lays down rule in Oklahoma

1909Cr. 283 , 101 Pac; 293, where the court lays down this rule: ‘Upon the trial for the offense of having possession of intoxicating liquors with the intention of violating the provisions ¡of the prohibition law, where no positive testimony tending to show such possession was offered to show possesson purely circumstantial and did not show actual or constructive possession of such liquors as charged, held, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction.’ (4) That the court in affirming the judgment and sentence in the case against this appellant overlooked the rule as laid down by th

1909Cr. 283 , 101 P. 293 , where the court lays down this rule: `Upon the trial for the offense of having possession of intoxicating liquors with the intention of violating the provisions of the prohibition law, where no positive testimony tending to show such possession was offered to show possession purely circumstantial and did not show actual or constructive possession of such liquors as charged, held, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction.' (4) That the court in affirming the judgment and sentence in the case against this appellant overlooked the rule as laid down by thi

1936Co. v. Nagle. 55 Okla. 235 , 151 P. 667 , the court lays down the rule as follows: “In order that an act of negligence may be deemed the proximate cause of an injury, it must be such that a person of ordinary intelligence would have foreseen that the injury was liable to be produced in the act.

1936Co. v. Nagle. 55 Okla. 235 , 151 P. 667 , the court lays down the rule as follows: “In order that an act of negligence may be deemed the proximate cause of an injury, it must be such that a person of ordinary intelligence would have foreseen that the injury was liable to be produced in the act.

1936In the case of Toombs v. Cummings, 151 Okla. 166 , 3 P. (2d) 177 . this court lays down the rule of proximate cause as follows: “The ‘proximate cause’ of an event must be understood to be that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an independent cause produces that event, and without which that event would not have occurred.” Lusk v. Pugh. 71 Okla. 182 , 159 P. 855 .

1936In the case of Toombs v. Cummings, 151 Okla. 166 , 3 P. (2d) 177 . this court lays down the rule of proximate cause as follows: “The ‘proximate cause’ of an event must be understood to be that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an independent cause produces that event, and without which that event would not have occurred.” Lusk v. Pugh. 71 Okla. 182 , 159 P. 855 .

1936In the case of Toombs v. Cummings, 151 Okla. 166 , 3 P. (2d) 177 . this court lays down the rule of proximate cause as follows: “The ‘proximate cause’ of an event must be understood to be that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an independent cause produces that event, and without which that event would not have occurred.” Lusk v. Pugh. 71 Okla. 182 , 159 P. 855 .

1936In the case of Toombs v. Cummings, 151 Okla. 166 , 3 P. (2d) 177 . this court lays down the rule of proximate cause as follows: “The ‘proximate cause’ of an event must be understood to be that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an independent cause produces that event, and without which that event would not have occurred.” Lusk v. Pugh. 71 Okla. 182 , 159 P. 855 .

1935In Western Silo Co. v. Pruitt, 94 Okla. 154 , 221 P. 106 , the court lays down the rule that where one gives a note in renewal of another note, with knowledge at the time of a partial consideration for the original note, or false representation by the payee, he waives the defense and cannot set it up to defeat a recovery on the renewal note.

1935In Western Silo Co. v. Pruitt, 94 Okla. 154 , 221 P. 106 , the court lays down the rule that where one gives a note in renewal of another note, with knowledge at the time of a partial consideration for the original note, or false representation by the payee, he waives the defense and cannot set it up to defeat a recovery on the renewal note.

1934In the case of Wyatt’s Adm’r v. Eambo, 29 Ala. 510 , the Supreme Court of that state in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus held that: “Although the orphan’s court, under the general powers conferred on it by the act of 1806 (Clay’s Digest, 300, sec. 21) may have been a court of general jurisdiction; yet, as to its power to order a sale of the personal property of an estate, which it derived exclusively from the act of 1809 (Ib., 223, sec. 13) it must be considered a court of special, or limited jurisdiction, and its records, therefore, must affirmatively show the facts necessary to sustain i

1931Lucky Kidd Mining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 110 Okla. 27 , 236 Pac. 600 .” This court also in the recent case of Mead Bros., Inc., et al. v. State Industrial Commission, 144 Okla. 279 , 291 Pac. 571 , in discussing the matter of whether or not employers are liable for or responsible to an employee while traveling to the place of his work, stated the rule to be as follows, in the third paragraph of the syllabus of the case: “In the absence of an agreement, express *29 or implied, to transport an employee to the place of work, the employer is not responsible for an injury sustained by

1931Lucky Kidd Mining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 110 Okla. 27 , 236 Pac. 600 .” This court also in the recent case of Mead Bros., Inc., et al. v. State Industrial Commission, 144 Okla. 279 , 291 Pac. 571 , in discussing the matter of whether or not employers are liable for or responsible to an employee while traveling to the place of his work, stated the rule to be as follows, in the third paragraph of the syllabus of the case: “In the absence of an agreement, express *29 or implied, to transport an employee to the place of work, the employer is not responsible for an injury sustained by

