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21 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barker v. Kallashgreen2 sentences2024However, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the Town defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in Action No. 2. "[W]here a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiff's conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation" ( Alami v Volkswagen of Am. , 97 NY2d 281, 285 [emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Manning v Brown , 91 NY2d 116, 120 ; Barker v Kallash , 63 NY2d 19, 25 ). 2023"Pursuant to established case law, the public policy of our State provides that 'where a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiff's conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation'" ( Oriental v U-Haul Co. of Ariz. , 130 AD3d 702, 703 [emphasis omitted], quoting Manning v Brown , 91 NY2d 116, 120 ; see Alami v Volkswagen of Am. , 97 NY2d 281, 287 ; Barker v Kallash , 63 NY2d 19, 24-26 ). | 10 | 17 |
Manning v. Browngreen2 sentences2024However, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the Town defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in Action No. 2. "[W]here a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiff's conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation" ( Alami v Volkswagen of Am. , 97 NY2d 281, 285 [emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Manning v Brown , 91 NY2d 116, 120 ; Barker v Kallash , 63 NY2d 19, 25 ). 2023"Pursuant to established case law, the public policy of our State provides that 'where a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiff's conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation'" ( Oriental v U-Haul Co. of Ariz. , 130 AD3d 702, 703 [emphasis omitted], quoting Manning v Brown , 91 NY2d 116, 120 ; see Alami v Volkswagen of Am. , 97 NY2d 281, 287 ; Barker v Kallash , 63 NY2d 19, 24-26 ). | 9 | 13 |
La Page v. Smithgreen2 sentences2014Plaintiff appeals. “[A]s a matter of public policy, . . . where a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiffs conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation” (Manning v Brown, 91 NY2d 116, 120 [1997]; see Barker v Kallash, 63 NY2d 19, 24 [1984]; Wolfe v Hatch, 95 AD3d 1394, 1395-1396 [2012]; La Page v Smith, 166 AD2d 831, 832 [1990], lv denied 78 NY2d 855 [1991]). 2014Plaintiff appeals. “[A]s a matter of public policy, . . . where a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiffs conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation” (Manning v Brown, 91 NY2d 116, 120 [1997]; see Barker v Kallash, 63 NY2d 19, 24 [1984]; Wolfe v Hatch, 95 AD3d 1394, 1395-1396 [2012]; La Page v Smith, 166 AD2d 831, 832 [1990], lv denied 78 NY2d 855 [1991]). | 6 | 6 |
Alami v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.green2 sentences2024However, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the Town defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in Action No. 2. "[W]here a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiff's conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation" ( Alami v Volkswagen of Am. , 97 NY2d 281, 285 [emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Manning v Brown , 91 NY2d 116, 120 ; Barker v Kallash , 63 NY2d 19, 25 ). 2023"Pursuant to established case law, the public policy of our State provides that 'where a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiff's conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation'" ( Oriental v U-Haul Co. of Ariz. , 130 AD3d 702, 703 [emphasis omitted], quoting Manning v Brown , 91 NY2d 116, 120 ; see Alami v Volkswagen of Am. , 97 NY2d 281, 287 ; Barker v Kallash , 63 NY2d 19, 24-26 ). | 4 | 4 |
Wolfe v. Hatchgreen2 sentences2014Plaintiff appeals. “[A]s a matter of public policy, . . . where a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiffs conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation” (Manning v Brown, 91 NY2d 116, 120 [1997]; see Barker v Kallash, 63 NY2d 19, 24 [1984]; Wolfe v Hatch, 95 AD3d 1394, 1395-1396 [2012]; La Page v Smith, 166 AD2d 831, 832 [1990], lv denied 78 NY2d 855 [1991]). 2014Plaintiff appeals. “[A]s a matter of public policy, . . . where a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiffs conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation” (Manning v Brown, 91 NY2d 116, 120 [1997]; see Barker v Kallash, 63 NY2d 19, 24 [1984]; Wolfe v Hatch, 95 AD3d 1394, 1395-1396 [2012]; La Page v Smith, 166 AD2d 831, 832 [1990], lv denied 78 NY2d 855 [1991]). | 3 | 3 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Here, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff's injuries arose directly from her knowing and intentional serious criminal activity of escaping police custody ( see Moore v County of Suffolk , 11 AD3d 591, 592 ; Johnson v State of New York , 253 AD2d 274, 279-280 ). 2012The rule, which is premised upon the public policy that “one may not profit from one’s own wrongdoing” (Manning v Brown, 91 NY2d at 120 ; see Johnson v State of New York, 253 AD2d 274, 279 [1999]), does not compel dismissal of a complaint “merely because the plaintiff’s injuries were occasioned by a criminal act” (Barker v Kallash, 63 NY2d at 25 ). | 2 | 3 |
Grayes v. DiStasiogreen2 sentences2015Taylor is also estopped from asserting that his conduct with respect to the underlying altercation with the decedent was justified (see Colby v Crocitto, 207 AD2d 764, 765 [1994]; Grayes v DiStasio, 166 AD2d 261, 263 [1990]). 2015Taylor is also estopped from asserting that his conduct with respect to the underlying altercation with the decedent was justified (see Colby v Crocitto, 207 AD2d 764, 765 [1994]; Grayes v DiStasio, 166 AD2d 261, 263 [1990]). | 2 | 2 |
