37 California opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2022 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Anzalonegreen2 sentences2015Defendant contends that, because this theory was supported by substantial evidence, the court was required to instruct with CALCRIM No. 626 (or a substantially similar instruction). 4 The clerk's minutes indicate the result of the polling of the jurors was "10 YES 0 NO." However, the reporter's transcript confirms that all 12 jurors answered "Yes" to the question "Was this and is this your verdict?" and that the clerk "record[ed] 12 affirmative responses." Because no party raises any issue and because there is nothing to indicate the reporter's transcript may be inaccurate, "we presume the cou 2015Defendant contends that, because this theory was supported by substantial evidence, the court was required to instruct with CALCRIM No. 626 (or a substantially similar instruction). 4 The clerk's minutes indicate the result of the polling of the jurors was "10 YES 0 NO." However, the reporter's transcript confirms that all 12 jurors answered "Yes" to the question "Was this and is this your verdict?" and that the clerk "record[ed] 12 affirmative responses." Because no party raises any issue and because there is nothing to indicate the reporter's transcript may be inaccurate, "we presume the cou | 2 | 2 |
Sluis v. Betty W.green2 sentences1978(See also In re Eugene W. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 623, 628, fn. 2 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 736 ].) Significantly, our state Supreme Court has expressly approved the definitions of mental illness relied upon in the In re Baby Boy T. and Eugene W. decisions. 1978(See also In re Eugene W. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 623, 628, fn. 2 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 736 ].) Significantly, our state Supreme Court has expressly approved the definitions of mental illness relied upon in the In re Baby Boy T. and Eugene W. decisions. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Relifordgreen2 sentences2022(People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1024 .) Section 1109 “reflects the legislative judgment that in 13. domestic violence cases, as in sex crimes, similar prior offenses are ‘uniquely probative’ of guilt in a later accusation.” (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 532 .) In People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1016 (Reliford), our Supreme Court approved CALJIC No. 2.50.01,11 a substantially similar instruction to CALCRIM No. 852A. 2022As a general matter, our high court has previously approved CALJIC No. 2.50.01, a substantially similar instruction to CALCRIM No. 852A, in People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1016 . | 1 | 4 |
People v. Zamudiogreen2 sentences2015We have previously concluded that a substantially similar instruction was ‘“argumentative” (Ha rtsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 510-511) and ‘“misleading to the extent it indicates that emotions may play no part in a juror’s decision to opt for the death penalty” (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 368). ‘“We have also held that the standard instructions given here, including CALJIC No. 8.85, adequately convey to the jury the proper consideration and use of victim *55 impact evidence.” 20 (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 197 [ 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 778 , 294 P.3d 1005 ].) Defendants cite no p 2011Finally, a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness's silence in that regard." However, we have previously considered similar claims regarding a substantially similar instruction, and have concluded that it need not, and should not be given. ( People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370 ; accord, People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 707-708 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 ]; People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198 ; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1244 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Quartermaingreen2 sentences1998(See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 630 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 941 P.2d 788 ]; People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 167 [61 Cal.Rptr .2d 386, 931 P.2d 960 ].) In any event, we rejected a substantially similar claim of prejudice in People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ] for reasons that are equally applicable here. 1998(See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 630 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 941 P.2d 788 ]; People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 167 [61 Cal.Rptr .2d 386, 931 P.2d 960 ].) In any event, we rejected a substantially similar claim of prejudice in People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ] for reasons that are equally applicable here. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1998(See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 630 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 941 P.2d 788 ]; People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 167 [61 Cal.Rptr .2d 386, 931 P.2d 960 ].) In any event, we rejected a substantially similar claim of prejudice in People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ] for reasons that are equally applicable here. 1998(See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 630 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 941 P.2d 788 ]; People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 167 [61 Cal.Rptr .2d 386, 931 P.2d 960 ].) In any event, we rejected a substantially similar claim of prejudice in People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ] for reasons that are equally applicable here. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Dementgreen1 sentence2019(See People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 53 (Dement) [rejecting a substantially similar claim].) Cruz further contends that the trial court erred in refusing his requested modification of CALJIC No. 2.03. | 1 | 1 |
Sam Feldt v. Mentor Corporationgreen1 sentence2018He concedes that the California Supreme Court has approved of a substantially similar instruction and that this court is bound by our high court’s precedent, but again states that he is raising the issue to preserve it for federal review.19 While defendant acknowledges that trial counsel did not object to 19 We note that federal district courts are required to “make a preliminary finding that a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the [uncharged sexual offense] and that it constituted an ‘offense of sexual assault’ for purposes of Rule 413. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. McHorsegreen1 sentence2018(United States v. McHorse (10th Cir. 1999) 179 F.3d 889, 899 [discussing the admission of such evidence based on a rule 403 balancing].) A number of the federal circuits do not appear to require that the district courts instruct jurors that before they consider such evidence, they must find that the prosecution established the uncharged acts by a preponderance of the evidence, or by any particular standard, but instead these district courts only instruct the jurors as to the purposes for which the evidence may be used. