constructive notice standard in New York

2025Adm'rs Ass'n of NY State , 124 AD3d at 1177 (citing Riverkeeper , 28 AD3d at 961-62 ).

2015We therefore are satisfied that the policy memorandum constituted a “definitive position” on the issue of buyout program eligibility — one that, as to the State respondents, could not be “significantly ameliorated by further administrative action” (Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 8 NY3d at 194 ). 3 As to the actual date upon which the four-month statute of limitations began to run, the State respondents correctly note that the “readily ascertainable” requirement is styled as a constructive notice standard; actual, in-hand notice of the underlying determination is not requ

2013As the Court of Appeals noted in 1-T-E Imperial Corp. — Empire Div. v Bankers Trust Co. ( 51 NY2d 811 [1980]), “[w]ith the adoption ... of the Uniform Commercial Code, the concept of notice under [UCC] article 3 (and by analogy under article 4 as well. . . ) has, as we have held in Chemical Bank of Rochester v Haskell ( 51 NY2d 85 [1980]), been changed from an objective to a subjective standard, and that change must be deemed to have amended the Lien Law as well” (id. at 813-814; see LeChase Data/Telecom Servs., LLC v Goebert, 6 NY3d 281, 291-292 [2006]).

2013As the Court of Appeals noted in 1-T-E Imperial Corp. — Empire Div. v Bankers Trust Co. ( 51 NY2d 811 [1980]), “[w]ith the adoption ... of the Uniform Commercial Code, the concept of notice under [UCC] article 3 (and by analogy under article 4 as well. . . ) has, as we have held in Chemical Bank of Rochester v Haskell ( 51 NY2d 85 [1980]), been changed from an objective to a subjective standard, and that change must be deemed to have amended the Lien Law as well” (id. at 813-814; see LeChase Data/Telecom Servs., LLC v Goebert, 6 NY3d 281, 291-292 [2006]).

2013As the Court of Appeals noted in 1-T-E Imperial Corp. — Empire Div. v Bankers Trust Co. ( 51 NY2d 811 [1980]), “[w]ith the adoption ... of the Uniform Commercial Code, the concept of notice under [UCC] article 3 (and by analogy under article 4 as well. . . ) has, as we have held in Chemical Bank of Rochester v Haskell ( 51 NY2d 85 [1980]), been changed from an objective to a subjective standard, and that change must be deemed to have amended the Lien Law as well” (id. at 813-814; see LeChase Data/Telecom Servs., LLC v Goebert, 6 NY3d 281, 291-292 [2006]).

2013As the Court of Appeals noted in 1-T-E Imperial Corp. — Empire Div. v Bankers Trust Co. ( 51 NY2d 811 [1980]), “[w]ith the adoption ... of the Uniform Commercial Code, the concept of notice under [UCC] article 3 (and by analogy under article 4 as well. . . ) has, as we have held in Chemical Bank of Rochester v Haskell ( 51 NY2d 85 [1980]), been changed from an objective to a subjective standard, and that change must be deemed to have amended the Lien Law as well” (id. at 813-814; see LeChase Data/Telecom Servs., LLC v Goebert, 6 NY3d 281, 291-292 [2006]).

1895Judge Rapallo said (page 125): “We have not been referred to any case where the doctrine of constructive notice has been applied so as to charge a purchaser of land, who has paid a valuable consideration and was, in fact, innocent of any guilty knowledge, with notice that his grantor made the conveyance with- intent to defraud creditors at large, having no special lien or equity.” After distinguishing the cases of Baker v. Bliss ( 39 N. Y. 70 ) and Reed v. Gannon ( 50 N. Y. 345 ) Judge Rapallo lays down the rule that there is no duty of active vigilance cast upon the purchaser for the benefit

1883The case of Baker v. Bliss ( 39 N. Y. 70 ) is cited as an authority to that effect, and the head note gives it that interpretation.

2025Rates , 76 NY2d 779 . "[T]he 'readily ascertainable' requirement is styled as a constructive notice standard; actual, in-hand notice of the underlying determination is not required." Sch.

2025Rates , 76 NY2d 779 . "[T]he 'readily ascertainable' requirement is styled as a constructive notice standard; actual, in-hand notice of the underlying determination is not required." Sch.

2025Adm'rs Ass'n of NY State , 124 AD3d at 1177 (citing Riverkeeper , 28 AD3d at 961-62 ).

2025Adm'rs Ass'n of NY State , 124 AD3d at 1177 (citing Riverkeeper , 28 AD3d at 961-62 ).

1895Judge Rapallo said (page 125): “We have not been referred to any case where the doctrine of constructive notice has been applied so as to charge a purchaser of land, who has paid a valuable consideration and was, in fact, innocent of any guilty knowledge, with notice that his grantor made the conveyance with- intent to defraud creditors at large, having no special lien or equity.” After distinguishing the cases of Baker v. Bliss ( 39 N. Y. 70 ) and Reed v. Gannon ( 50 N. Y. 345 ) Judge Rapallo lays down the rule that there is no duty of active vigilance cast upon the purchaser for the benefit

1883In the case of Reed v. Gannon ( 50 N. Y. 345 ) the doctrine of constructive notice was applied to the case of a transfer of personal property.

