substantially similar standard in Ohio

2001The Ohio Supreme Court set out a substantially similar standard in State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , paragraph two of the syllabus, holding "[c]ounsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel's performance." Defendant has failed to allege how he was either denied effective assistance of counsel or how he was prejudiced by any alleged ineffectiveness.

2001The Ohio Supreme Court set out a substantially similar standard in State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , paragraph two of the syllabus, holding "[c]ounsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel's performance." Appellant Woodall has alleged that counsel's representation was deficient in that (1) he failed to timely subpoena three witnesses, and (2) he failed to timely request documents from CSB resulting in the tria

2007Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." Id. at 687 . {¶ 26} The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391 , 358 N.E.2d 623 , devised a substantially similar test: "When considering an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a two-step process is usually employed.

2000The Supreme Court of Ohio set out a substantially similar standard in State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , paragraph two of the syllabus, holding that "[c]ounsel's performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until counsel's performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel's performance." In order to show prejudice, "the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different." Id. at para

2007Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." Id. at 687 . {¶ 26} The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391 , 358 N.E.2d 623 , devised a substantially similar test: "When considering an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a two-step process is usually employed.

2007Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." Id. at 687 . {¶ 26} The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391 , 358 N.E.2d 623 , devised a substantially similar test: "When considering an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a two-step process is usually employed.

2018Warren No. CA2017-07-117, 2018-Ohio-2885 . -2- Butler CA2017-10-153 was served with the motions by regular mail, postage prepaid, on August 2, 2017.

2013Ross No. 94CA2072, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 915 (Mar. 5, 1996), the court held that the heart of the statutory charge is that accomplice testimony is to be viewed with “grave suspicion” and “weighed with great caution.” See State v. Tumbleson, 105 Ohio App.3d 693 , 664 N.E.2d 1318 (12th Dist.1995); State v. Adams, 9th Dist.

2013Ross No. 94CA2072, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 915 (Mar. 5, 1996), the court held that the heart of the statutory charge is that accomplice testimony is to be viewed with “grave suspicion” and “weighed with great caution.” See State v. Tumbleson, 105 Ohio App.3d 693 , 664 N.E.2d 1318 (12th Dist.1995); State v. Adams, 9th Dist.

2013Reiterating the First Appellate District, “[w]e emphasize that judges should not meddle with the instructions written in any statute, because a few more words of difference could well result in a reversal * * *.” State v. Williams, 117 Ohio App.3d 488 , 495 690 N.E.2d 1297 (1st Dist.1996). {¶91} Gibson also summarily states that the court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that prior convictions of the witness could be used to evaluate credibility, which compounded the problem with the accomplice testimony instruction.

2013Reiterating the First Appellate District, “[w]e emphasize that judges should not meddle with the instructions written in any statute, because a few more words of difference could well result in a reversal * * *.” State v. Williams, 117 Ohio App.3d 488 , 495 690 N.E.2d 1297 (1st Dist.1996). {¶91} Gibson also summarily states that the court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that prior convictions of the witness could be used to evaluate credibility, which compounded the problem with the accomplice testimony instruction.

2006It is the duty of the courts, if the language of a statute fairly permits or unless restrained by the clear language thereof, so to construe the statute as to avoid such a result.’ Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 47 [ 45 O.O.2d 327 , 242 N.E.2d 566 ], paragraph four of the syllabus.” Celebrezze v. Hughes (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 , 18 OBR 102, 479 N.E.2d 886 . {¶ 44} As applied to acts or practices that allegedly violate generic but reasonably specific rules promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to R.C. 1345.05(B)(2), the substantially-similar test imposes an u

2006It is the duty of the courts, if the language of a statute fairly permits or unless restrained by the clear language thereof, so to construe the statute as to avoid such a result.’ Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 47 [ 45 O.O.2d 327 , 242 N.E.2d 566 ], paragraph four of the syllabus.” Celebrezze v. Hughes (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 , 18 OBR 102, 479 N.E.2d 886 . {¶ 44} As applied to acts or practices that allegedly violate generic but reasonably specific rules promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to R.C. 1345.05(B)(2), the substantially-similar test imposes an u

2006It is the duty of the courts, if the language of a statute fairly permits or unless restrained by the clear language thereof, so to construe the statute as to avoid such a result.’ Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 47 [ 45 O.O.2d 327 , 242 N.E.2d 566 ], paragraph four of the syllabus.” Celebrezze v. Hughes (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 , 18 OBR 102, 479 N.E.2d 886 . {¶ 44} As applied to acts or practices that allegedly violate generic but reasonably specific rules promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to R.C. 1345.05(B)(2), the substantially-similar test imposes an u

2006It is the duty of the courts, if the language of a statute fairly permits or unless restrained by the clear language thereof, so to construe the statute as to avoid such a result.’ Canton v. Imperial Bowling Lanes (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 47 [ 45 O.O.2d 327 , 242 N.E.2d 566 ], paragraph four of the syllabus.” Celebrezze v. Hughes (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 , 18 OBR 102, 479 N.E.2d 886 . {¶ 44} As applied to acts or practices that allegedly violate generic but reasonably specific rules promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to R.C. 1345.05(B)(2), the substantially-similar test imposes an u

2001Super. 1 , 750 A.2d 773 , an appeal from the same Bergen County Superior Court (Law Division, Civil Part) that entered the order in the present matter, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court determined, in part, that a substantially similar clause in a copier lease did not provide notice of the forum and militates in favor of a finding that the clause is both unfair and unreasonable as measured by Restatement standards.

2001Id., at 6 , 750 A.2d at 776 .

1987Appellant further submits that this error was compounded by the court’s statement that “* * * [t]he final decision as to whether the death penalty shall be imposed upon the defendant rests upon this Court after the Court follows certain additional procedures required by the laws of this State.” A substantially similar instruction 1 was considered by this court in State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St. 3d 124 , 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E. 2d 795 .

1987Appellant further submits that this error was compounded by the court’s statement that “* * * [t]he final decision as to whether the death penalty shall be imposed upon the defendant rests upon this Court after the Court follows certain additional procedures required by the laws of this State.” A substantially similar instruction 1 was considered by this court in State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St. 3d 124 , 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E. 2d 795 .