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Dwaun Jabbar Guidrygreen1 sentence2018He concedes that the California Supreme Court has approved of a substantially similar instruction and that this court is bound by our high court’s precedent, but again states that he is raising the issue to preserve it for federal review.19 While defendant acknowledges that trial counsel did not object to 19 We note that federal district courts are required to “make a preliminary finding that a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the [uncharged sexual offense] and that it constituted an ‘offense of sexual assault’ for purposes of Rule 413. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2015We have previously concluded that a substantially similar instruction was ‘“argumentative” (Ha rtsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 510-511) and ‘“misleading to the extent it indicates that emotions may play no part in a juror’s decision to opt for the death penalty” (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 368). ‘“We have also held that the standard instructions given here, including CALJIC No. 8.85, adequately convey to the jury the proper consideration and use of victim *55 impact evidence.” 20 (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 197 [ 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 778 , 294 P.3d 1005 ].) Defendants cite no p 2015We have previously concluded that a substantially similar instruction was ‘“argumentative” (Ha rtsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 510-511) and ‘“misleading to the extent it indicates that emotions may play no part in a juror’s decision to opt for the death penalty” (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 368). ‘“We have also held that the standard instructions given here, including CALJIC No. 8.85, adequately convey to the jury the proper consideration and use of victim *55 impact evidence.” 20 (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 197 [ 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 778 , 294 P.3d 1005 ].) Defendants cite no p | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tategreen2 sentences2011Finally, a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness's silence in that regard." However, we have previously considered similar claims regarding a substantially similar instruction, and have concluded that it need not, and should not be given. ( People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370 ; accord, People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 707-708 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 ]; People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198 ; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1244 2011Finally, a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness's silence in that regard." However, we have previously considered similar claims regarding a substantially similar instruction, and have concluded that it need not, and should not be given. ( People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370 ; accord, People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 707-708 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 ]; People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198 ; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1244 | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Vanngreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hawkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Visciottigreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Thomas Albert Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Gregory Lynn Cummins, United States of America v. Timothy Akins, A/K/A Michael Mayfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Myers v. Stringhamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brosnahan v. Eugreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wells v. Lloydgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yolo Water & Power Co. v. Hudsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| National Bank of Greece v. Savarikagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Town of South Kingstown v. Wakefield Trust Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Pierce v. United Gas and Electric Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rathbun v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Saddler
green
2 sentences2022(Ibid.) Moreover, in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671 , the California Supreme court rejected an argument that a substantially similar instruction—CALJIC No. 2.62— violated a defendant’s due process rights by denying him the presumption of innocence and instead raising an inference of guilt. 2021(Ibid.) Moreover, in People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671 , the California Supreme court rejected an argument that a substantially similar instruction—CALJIC No. 2.62— violated a defendant’s due process rights by denying him the presumption of innocence and instead raising an inference of guilt. | 2 | 2021–2022 |
People v. Ochoa
green
2 sentences2020In People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 457 , we concluded that the court’s refusal to give a substantially similar instruction was not erroneous because, as in this case, the court properly instructed the jury on aggravating and mitigating factors. 2020In People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 457 , we concluded that the court’s refusal to give a substantially similar instruction was not erroneous because, as in this case, the court properly instructed the jury on aggravating and mitigating factors. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Maldonado v. Morales
green
2 sentences2016A substantially similar claim was squarely rejected in Maldonado v. Morales (9th Cir. 2009) 556 F.3d 1037, 1048 , where the court found that the grandfathering clause of the OAA, exempting its application to billboards in place before November 7, 1967, did not violate the equal protection rights of new off-site billboard operators, because “banning new offsite billboards but allowing legal non- conforming billboards to remain ‘furthers the State’s significant interest in reducing blight and increasing traffic safety,’ even if all billboards are not eliminated.” And, unlike Lamar and General Ou 2016A substantially similar claim was squarely rejected in Maldonado v. Morales (9th Cir. 2009) 556 F.3d 1037, 1048 , where the court found that the grandfathering clause of the OAA, exempting its application to billboards in place before November 7, 1967, did not violate the equal protection rights of new off-site billboard operators, because “banning new offsite billboards but allowing legal nonconforming billboards to remain ‘furthers the State’s significant interest in reducing blight and increasing traffic safety,’ even if all billboards are not eliminated.” And, unlike Lamar and General Outd | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences1998(See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 630 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 941 P.2d 788 ]; People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 167 [61 Cal.Rptr .2d 386, 931 P.2d 960 ].) In any event, we rejected a substantially similar claim of prejudice in People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ] for reasons that are equally applicable here. 1998(See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 630 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609 , 941 P.2d 788 ]; People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 167 [61 Cal.Rptr .2d 386, 931 P.2d 960 ].) In any event, we rejected a substantially similar claim of prejudice in People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49 , 920 P.2d 1254 ] for reasons that are equally applicable here. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
In Re Baby Boy T.