2026Interestingly, the interplay between applying a county's prior written notice statute involving conditions on roadways within the county's jurisdiction and the burden imposed on the parties on a motion for summary judgment are often presented together, as they are here (<i>see</i> <i>Hart v City of <span>[*8]</span>Buffalo</i>, 218 AD3d at 1147 ; <i>Pasternak v County of Chenango</i>, 156 AD3d 1007 ; <i>Napolitano v Suffolk County Dept. of Pub.

2026Interestingly, the interplay between applying a county's prior written notice statute involving conditions on roadways within the county's jurisdiction and the burden imposed on the parties on a motion for summary judgment are often presented together, as they are here (<i>see</i> <i>Hart v City of <span>[*8]</span>Buffalo</i>, 218 AD3d at 1147 ; <i>Pasternak v County of Chenango</i>, 156 AD3d 1007 ; <i>Napolitano v Suffolk County Dept. of Pub.

2015We therefore are satisfied that the policy memorandum constituted a “definitive position” on the issue of buyout program eligibility — one that, as to the State respondents, could not be “significantly ameliorated by further administrative action” (Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 8 NY3d at 194 ). 3 As to the actual date upon which the four-month statute of limitations began to run, the State respondents correctly note that the “readily ascertainable” requirement is styled as a constructive notice standard; actual, in-hand notice of the underlying determination is not requ

2013Plaintiff’s own submissions raise issues of fact whether First Niagara had actual notice, and thus we need not consider the sufficiency of First Niagara’s opposing papers (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 ). -3- 1088 CA 12-02386 We also agree with First Niagara that the court erred in applying a constructive notice standard in determining that First Niagara was not a holder in due course, and thus could be liable under Lien Law § 72 (1).

2000The actual or constructive notice rule is premised on the concept that some observable condition exists that the landlord either has discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered and remedied (see, Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837 ).

1988Subsequent decisions have tended to restrict rather than expand the Bartolomeo doctrine so that custodial interrogation is not barred where the defendant falsely denies being represented on a pending charge so long as such denial is reasonable (People v Lucarano, 61 NY2d 138 ) or where different law enforcement agencies were involved (People v Fuschino, 59 NY2d 91 ), provided they were not working so closely as to constitute a joint investigation (People v Miles, 112 AD2d 585 , affd, 67 NY2d 920 ), and even when the same District Attorney’s office was involved, so long as the person handling t

1988Implicit in that decision, however, was the finding that actual knowledge of the pending charges was not overlooked or avoided by the police, thus in effect creating a "good faith” exception to the constructive notice rule of Bartolomeo (supra).

1988Subsequent decisions have tended to restrict rather than expand the Bartolomeo doctrine so that custodial interrogation is not barred where the defendant falsely denies being represented on a pending charge so long as such denial is reasonable (People v Lucarano, 61 NY2d 138 ) or where different law enforcement agencies were involved (People v Fuschino, 59 NY2d 91 ), provided they were not working so closely as to constitute a joint investigation (People v Miles, 112 AD2d 585 , affd, 67 NY2d 920 ), and even when the same District Attorney’s office was involved, so long as the person handling t

1988Subsequent decisions have tended to restrict rather than expand the Bartolomeo doctrine so that custodial interrogation is not barred where the defendant falsely denies being represented on a pending charge so long as such denial is reasonable (People v Lucarano, 61 NY2d 138 ) or where different law enforcement agencies were involved (People v Fuschino, 59 NY2d 91 ), provided they were not working so closely as to constitute a joint investigation (People v Miles, 112 AD2d 585 , affd, 67 NY2d 920 ), and even when the same District Attorney’s office was involved, so long as the person handling t

1988Subsequent decisions have tended to restrict rather than expand the Bartolomeo doctrine so that custodial interrogation is not barred where the defendant falsely denies being represented on a pending charge so long as such denial is reasonable (People v Lucarano, 61 NY2d 138 ) or where different law enforcement agencies were involved (People v Fuschino, 59 NY2d 91 ), provided they were not working so closely as to constitute a joint investigation (People v Miles, 112 AD2d 585 , affd, 67 NY2d 920 ), and even when the same District Attorney’s office was involved, so long as the person handling t

1966The case of Anderson v. Blood ( 152 N. Y. 285 ) also involved the application of the doctrine of constructive notice to real estate transfers.

1963“If the agent acquires knowledge of a fact, while engaged in the business of his principal, and fails to institute the proper inquiries, by reason of forgetfulness, it is negligence, and the doctrine of constructive notice applies.” (Bennett v. Buchan, 76 N. Y. 386, 390-391 , supra.) (See, also, Link v. Wabash R.

1913He must have actual knowledge." In Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N. Y. 348 , the court said (p. 352): “ It is not sufficient that the seller may have the means of ascertaining the name of the principal.

1913The doctrine of constructive notice, from the .possession of the certificate, would be misapplied if, in this case, it should be held to exempt the bank from liability.” In DeRemer v. Brown, 165 N. Y. 410 , the court said (p. 419): "Nor is it sufficient to exonerate the agent from liability that the seller has means of ascertaining the name of the principal.

1895Acer v. Westcott, 46 N. Y. 384 .

1879(See 15 N. Y., 362 [supra]; 50 id., 350 [supra]).