1931Lucky Kidd Mining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 110 Okla. 27 , 236 Pac. 600 .” This court also in the recent case of Mead Bros., Inc., et al. v. State Industrial Commission, 144 Okla. 279 , 291 Pac. 571 , in discussing the matter of whether or not employers are liable for or responsible to an employee while traveling to the place of his work, stated the rule to be as follows, in the third paragraph of the syllabus of the case: “In the absence of an agreement, express *29 or implied, to transport an employee to the place of work, the employer is not responsible for an injury sustained by

1931Lucky Kidd Mining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 110 Okla. 27 , 236 Pac. 600 .” This court also in the recent case of Mead Bros., Inc., et al. v. State Industrial Commission, 144 Okla. 279 , 291 Pac. 571 , in discussing the matter of whether or not employers are liable for or responsible to an employee while traveling to the place of his work, stated the rule to be as follows, in the third paragraph of the syllabus of the case: “In the absence of an agreement, express *29 or implied, to transport an employee to the place of work, the employer is not responsible for an injury sustained by

1931In the case of Martin v. Spaulding, 40 Okla. 191 , 137 Pac. 882 , in an opinion by Mr. Justice Kane, this court lays down the rule in regard to findings of the court as follows: “Where the testimony is oral and conflicting, and the finding of the court is general, such finding is a finding of every special thing necessary to be found to sustain the general finding, and is conclusive upon this court upon all doubtful and disputed questions of fact.” This rule has been affirmed by innumerable decisions of the Supreme Court.

1931Oil Co. et al. v. Datel et al., 145 Okla. 264 , 292 Pac. 564 , the court lays down the rule relative to reopening a case by the Commission, syllabus No. 2 of said cause being as follows: “In order to reopen a ease and award fur- . ther compensation upon account of change of condition, the claimant must establish before the Industrial Commission that there has in fact been a change of condition since the original award was made, and, further, that same was due to the original injury.” And also in the body of said opinion, the court quotes with approval from the Bed-ford-Carthage Stone Co. Case,

1931Oil Co. et al. v. Datel et al., 145 Okla. 264 , 292 Pac. 564 , the court lays down the rule relative to reopening a case by the Commission, syllabus No. 2 of said cause being as follows: “In order to reopen a ease and award fur- . ther compensation upon account of change of condition, the claimant must establish before the Industrial Commission that there has in fact been a change of condition since the original award was made, and, further, that same was due to the original injury.” And also in the body of said opinion, the court quotes with approval from the Bed-ford-Carthage Stone Co. Case,

1931Oil Co. et al. v. Datel et al., 145 Okla. 264 , 292 Pac. 564 , the court lays down the rule relative to reopening a case by the Commission, syllabus No. 2 of said cause being as follows: “In order to reopen a ease and award fur- . ther compensation upon account of change of condition, the claimant must establish before the Industrial Commission that there has in fact been a change of condition since the original award was made, and, further, that same was due to the original injury.” And also in the body of said opinion, the court quotes with approval from the Bed-ford-Carthage Stone Co. Case,

1931Oil Co. et al. v. Datel et al., 145 Okla. 264 , 292 Pac. 564 , the court lays down the rule relative to reopening a case by the Commission, syllabus No. 2 of said cause being as follows: “In order to reopen a ease and award fur- . ther compensation upon account of change of condition, the claimant must establish before the Industrial Commission that there has in fact been a change of condition since the original award was made, and, further, that same was due to the original injury.” And also in the body of said opinion, the court quotes with approval from the Bed-ford-Carthage Stone Co. Case,

1931It is contended by claimant, however, that by section 7325, as amended by section 13, c. 61, Session Law's 1923, a continuing power and jurisdiction is conferred upon the Commission in all cases to change or modify its former orders and awards.’ “After setting out section 7325, and commenting upon the same in connection with section 7297, the court says: “ ‘When sections 7296, 7297, and 7325 are considered together it must be held, we think, that it was the legislative intent that the Commission have a continuing power and jurisdiction to review' its award on the ground of a change in conditio

1931It is contended by claimant, however, that by section 7325, as amended by section 13, c. 61, Session Law's 1923, a continuing power and jurisdiction is conferred upon the Commission in all cases to change or modify its former orders and awards.’ “After setting out section 7325, and commenting upon the same in connection with section 7297, the court says: “ ‘When sections 7296, 7297, and 7325 are considered together it must be held, we think, that it was the legislative intent that the Commission have a continuing power and jurisdiction to review' its award on the ground of a change in conditio

1931In the case of Martin v. Spaulding, 40 Okla. 191 , 137 Pac. 882 , in an opinion by Mr. Justice Kane, this court lays down the rule in regard to findings of the court as follows: “Where the testimony is oral and conflicting, and the finding of the court is general, such finding is a finding of every special thing necessary to be found to sustain the general finding, and is conclusive upon this court upon all doubtful and disputed questions of fact.” This rule has been affirmed by innumerable decisions of the Supreme Court.

