notice of intention claim in New York

2013Claimant’s further contention that the continuous treatment doctrine applied to toll the time period within which the notice of intention or claim may be served (see Ogle v State of New York, 142 AD2d 37, 39 [1988]) is not properly before us because it is raised for the first time on appeal (see Hatzfeld, 104 AD3d at 1167 ; Williams v State of New York, 56 AD3d 1208 , 1208 [2008]).

2013Claimant’s further contention that the continuous treatment doctrine applied to toll the time period within which the notice of intention or claim may be served (see Ogle v State of New York, 142 AD2d 37, 39 [1988]) is not properly before us because it is raised for the first time on appeal (see Hatzfeld, 104 AD3d at 1167 ; Williams v State of New York, 56 AD3d 1208 , 1208 [2008]).

2026Co. v Szwec , 36 AD2d 863 ), the notice of intention at bar was proper."]).

2026Co. v Szwec , 36 AD2d 863), the notice of intention at bar was proper."]).

1986It has been stated that the term "claim accrued” as used in the Court of Claims Act § 10 is not identical with the expression "cause of action accrued” found in CPLR 203 (a) (see, e.g., Otis Elevator Co. v State of New York, 52 AD2d 380; Dufel v State of New York, 198 App Div 97, 102 ; Moltion v State of New York, 193 Misc 850 , affd 277 App Div 835 , affd sub nom.

1947Co., 270 N. Y. 287 ; Dufel v. State of New York, 198 App. Div. 97 .) Section 10 of the Court of Claims Act is a Statute of Limitations and the time prescribed by it for the filing of a notice of intention or claim begins to run upon the accrual of the cause of action.

2011In contrast, in Sheils v State of New York ( 249 AD2d 459 [1998]) a lack of detail within a notice of intention and claim regarding the exact location along a 1,000-foot length of specified roadway in front of a church property where a pedestrian fell was held to be jurisdictionally defective, where the fall was attributed to a defect along the roadway (see also Wilson, 61 AD3d 1367 [2009] [notice of intention defective for failing to recite year of injury, and a particular road or place on such road where fall allegedly occurred]; Triani, 44 AD3d 1032 [2007] [reversing Court of Claims’ determ

2011I lastly note that Vargas v State of New York ( 83 AD3d 1525 [2011]), cited by defendants herein, similarly affirmed the dismissal of a claim that was based upon the failure to recite the particular location along 4.7 miles of an identified roadway wherein claimed dangerous pavement allegedly caused a motorcyclist to crash, or the nature of the pavement defect involved. 5 Here, the claim is similarly premised upon an alleged defect in an open setting, such that specificity in the description of the location of the incident is of heightened significance.

2011In contrast, in Sheils v State of New York ( 249 AD2d 459 [1998]) a lack of detail within a notice of intention and claim regarding the exact location along a 1,000-foot length of specified roadway in front of a church property where a pedestrian fell was held to be jurisdictionally defective, where the fall was attributed to a defect along the roadway (see also Wilson, 61 AD3d 1367 [2009] [notice of intention defective for failing to recite year of injury, and a particular road or place on such road where fall allegedly occurred]; Triani, 44 AD3d 1032 [2007] [reversing Court of Claims’ determ

2011In contrast, in Sheils v State of New York ( 249 AD2d 459 [1998]) a lack of detail within a notice of intention and claim regarding the exact location along a 1,000-foot length of specified roadway in front of a church property where a pedestrian fell was held to be jurisdictionally defective, where the fall was attributed to a defect along the roadway (see also Wilson, 61 AD3d 1367 [2009] [notice of intention defective for failing to recite year of injury, and a particular road or place on such road where fall allegedly occurred]; Triani, 44 AD3d 1032 [2007] [reversing Court of Claims’ determ

2007M-63375, CM-63422, UID No. 2001-029-073, affd 291 AD2d 432 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 602 [2002] [statement that “Court lacks jurisdiction . . . due to Claimant’s failure to timely serve the notice of intention and the claim ... in accordance with Court of Claims Act Sections 10 and 11, which requires (sic) service and filing of the notice of intention or claim within ninety days of the accrual date” found sufficient]; Ramirez v State of New York, 171 Misc 2d 677, 679 [1997] [statement that “Claimant served neither a notice of intention nor the claim on the State within ninety (90) days of the

1986It has been stated that the term "claim accrued” as used in the Court of Claims Act § 10 is not identical with the expression "cause of action accrued” found in CPLR 203 (a) (see, e.g., Otis Elevator Co. v State of New York, 52 AD2d 380; Dufel v State of New York, 198 App Div 97, 102 ; Moltion v State of New York, 193 Misc 850 , affd 277 App Div 835 , affd sub nom.