green
2 sentences1978A substantially similar claim was urged and rejected in In re Baby Boy T. (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 815 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 418 ], which held that the legislative intent in enacting the subdivision (formerly § 232, subd. (g)) was to adopt the substantive definitions then provided by Welfare and Institutions Code former section 5550 5 (at pp. 820-821). 1978A substantially similar claim was urged and rejected in In re Baby Boy T. (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 815 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 418 ], which held that the legislative intent in enacting the subdivision (formerly § 232, subd. (g)) was to adopt the substantive definitions then provided by Welfare and Institutions Code former section 5550 5 (at pp. 820-821). | 2 | 1978–1978 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1024 .) Section 1109 “reflects the legislative judgment that in 13. domestic violence cases, as in sex crimes, similar prior offenses are ‘uniquely probative’ of guilt in a later accusation.” (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 532 .) In People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1016 (Reliford), our Supreme Court approved CALJIC No. 2.50.01,11 a substantially similar instruction to CALCRIM No. 852A. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Hoover
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1024 .) Section 1109 “reflects the legislative judgment that in 13. domestic violence cases, as in sex crimes, similar prior offenses are ‘uniquely probative’ of guilt in a later accusation.” (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 532 .) In People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1016 (Reliford), our Supreme Court approved CALJIC No. 2.50.01,11 a substantially similar instruction to CALCRIM No. 852A. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2019(See People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1 , 20-21, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 , 178 P.3d 1113 .) e. Reasonable doubt Dalton contends the trial court's instructions in the language of CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 2.01, 2.02, 2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 2.90, 8.20, 8.83, and 8.83.1 undermined and diluted the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 2019(See People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1 , 20-21, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 , 178 P.3d 1113 .) e. Reasonable doubt Dalton contends the trial court's instructions in the language of CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 2.01, 2.02, 2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 2.90, 8.20, 8.83, and 8.83.1 undermined and diluted the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Kerry Neil Enjady
green
1 sentence2018He concedes that the California Supreme Court has approved of a substantially similar instruction and that this court is bound by our high court’s precedent, but again states that he is raising the issue to preserve it for federal review.19 While defendant acknowledges that trial counsel did not object to 19 We note that federal district courts are required to “make a preliminary finding that a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the [uncharged sexual offense] and that it constituted an ‘offense of sexual assault’ for purposes of Rule 413. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Betsy Sue Johnson v. Elk Lake School District Wayne Stevens Charlotte A. Slocum School Board Elk Lake School District
green
1 sentence2018He concedes that the California Supreme Court has approved of a substantially similar instruction and that this court is bound by our high court’s precedent, but again states that he is raising the issue to preserve it for federal review.19 While defendant acknowledges that trial counsel did not object to 19 We note that federal district courts are required to “make a preliminary finding that a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the [uncharged sexual offense] and that it constituted an ‘offense of sexual assault’ for purposes of Rule 413. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Dillon
green
1 sentence2018He concedes that the California Supreme Court has approved of a substantially similar instruction and that this court is bound by our high court’s precedent, but again states that he is raising the issue to preserve it for federal review.19 While defendant acknowledges that trial counsel did not object to 19 We note that federal district courts are required to “make a preliminary finding that a jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the [uncharged sexual offense] and that it constituted an ‘offense of sexual assault’ for purposes of Rule 413. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Villatoro
green
2 sentences2016The People must still prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt." (Italics added.) Defendant contends CALCRIM No. 1191 violates due process "because it expressly [told] the jury it may infer the defendant's guilt of the charged offenses if it finds, based on evidence of another sexual offense, the defendant is predisposed to commit such crimes and may be found to have committed the current crimes based on nothing other than the uncharged allegations." Defendant, however, acknowledges that our high court has held a substantially similar instruction to the one given in his case does not violat 2016We thus reject this contention.4 II CALCRIM No. 1111 Defendant next contends the court erred when it instructed the jury in connection with counts 3 through 11—involving lewd or lascivious acts by force or fear on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1))—that "[i]t is not a defense that the child may have consented to the act" as set forth in CALCRIM No. 1111.5 Defendant contends that 4 In light of our conclusion that the court's decision to admit evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct against Nicole was not improper (see Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266 ) and that the court pr | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2016The People must still prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt." (Italics added.) Defendant contends CALCRIM No. 1191 violates due process "because it expressly [told] the jury it may infer the defendant's guilt of the charged offenses if it finds, based on evidence of another sexual offense, the defendant is predisposed to commit such crimes and may be found to have committed the current crimes based on nothing other than the uncharged allegations." Defendant, however, acknowledges that our high court has held a substantially similar instruction to the one given in his case does not violat | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Goldsmith