1925Moubray v. Dieckman, 41 N. Y.

1925Wimbish, 33 Okla. 110 . 174 Pac. 284 ; Smith v. Smith, 22 Kan. 699 : Lewis v. Fox (Cal.) 54 Pac. 823 ; Scott v. Fowler, 14 Ark. 427 ; Cloud v. Barton, 14 Ala. 347 ; Beazley v. Phillips, 117 Fed. 105 ; Rucker v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.

1925Wimbish, 33 Okla. 110 . 174 Pac. 284 ; Smith v. Smith, 22 Kan. 699 : Lewis v. Fox (Cal.) 54 Pac. 823 ; Scott v. Fowler, 14 Ark. 427 ; Cloud v. Barton, 14 Ala. 347 ; Beazley v. Phillips, 117 Fed. 105 ; Rucker v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.

1925Wimbish, 33 Okla. 110 . 174 Pac. 284 ; Smith v. Smith, 22 Kan. 699 : Lewis v. Fox (Cal.) 54 Pac. 823 ; Scott v. Fowler, 14 Ark. 427 ; Cloud v. Barton, 14 Ala. 347 ; Beazley v. Phillips, 117 Fed. 105 ; Rucker v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.

1925Wimbish, 33 Okla. 110 . 174 Pac. 284 ; Smith v. Smith, 22 Kan. 699 : Lewis v. Fox (Cal.) 54 Pac. 823 ; Scott v. Fowler, 14 Ark. 427 ; Cloud v. Barton, 14 Ala. 347 ; Beazley v. Phillips, 117 Fed. 105 ; Rucker v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.

1925Our court does not seem to have passed on a case involving the same facts as appear in this case, but the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Middlehauff v. Belle, 207 Pac. 184 , presents a state of facts very similar to this case.

1925In the case of Creek Land & Improvement Co. v. Davis, 28 Okla. 579 , 115 Pac. 468 , the court lays down the rule that: “A purchaser of lands takes them with constructive notice of whatever appears in the conveyances which constitute his chain of title; and, if sufficient appears therein to put a prudent man on inquiry, which would, if prosecuted with ordinary diligence, lead to actual notice of a right or title in conflict with that he is about to purchase, and he fails to make such inquiry, the law will charge him with the ae.ual notice he would have received if he had made it.” When the defe

1925In the case of Creek Land & Improvement Co. v. Davis, 28 Okla. 579 , 115 Pac. 468 , the court lays down the rule that: “A purchaser of lands takes them with constructive notice of whatever appears in the conveyances which constitute his chain of title; and, if sufficient appears therein to put a prudent man on inquiry, which would, if prosecuted with ordinary diligence, lead to actual notice of a right or title in conflict with that he is about to purchase, and he fails to make such inquiry, the law will charge him with the ae.ual notice he would have received if he had made it.” When the defe

1925In .the case of Kugler v. White, 91 Okla. 130 , 216 Pac. 903 , a case similar to this one, the court lays down this rule in the syllabus: “Where a cause is submitted to a jury, they are the triers of the facts, and it is not the province of the appellate court to weigh the evidence, and if there is any evidence in .the record reasonably tending to support the verdict and judgment, and no substantial errors appear upon the trial, the judgment should not be disturbed on appeal.” Also, in the case of Mitchell v. Aaronson, 91 Okla. 82 , 216 Pac. 102 , the same rule is stated, as follows: “It is th

1925In .the case of Kugler v. White, 91 Okla. 130 , 216 Pac. 903 , a case similar to this one, the court lays down this rule in the syllabus: “Where a cause is submitted to a jury, they are the triers of the facts, and it is not the province of the appellate court to weigh the evidence, and if there is any evidence in .the record reasonably tending to support the verdict and judgment, and no substantial errors appear upon the trial, the judgment should not be disturbed on appeal.” Also, in the case of Mitchell v. Aaronson, 91 Okla. 82 , 216 Pac. 102 , the same rule is stated, as follows: “It is th

1925Wimbish, 33 Okla. 110 . 174 Pac. 284 ; Smith v. Smith, 22 Kan. 699 : Lewis v. Fox (Cal.) 54 Pac. 823 ; Scott v. Fowler, 14 Ark. 427 ; Cloud v. Barton, 14 Ala. 347 ; Beazley v. Phillips, 117 Fed. 105 ; Rucker v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.