1986It has been stated that the term "claim accrued” as used in the Court of Claims Act § 10 is not identical with the expression "cause of action accrued” found in CPLR 203 (a) (see, e.g., Otis Elevator Co. v State of New York, 52 AD2d 380; Dufel v State of New York, 198 App Div 97, 102 ; Moltion v State of New York, 193 Misc 850 , affd 277 App Div 835 , affd sub nom.

1985(See, Morawski v Board of Educ., 85 AD2d 850 , lv denied 57 NY2d 602 .) No such document was filed until January of 1984, well beyond the last month (Feb. 1983) that third-party calls were at issue.

1984Said Authority “is an autonomous public corporation, with an existence separate and independent from the State”, and service on the Attorney-General is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the Thruway Authority as a party defendant (Cantor v State of New York, 43 AD2d 872, 873 ).

1984Finally, claimant’s action appears to be meritorious (see Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 Misc 2d 1 ), and is claimant’s only available remedy.

1984Furthermore, since any recovery herein will be restricted to the items advanced in claimant’s verified statement of claim (see Standard Specifications, § 109-14; see, also, Fosco Fabricators v State of New York, 94 AD2d 667, 668 , supra; Kembridge Corp. v State of New York, 101 Misc 2d 904, 908 , supra), we cannot find that any prejudice has resulted to defendant by reason of claimant’s failure to timely serve it with a notice of intention or claim.

1983(See, e.g., La Bar Truck Rental v State of New York, 52 AD2d 1007 .) As to claimants’ dispersion, they must have discovered the subject error (i.e., when it was confirmed George Jenkins was in fact still alive) before February 26,1980, since that was the date the State wrote Agnes Jenkins apologizing for the mistake. 2 Thus they had about 70 days in which to timely file a notice of intention or claim.

1981(Jones v City Univ. of N. Y., 105 Misc 2d 1087 .) Applying the above-cited rule to the facts of this case results in the accrual of the claim on May 30, 1981, 30 days after the demand had been made.

1979Service of the notice of intention or claim provides "the only actual notice to the State body or officer responsible for the investigation and litigation of the claim” (Andriola v State of New York, 53 AD2d 966, 968 ).

1979The failure to file the notice of intention within the 90-day period is of no real significance in its effect upon the proceedings so long as the notice of intention was timely served on the Attorney-General (Garrette v State of New York, 197 Misc 842, 846 ).

1976Co. ( 30 NY2d 143 ), the State contended that claimants were required to file and serve a notice of intention or claim on or before September 22, 1972; or, within six months of the Dole effective date.

1965(Wittkugel v. State of New York, 5 Misc 2d 886, 890 , affd. 5 A D 2d 958; Curtis v. State of New York, 201 Misc. 342 .) The instant record compels the conclusion that the legal duty imposed on the committee to comply with subdivision 3 of section 10 of the act which by its terms requires the filing of a notice of intention or claim within 90 days of the accrual of the claim, in this case the date of the accident, conceded to be June 27, 1963, may not be interposed to defeat the instant motion.

1965(Wittkugel v. State of New York, 5 Misc 2d 886, 890 , affd. 5 A D 2d 958; Curtis v. State of New York, 201 Misc. 342 .) The instant record compels the conclusion that the legal duty imposed on the committee to comply with subdivision 3 of section 10 of the act which by its terms requires the filing of a notice of intention or claim within 90 days of the accrual of the claim, in this case the date of the accident, conceded to be June 27, 1963, may not be interposed to defeat the instant motion.

1947Co., 270 N. Y. 287 ; Dufel v. State of New York, 198 App. Div. 97 .) Section 10 of the Court of Claims Act is a Statute of Limitations and the time prescribed by it for the filing of a notice of intention or claim begins to run upon the accrual of the cause of action.

1947(Undritz v. State of New York, 179 Misc. 467 ; Tomasetti Constr.

1941In support thereof, the case of Schroeder v. State of New York ( 252 App. Div. 16 ; affd., 276 N. Y. 627 ) is cited.