ten years[.]” It is also tangentially supported by plaintiff’s motion in the trial court to reassign the case to a different judge because “[t]his is a case about a custody issue . . . .” -3- If plaintiff were rec

2022Id.; Killingbeck [v Killingbeck, 269 Mich App 132, 141-142 ; 711 NW2d 759 (2005)].

2022Id.; Killingbeck [v Killingbeck, 269 Mich App 132, 141-142 ; 711 NW2d 759 (2005)].

2023In addition, the equitable parent doctrine, which necessarily requires an ad hoc, case-by-case determination of parentage after the facts of the case have been determined, would eliminate the significant degree of certainty regarding who is and who is not a child’s parent that our jurisprudence supplies. [Doe v Doe, 244 Conn 403 , 444 n 46; 710 A2d 1297 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds, In re Joshua S, 260 Conn 182 , 796 A2d 1141 (2002).] While the [Michigan] Supreme Court has apparently reserved this question for another day, the continuing viability of the equitable parent doctrine

2023In addition, the equitable parent doctrine, which necessarily requires an ad hoc, case-by-case determination of parentage after the facts of the case have been determined, would eliminate the significant degree of certainty regarding who is and who is not a child’s parent that our jurisprudence supplies. [Doe v Doe, 244 Conn 403 , 444 n 46; 710 A2d 1297 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds, In re Joshua S, 260 Conn 182 , 796 A2d 1141 (2002).] While the [Michigan] Supreme Court has apparently reserved this question for another day, the continuing viability of the equitable parent doctrine

2023In addition, the equitable parent doctrine, which necessarily requires an ad hoc, case-by-case determination of parentage after the facts of the case have been determined, would eliminate the significant degree of certainty regarding who is and who is not a child’s parent that our jurisprudence supplies. [Doe v Doe, 244 Conn 403 , 444 n 46; 710 A2d 1297 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds, In re Joshua S, 260 Conn 182 , 796 A2d 1141 (2002).] While the [Michigan] Supreme Court has apparently reserved this question for another day, the continuing viability of the equitable parent doctrine

2023In addition, the equitable parent doctrine, which necessarily requires an ad hoc, case-by-case determination of parentage after the facts of the case have been determined, would eliminate the significant degree of certainty regarding who is and who is not a child’s parent that our jurisprudence supplies. [Doe v Doe, 244 Conn 403 , 444 n 46; 710 A2d 1297 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds, In re Joshua S, 260 Conn 182 , 796 A2d 1141 (2002).] While the [Michigan] Supreme Court has apparently reserved this question for another day, the continuing viability of the equitable parent doctrine

2023See Titchenal v Dexter, 166 Vt 373, 384-385; 693 A2d 682 (1997) (noting that “[v]ery few jurisdictions have embraced the equitable-parent doctrine adopted in Atkinson”). 9 to her partner’s conceiving a child using assisted reproductive technology. 6 “The essence of the Equal Protection Clauses is that the government not treat persons differently on account of certain, largely innate, characteristics that do not justify disparate treatment.” Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 258 , 615 NW2d 218 (2000).

2023See Titchenal v Dexter, 166 Vt 373, 384-385; 693 A2d 682 (1997) (noting that “[v]ery few jurisdictions have embraced the equitable-parent doctrine adopted in Atkinson”). 9 to her partner’s conceiving a child using assisted reproductive technology. 6 “The essence of the Equal Protection Clauses is that the government not treat persons differently on account of certain, largely innate, characteristics that do not justify disparate treatment.” Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 258 , 615 NW2d 218 (2000).

2023In [Hunter v Hunter, 484 Mich 247, 251, 261, 271-275 ; 771 NW2d 694 (2009)], our Supreme Court overruled Mason v Simmons, 267 Mich App 188 ; 704 NW2d 104 (2005), a case similarly premised in part on equitable considerations, instead of a governing statute.

2023In [Hunter v Hunter, 484 Mich 247, 251, 261, 271-275 ; 771 NW2d 694 (2009)], our Supreme Court overruled Mason v Simmons, 267 Mich App 188 ; 704 NW2d 104 (2005), a case similarly premised in part on equitable considerations, instead of a governing statute.

2023We declined to review the equitable-parent doctrine’s application to unmarried same-sex couples whose relationships ended before 14 Obergefell by denying leave in two analogous cases that same year: Mabry v Mabry, 499 Mich 997 (2016), and Kolailat v McKennett, 499 Mich 996 (2016).