green
2 sentences2016We thus reject this contention.4 II CALCRIM No. 1111 Defendant next contends the court erred when it instructed the jury in connection with counts 3 through 11—involving lewd or lascivious acts by force or fear on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1))—that "[i]t is not a defense that the child may have consented to the act" as set forth in CALCRIM No. 1111.5 Defendant contends that 4 In light of our conclusion that the court's decision to admit evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct against Nicole was not improper (see Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266 ) and that the court pr 2016We thus reject this contention.4 II CALCRIM No. 1111 Defendant next contends the court erred when it instructed the jury in connection with counts 3 through 11—involving lewd or lascivious acts by force or fear on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1))—that "[i]t is not a defense that the child may have consented to the act" as set forth in CALCRIM No. 1111.5 Defendant contends that 4 In light of our conclusion that the court's decision to admit evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct against Nicole was not improper (see Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266 ) and that the court pr | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Hartsch
green
1 sentence2015We have previously concluded that a substantially similar instruction was “argumentative” ( Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 510–511) and “misleading to the extent it indicates that emotions may play no part in a juror’s decision to opt for the death penalty” (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 368). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Sambrano v. City of San Diego
green
1 sentence2013(Sambrano v. City of San Diego, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 233-235, 238), and the court ruled it did not satisfy the same or substantially similar rule. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Carrington
green
2 sentences2011Finally, a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness's silence in that regard." However, we have previously considered similar claims regarding a substantially similar instruction, and have concluded that it need not, and should not be given. ( People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370 ; accord, People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 707-708 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 ]; People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198 ; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1244 2011Finally, a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness's silence in that regard." However, we have previously considered similar claims regarding a substantially similar instruction, and have concluded that it need not, and should not be given. ( People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370 ; accord, People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 707-708 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 ]; People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198 ; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1244 | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Bramit
green
2 sentences2011(People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370 ; accord, People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 707-708 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 ]; People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198 ; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1244-1245 .) Several reasons exist. 2011Finally, a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness's silence in that regard." However, we have previously considered similar claims regarding a substantially similar instruction, and have concluded that it need not, and should not be given. ( People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-370 ; accord, People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 707-708 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 , 234 P.3d 428 ]; People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th 145, 198 ; People v. Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1244 | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| People v. Winters green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Victor v. Nebraska green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Elguera green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| United States v. Milton Hawkins green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| United States v. Jose Luis Guzman and Sonia Cruz-Lazo green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| United States v. William O. Trigg green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Luque v. McLean green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Callahan v. Theodore green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Noble v. First Nat. Bank neutral | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Dunn v. Ellisor neutral | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Manufacturers National Bank v. Woodward green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| People v. Douglass green | 1 | 1900–1900 |
| Hunter v. Hunter green | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.