substantially similar standard in Pennsylvania

2017The Court also makes an independent determination — apparently, as a matter of law — that Dr. Foster was not qualified to testify under MCARE because Schweers submitted an affidavit filed by Dr. Foster in another case that stated that he “no longer practices as an orthopedic surgeon.” Citing Section 512(c)(2) of the MCARE Act, 40 P.S. § 1303.512(c)(2), the Court notes that an expert testifying as to a physician’s standard of care must practice “in the same subspecialty as the defendant physician or in a subspecialty which has a substantially similar standard of care for the specific care at is

2016“With passage of the MCARE Act, the General Assembly created a more stringent standard for admissibility of medical expert testimony in a medical malpractice action by the imposition of specific additional requirements not present in the common law standard.” Vicari v. Spiegel, - 11 - J.A02042/16 989 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Pa. 2010) (“Vicari II”).

2009Finally, the court indicated that Section 512(c)(2)’s same-subspecialty requirement may be waived where the testifying physician has expertise in a subspecialty “which has a substantially similar standard of care for the specific care in issue.” Id. at 211 (citing Herbert v. Parkview Hosp., 854 A.2d 1285, 1292 (Pa.Super.2004)).

2009Finally, the court indicated that Section 512(c)(2)'s same-subspecialty requirement may be waived where the testifying physician has expertise in a subspecialty "which has a substantially similar standard of care for the specific care in issue." Id. at 211 (citing Herbert v. Parkview Hosp., 854 A.2d 1285, 1292 (Pa.Super.2004)).

2009They argue that since he was neither substantially familiar with the applicable standard of care, nor practiced in a specialty that had a substantially similar standard of care, he was unqualified to render standard-of-eare opinion as to Dr. Hebron under Section 1303.512 of the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (“MCARE”) Act, 40 Pa.C.S.A. § 1303.101, et seq., which addresses the qualifications of expert witnesses in medical malpractice actions. ¶ 20 “Decisions regarding admission of expert testimony, like other evidentiary decisions, are within the sound discretion of the trial

2006This was made clear in the case of Smith v. Paoli Memorial Hospital, 885 A.2d 1012 (Pa. Super. 2005), wherein we find: “In addressing the admissibility of the internist’s testimony, the Herbert [v. Parkview Hospital, 854 A.2d 1285 (Pa. Super. 2004)] panel focused on the language of the MCARE Act requiring that the expert be familiar with the standard of care for the specific care at issue and practice in the same or a substantially similar sub-specialty which has a substantially similar standard of care for the specific care at issue.

2025Further, the trial court made no determination with regard to Section 512(e). “[Section 512(e)] allows a court to waive the same specialty and board certification requirements for an expert testifying as to a standard of care if the court determines that the expert possesses sufficient training, experience, and knowledge to provide the testimony as a result of active involvement in ... medicine in a ... related field of medicine within the previous five-year time period.” George v. Ellis, 911 A.2d 121, 131 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing 40 P.S. § 1303.512(e)).

2024Further, the trial court made no determination with regard to Section 512(e). “[Section 512(e)] allows a court to waive the same specialty and board certification requirements for an expert testifying as to a standard of care if the court determines that the expert possesses sufficient training, experience, and knowledge to provide the testimony as a result of active involvement in ... medicine in a ... related field of medicine within the previous five-year time period.” George v. Ellis, 911 A.2d 121, 131 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing 40 P.S. § 1303.512(e)).

2015For expert testimony on the standard of care in medical malpractice matters, the MCARE Act requires a “three part test in which each basis must be established.” Rose v. Annabi, 2007 PA Super 308 , 934 A.2d 743, 746 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also, Vicari v. Spiegel, 605 Pa. 381, 388 , 989 A.2d at 1281, 1282 (Pa. 2010) (each of the three Section 512(c) requirements (standard-of-care-familiarity, same-subspecialty, and board-certification) is mandatory).

2015For expert testimony on the standard of care in medical malpractice matters, the MCARE Act requires a “three part test in which each basis must be established.” Rose v. Annabi, 2007 PA Super 308 , 934 A.2d 743, 746 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also, Vicari v. Spiegel, 605 Pa. 381, 388 , 989 A.2d at 1281, 1282 (Pa. 2010) (each of the three Section 512(c) requirements (standard-of-care-familiarity, same-subspecialty, and board-certification) is mandatory).

2005See Gartland v. Rosenthal, 850 A.2d 671, 673, 675-676 (Pa.Super.2004) (opining that a neurologist was qualified to testify as to the standard of care for a radiologist reading a CT scan of the brain where the specific treatment at issue was failure to report on the possibility of a tumor and to recommend an MRI).