2022Furthermore, we, as well as our Supreme Court, have expressly chosen not to extend the equitable-parent doctrine beyond the context of marriage, Bay Co Prosecutor v Nugent, 276 Mich App 183 , 191 n 2, 740 NW2d 678 (2007); Van, 460 Mich at 330-335 , and to do so only for same-sex couples would be improper, Kolailat v McKennett, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 17, 2015 (Docket No. 328333), pp 2-3 (declining to apply the equitable-parent doctrine to a same-sex couple after the Obergefell decision). [Lake, 316 Mich App at 255-256 .] In Sheardown v Guastella,

2022Furthermore, we, as well as our Supreme Court, have expressly chosen not to extend the equitable-parent doctrine beyond the context of marriage, Bay Co Prosecutor v Nugent, 276 Mich App 183 , 191 n 2, 740 NW2d 678 (2007); Van, 460 Mich at 330-335 , and to do so only for same-sex couples would be improper, Kolailat v McKennett, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 17, 2015 (Docket No. 328333), pp 2-3 (declining to apply the equitable-parent doctrine to a same-sex couple after the Obergefell decision). [Lake, 316 Mich App at 255-256 .] In Sheardown v Guastella,

2022Here, the CCA confers standing to initiate child custody actions only upon certain persons; specifically, “parents,” “agencies,” or designated “third persons.” See MCL 722.25(1); Aichele v Hodge, 259 Mich App 146, 165 ; 673 NW2d 452 (2003). [Kolailat v McKennett, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 17, 2015 (Docket No. 328333), p 2.] The same panel also explained why plaintiff lacked standing under the equitable-parent doctrine: impregnated [defendant] with [child].” In dismissing the complaint, the trial court reasoned that allegedly paying for the sperm di

2022Here, the CCA confers standing to initiate child custody actions only upon certain persons; specifically, “parents,” “agencies,” or designated “third persons.” See MCL 722.25(1); Aichele v Hodge, 259 Mich App 146, 165 ; 673 NW2d 452 (2003). [Kolailat v McKennett, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 17, 2015 (Docket No. 328333), p 2.] The same panel also explained why plaintiff lacked standing under the equitable-parent doctrine: impregnated [defendant] with [child].” In dismissing the complaint, the trial court reasoned that allegedly paying for the sperm di

2021Stankevich v Milliron, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 17, 2013 (Docket No. 310710), p 1, (hereinafter Stankevich I) vacated and remanded 498 Mich 877 ; 868 NW2d 907 (2015) (hereinafter Stankevich II).

2021Stankevich v Milliron, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 17, 2013 (Docket No. 310710), p 1, (hereinafter Stankevich I) vacated and remanded 498 Mich 877 ; 868 NW2d 907 (2015) (hereinafter Stankevich II).

2015ANALYSIS As a result of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Obergefell, plaintiff has standing under the equitable-parent doctrine because Michigan now is required to recognize the parties’ same-sex marriage, and plaintiffs complaint alleges facts that, if proven, are sufficient to establish equitable parenthood. 2 *238 “Generally, a party has standing if it has some real interest in the cause of action, ... or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” In re Anjoski, 283 Mich App 41, 50 ; 770 NW2d 1 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

2015ANALYSIS As a result of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Obergefell, plaintiff has standing under the equitable-parent doctrine because Michigan now is required to recognize the parties’ same-sex marriage, and plaintiffs complaint alleges facts that, if proven, are sufficient to establish equitable parenthood. 2 *238 “Generally, a party has standing if it has some real interest in the cause of action, ... or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” In re Anjoski, 283 Mich App 41, 50 ; 770 NW2d 1 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

2009The court should consider: (a) whether the trial court legally erred in allowing the biological father to intervene in the divorce proceedings; (b) whether the defendant father was the child's legal father prior to the trial court's determination that the defendant father was not a biological parent; (c) whether the trial court's determination that the defendant father was not the child's biological parent amounted to termination of his parental rights; (d) if the trial court's determination did amount to a termination of the defendant father's parental rights, whether any constitutional impli

2009The court should consider: (a) whether the trial court legally erred in allowing the biological father to intervene in the divorce proceedings; (b) whether the defendant father was the child's legal father prior to the trial court's determination that the defendant father was not a biological parent; (c) whether the trial court's determination that the defendant father was not the child's biological parent amounted to termination of his parental rights; (d) if the trial court's determination did amount to a termination of the defendant father's parental rights, whether any constitutional impli

1999It held at 99, 575 N.W.2d 566 : In sum, the equitable parent doctrine has previously been applied only in situations where a child was born or conceived during a marriage, to convey equitable parenting status on a husband who was not the biological father of the child.

1999It opined: [I]f this Court [in Carnes, supra ] was struck by the magnitude of the public policy questions arising from property disputes in cohabitation situations, there can be no doubt that questions pertaining to the best interests of children in cohabitation situations should be left to the legislative process, especially if one of the cohabitants seeking custody or visitation is not biologically related to the child. [ 227 Mich.App. at 97 , 575 N.W.2d 566 .] We hold that because the requested extension of the equitable parent doctrine would affect the state's public policy in favor of mar

1999It opined: [I]f this Court [in Carnes, supra] was struck by the magnitude of the public policy questions arising from property disputes in cohabitation situations, there can be no doubt that questions pertaining to the best interests of children in cohabitation situations should be left to the legislative process, especially if one of the cohabitants seeking custody or visitation is not biologically related to the child. [ 227 Mich App 97 .] We hold that because the requested extension of the equitable parent doctrine would affect the state’s public policy in favor of marriage, the Legislature