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21 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 2018–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pirgu v. United Services Automobile Associationgreen2 sentences2026See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 282 ; see also, e.g., Powers v Brown, 328 Mich App 617 , 624- 625; 939 NW2d 733 (2019) (concluding that the trial court abused its discretion and that remand was necessary because the court “did not comprehensively review and state its findings with respect to all the factors in the Smith/Pirgu framework”); Cadwell v Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 657-658 ; 922 NW2d 639 (2018) (“[B]y failing to briefly discuss each of the reasonableness factors set forth in Pirgu, the trial court necessarily abused its discretion.”). 2026Id.6 The Pirgu factors are as follows: (1) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services, (2) the difficulty of the case, i.e., the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (3) the amount in question and the results obtained, (4) the expenses incurred, (5) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, (6) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer, (7) the time limit | 8 | 16 |
Smith v. Khourigreen2 sentences2023This framework is also known as the “Smith/Pirgu factors,” and it applies in determining reasonable attorney fees under FOIA and other fee-shifting statutes or rules. 18 See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 278 (recognizing that Smith refined the framework that courts apply for fee-shifting statutes or rules); Smith, 481 Mich at 535 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.) (stating that the framework “provide[s] a workable, objective methodology for assessing reasonable attorney fees that Michigan courts can apply consistently to our various fee- shifting rules and statutes”); see also Coblentz v Novi, 485 Mich 961 (2009) 2022The proper analysis under the Smith/Pirgu test begins with the trial court determining the fee “customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.” Smith, 481 Mich at 530 . | 6 | 8 |
Theodore Cadwell v. City of Highland Parkgreen2 sentences2026See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 282 ; see also, e.g., Powers v Brown, 328 Mich App 617 , 624- 625; 939 NW2d 733 (2019) (concluding that the trial court abused its discretion and that remand was necessary because the court “did not comprehensively review and state its findings with respect to all the factors in the Smith/Pirgu framework”); Cadwell v Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 657-658 ; 922 NW2d 639 (2018) (“[B]y failing to briefly discuss each of the reasonableness factors set forth in Pirgu, the trial court necessarily abused its discretion.”). 2026See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 282 ; see also, e.g., Powers v Brown, 328 Mich App 617 , 624- 625; 939 NW2d 733 (2019) (concluding that the trial court abused its discretion and that remand was necessary because the court “did not comprehensively review and state its findings with respect to all the factors in the Smith/Pirgu framework”); Cadwell v Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 657-658 ; 922 NW2d 639 (2018) (“[B]y failing to briefly discuss each of the reasonableness factors set forth in Pirgu, the trial court necessarily abused its discretion.”). | 1 | 4 |
Coblentz v. City of Novigreen1 sentence2023This framework is also known as the “Smith/Pirgu factors,” and it applies in determining reasonable attorney fees under FOIA and other fee-shifting statutes or rules. 18 See Pirgu, 499 Mich at 278 (recognizing that Smith refined the framework that courts apply for fee-shifting statutes or rules); Smith, 481 Mich at 535 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.) (stating that the framework “provide[s] a workable, objective methodology for assessing reasonable attorney fees that Michigan courts can apply consistently to our various fee- shifting rules and statutes”); see also Coblentz v Novi, 485 Mich 961 (2009) | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Department of Transportation v. Randolph
green
2 sentences2022Plaintiff argues that this case is controlled by Mich Dep’t of Trans v Randolph, 461 Mich 757 ; 610 NW2d 893 (2000). 2022Plaintiff argues that this case is controlled by Mich Dep’t of Trans v Randolph, 461 Mich 757 ; 610 NW2d 893 (2000). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Kennedy v. Robert Lee Auto Sales
green
2 sentences2022It is unlike, for example, MCL 15.271(4) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq., which provides that a successful OMA plaintiff is entitled to “court costs and actual attorney fees.” We have regularly applied the Pirgu framework, or its predecessor Smith framework, to statutes that refer to “reasonable attorney fees.” For example, in Cadwell v City of Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 655 ; 922 NW2d 639 (2018), we applied the Pirgu framework to MCL 15.364 of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., which provides that “[a] court may also award the complainant all or a 2022It is unlike, for example, MCL 15.271(4) of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq., which provides that a successful OMA plaintiff is entitled to “court costs and actual attorney fees.” We have regularly applied the Pirgu framework, or its predecessor Smith framework, to statutes that refer to “reasonable attorney fees.” For example, in Cadwell v City of Highland Park, 324 Mich App 642, 655 ; 922 NW2d 639 (2018), we applied the Pirgu framework to MCL 15.364 of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., which provides that “[a] court may also award the complainant all or a | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Vittiglio v. Vittiglio
green
2 sentences2025In light of the trial court’s analysis of the Pirgu factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, Colen, 331 Mich App at 305, or that the amount of the sanction award constituted an abuse of discretion, Vittiglio, 297 Mich App at 408 . 2025In light of the trial court’s analysis of the Pirgu factors, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous, Colen, 331 Mich App at 305, or that the amount of the sanction award constituted an abuse of discretion, Vittiglio, 297 Mich App at 408 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Grievance Administrator v. Lopatin
green
2 sentences2024Consequently, “an appellate court’s determination of an issue in a case binds lower tribunals on remand and the appellate court in subsequent appeals.” Id. at 260 . -8- adjustments to the baseline fee after considering the Pirgu factors. 2024Consequently, “an appellate court’s determination of an issue in a case binds lower tribunals on remand and the appellate court in subsequent appeals.” Id. at 260 . -8- adjustments to the baseline fee after considering the Pirgu factors. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.