1925Wimbish, 33 Okla. 110 . 174 Pac. 284 ; Smith v. Smith, 22 Kan. 699 : Lewis v. Fox (Cal.) 54 Pac. 823 ; Scott v. Fowler, 14 Ark. 427 ; Cloud v. Barton, 14 Ala. 347 ; Beazley v. Phillips, 117 Fed. 105 ; Rucker v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.

1925Co. v. Hooker (Ky.) 64 S. W. 638 , the court said: “A railroad company owes to unauthorized persons in its switch yards no duty except to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to them after their peril is discovered.” In the body of the opinion the court lays down this rule: “The law is well settled both in this state and elsewhere, that a railroad company is not under obligation, in > moving its engines and cars in its own switch yard, to take special precautions or give special warnings to avoid injuring any unauthorized person, who may, for his own convenience, go therein, until the presen

1925In the case of Reader v. Farriss, 49 Okla. 459 , 153 Pac. 678 , the court lays down this rule, which we think is applicable to the case at bar: “If, on the facts stated in the petition, no cause of action exists against the defendant, and no. relief can be granted against him on those facts, subsequently occurring facts cannot be made a part of the plaintiff’s case, and he will not be permitted to file a supplemental petition alleging such additional facts to enable him to .maintain the action which he has instituted, as the office of a supplemental complaint is no-t to supply facta which, bei

1925In the case of Reader v. Farriss, 49 Okla. 459 , 153 Pac. 678 , the court lays down this rule, which we think is applicable to the case at bar: “If, on the facts stated in the petition, no cause of action exists against the defendant, and no. relief can be granted against him on those facts, subsequently occurring facts cannot be made a part of the plaintiff’s case, and he will not be permitted to file a supplemental petition alleging such additional facts to enable him to .maintain the action which he has instituted, as the office of a supplemental complaint is no-t to supply facta which, bei

1925In .the case of Kugler v. White, 91 Okla. 130 , 216 Pac. 903 , a case similar to this one, the court lays down this rule in the syllabus: “Where a cause is submitted to a jury, they are the triers of the facts, and it is not the province of the appellate court to weigh the evidence, and if there is any evidence in .the record reasonably tending to support the verdict and judgment, and no substantial errors appear upon the trial, the judgment should not be disturbed on appeal.” Also, in the case of Mitchell v. Aaronson, 91 Okla. 82 , 216 Pac. 102 , the same rule is stated, as follows: “It is th

1925In .the case of Kugler v. White, 91 Okla. 130 , 216 Pac. 903 , a case similar to this one, the court lays down this rule in the syllabus: “Where a cause is submitted to a jury, they are the triers of the facts, and it is not the province of the appellate court to weigh the evidence, and if there is any evidence in .the record reasonably tending to support the verdict and judgment, and no substantial errors appear upon the trial, the judgment should not be disturbed on appeal.” Also, in the case of Mitchell v. Aaronson, 91 Okla. 82 , 216 Pac. 102 , the same rule is stated, as follows: “It is th

1925It is not required to anticipate an intrusion of others, and one who enters upon their track without authority does so at his peril, and in case of injury cannot recover, unless it was wantonly inflicted after the danger was discovered.” In the case of Koke’s Adm’r. v. Andrews Steel Co. (Ky.) 149 S. W. 968 , it was held: “Those operating a railroad are not required to send a man along to cut off cars to ascertain if anybody is between them before making a coupling to the cars.” And, in the body of the opinion, it is further said: “Persons who put themselves between cars standing on a sidetrack

1925In the case of West v. Madansky, 80 Okla. 161 , 194 Pac. 439 , the court lays down this rule: “Under our statutes and the system of Code pleading in this state, the district courts are endowed alike with the powers of a chancellor and a court of law, and where upon a given statement of facts, constituting but a single wrong, but which show the plaintiff entitled to relief, either in law or equity, and it is shown by the testimony that under the conditions it would be impracticable to render relief in equity, then the court will retain jurisdiction and grant such relief in law as, under the all

1925In the case of West v. Madansky, 80 Okla. 161 , 194 Pac. 439 , the court lays down this rule: “Under our statutes and the system of Code pleading in this state, the district courts are endowed alike with the powers of a chancellor and a court of law, and where upon a given statement of facts, constituting but a single wrong, but which show the plaintiff entitled to relief, either in law or equity, and it is shown by the testimony that under the conditions it would be impracticable to render relief in equity, then the court will retain jurisdiction and grant such relief in law as, under the all

1924Cr. 46 , 209 Pac. 781 , the court lays down this rule: “Ordinarily, an instruction on character evidence should be to the effect that such evidence should be weighed with all the other facts and circumstances in the ease tending to raise a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, without designating or pointing out to the jury any particular issue involved.” In the case of Adair v. State, 15 Okla.