Colby v. Crocittogreen2 sentences2015Taylor is also estopped from asserting that his conduct with respect to the underlying altercation with the decedent was justified (see Colby v Crocitto, 207 AD2d 764, 765 [1994]; Grayes v DiStasio, 166 AD2d 261, 263 [1990]). 2015Taylor is also estopped from asserting that his conduct with respect to the underlying altercation with the decedent was justified (see Colby v Crocitto, 207 AD2d 764, 765 [1994]; Grayes v DiStasio, 166 AD2d 261, 263 [1990]). | 2 | 2 |
Carr v. Hoygreen2 sentences2021The rule derives from the maxim that "[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his [or her] own fraud, or to take advantage of his [or her] own wrong, or to found any claim upon his [or her] own iniquity, or to acquire property by his [or her] own crime" ( Riggs , 115 NY at 511 ; see Alami v Volkswagen of Am. , 97 NY2d 281, 286 [2002]; Manning , 91 NY2d at 120 ; Barker , 63 NY2d at 25 ; Carr v Hoy , 2 NY2d 185, 187 [1957]). 1997The policy derives from the rule that one may not profit from one’s own wrongdoing (see, Carr v Hoy, 2 NY2d 185 ; Riggs v Palmer, 115 NY 506 ) and precludes recovery "at the very threshold of the plaintiff’s application for judicial relief” (Barker v Kallash, supra, 63 NY2d, at 26 ). ”[R]ecovery is denied, not because plaintiff contributed to [her] injury, but because the public policy of this State generally denies judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act” (id., at 24). | 1 | 2 |
Oriental v. U-Haul Co. of Ariz.green1 sentence2023"Pursuant to established case law, the public policy of our State provides that 'where a plaintiff has engaged in unlawful conduct, the courts will not entertain suit if the plaintiff's conduct constitutes a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which the plaintiff seeks recovery are the direct result of that violation'" ( Oriental v U-Haul Co. of Ariz. , 130 AD3d 702, 703 [emphasis omitted], quoting Manning v Brown , 91 NY2d 116, 120 ; see Alami v Volkswagen of Am. , 97 NY2d 281, 287 ; Barker v Kallash , 63 NY2d 19, 24-26 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Riggs v. . Palmer
green
2 sentences2021The rule derives from the maxim that "[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his [or her] own fraud, or to take advantage of his [or her] own wrong, or to found any claim upon his [or her] own iniquity, or to acquire property by his [or her] own crime" ( Riggs , 115 NY at 511 ; see Alami v Volkswagen of Am. , 97 NY2d 281, 286 [2002]; Manning , 91 NY2d at 120 ; Barker , 63 NY2d at 25 ; Carr v Hoy , 2 NY2d 185, 187 [1957]). 1997The policy derives from the rule that one may not profit from one’s own wrongdoing (see, Carr v Hoy, 2 NY2d 185 ; Riggs v Palmer, 115 NY 506 ) and precludes recovery "at the very threshold of the plaintiff’s application for judicial relief” (Barker v Kallash, supra, 63 NY2d, at 26 ). ”[R]ecovery is denied, not because plaintiff contributed to [her] injury, but because the public policy of this State generally denies judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act” (id., at 24). | 2 | 1997–2021 |
Hathaway v. Eastman
green
1 sentence2024Contrary to the Estate's contention, the Town defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint in Action No. 2 by showing that Williams' actions of driving erratically and speeding in order to evade the police were sufficiently serious to bar the causes of action to recover damages for pain and suffering and wrongful death ( see Manning v Brown , 91 NY2d at 120 ; Hathaway v Eastman , 122 AD3d 964, 966 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Moore v. County of Suffolk
green
1 sentence2023Here, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff's injuries arose directly from her knowing and intentional serious criminal activity of escaping police custody ( see Moore v County of Suffolk , 11 AD3d 591, 592 ; Johnson v State of New York , 253 AD2d 274, 279-280 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Barretta v. Trump Plaza Hotel & Casino
green
2 sentences2002The Appellate Division affirmed, holding only that “the negligent manner in which the decedent was operating his vehicle was the sole proximate cause of the collision and his fatal injuries” ( 278 AD2d 262 ). 2002The Appellate Division affirmed, holding only that "the negligent manner in which the decedent was operating his vehicle was the sole proximate cause of the collision and his fatal injuries" ( 278 AD2d 262 ). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Boodle
green
1 sentence1987That is how the matter was han died in People v Boodle (supra) on which the decision in Ocampo is based. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Lombardi
green
1 sentence1985Indeed, the receipt of such information during the course of a Sandoval hearing does not preclude a Trial Judge from presiding at the subsequent bench trial (People v Lombardi, 76 AD2d 891 ). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Reno v. D'Javid
green
1 sentence1984In this latter instance recovery is denied, not because the plaintiff contributed to his injury, but because the public policy of this State generally denies judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act (Reno v D’Javid, 42 NY2d 1040 ). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.