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21 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Chang Hwan Chogreen2 sentences2010Especially in light of the emphatic legislative and judicial hostility toward strict liability crimes, ORS 161.025(l)(d) (purposes of criminal code include to “limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is without fault”); Cho, 297 Or at 200 (noting “legal maxim” that “to punish a person for a crime, the person must have acted with mens rea in breaching the terms of an offense”); Andrews, 174 Or App at 363 (noting “the Criminal Code’s fundamental hostility toward imposing criminal liability without fault”), we conclude that, in enacting and amending ORS 166.270(1), the legislature h 1990That is for the legislature to enact a statute, after January 1, 1972, which provides that an offense is not a violation, and for the offense to clearly indicate a legislative intent to dispense with the culpable mental state requirement." 297 Or. at 200 , 681 P.2d 1152 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Perkinsgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630-31 , 529 P3d 999 (2023) (applying federal harmless error test because the fail- ure to instruct the jury on a required culpable mental state for an element is a federal constitutional error). 2025See State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630-31 , 529 P3d 999 (2023) (applying federal harmless error test because the fail- ure to instruct the jury on a required culpable mental state for an element is a federal constitutional error). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Rutleygreen2 sentences2016The court concluded that the legislature clearly intended to dispense with the culpable mental state requirement with respect to the distance element based on three factors: “[T]he *544 legislature’s obvious intent to protect children from predatory drug dealers by enhancing the penalty for delivery in the vicinity of a school, the grammatical structure of the statute’s text, and the nature of the element (no mental state is logically required for a distance element)[.]” Id. at 377 . 2010See Rutley, 343 Or at 376-77 (holding that the state need not prove that a defendant knew that he was distributing drugs within 1,000 feet of a school; likelihood that legislature intended such a requirement “is virtually nonexistent”); State v. Miller, 309 Or 362, 368 , 788 P2d 974 (1990) (holding that the state need not prove that a DUII defendant knew he was intoxicated; such requirement “seems preposterous”); State v. Engen, 164 Or App 591, 603 , 993 P2d 161 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 331 (2000) (legislative intent to dispense with culpable mental state requirement can be inferred where such | 1 | 4 |
State v. Rainoldigreen2 sentences2010Rutley, 343 Or at 375-77 ; State v. Rainoldi, 236 Or App 129, 135-40 , 235 P3d 710 (2010). 2010See Rutley, 343 Or at 376-77 (holding that the state need not prove that a defendant knew that he was distributing drugs within 1,000 feet of a school; likelihood that legislature intended such a requirement “is virtually nonexistent”); State v. Miller, 309 Or 362, 368 , 788 P2d 974 (1990) (holding that the state need not prove that a DUII defendant knew he was intoxicated; such requirement “seems preposterous”); State v. Engen, 164 Or App 591, 603 , 993 P2d 161 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 331 (2000) (legislative intent to dispense with culpable mental state requirement can be inferred where such | 1 | 2 |
State v. Buttreygreen2 sentences1990The court determined that the language of former ORS 487.560, coupled with its legislative history, clearly indicated a legislative intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement. 293 Or. at 585 , 651 P.2d 1075 . 1990The court determined that the language of former ORS 487.560, coupled with its legislative history, clearly indicated a legislative intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement. 293 Or. at 585 , 651 P.2d 1075 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Hortongreen2 sentences2025Viewing the record as a whole, the evidence of the assaultive conduct and resulting injuries in this case, and the absence of an alter- native theory at trial as to defendant’s mental state regard- ing the result of his conduct, the likelihood that the verdict would have been different “is an extremely low likelihood.” Horton, 327 Or App at 266 ; see id. (declining to exercise dis- cretion to correct the trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on the culpable mental state requirement for the value element of criminal mischief); see also Inman, 275 Or App at 936 (“[T]he error in thi 2025Viewing the record as a whole, the evidence of the assaultive conduct and resulting injuries in this case, and the absence of an alter- native theory at trial as to defendant’s mental state regard- ing the result of his conduct, the likelihood that the verdict would have been different “is an extremely low likelihood.” Horton, 327 Or App at 266 ; see id. (declining to exercise dis- cretion to correct the trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on the culpable mental state requirement for the value element of criminal mischief); see also Inman, 275 Or App at 936 (“[T]he error in thi | 1 | 1 |
State v. McKinney/Shiffergreen1 sentence2025Viewing the record as a whole, the evidence of the assaultive conduct and resulting injuries in this case, and the absence of an alter- native theory at trial as to defendant’s mental state regard- ing the result of his conduct, the likelihood that the verdict would have been different “is an extremely low likelihood.” Horton, 327 Or App at 266 ; see id. (declining to exercise dis- cretion to correct the trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on the culpable mental state requirement for the value element of criminal mischief); see also Inman, 275 Or App at 936 (“[T]he error in thi | 1 | 1 |
State v. Inmangreen1 sentence2025Viewing the record as a whole, the evidence of the assaultive conduct and resulting injuries in this case, and the absence of an alter- native theory at trial as to defendant’s mental state regard- ing the result of his conduct, the likelihood that the verdict would have been different “is an extremely low likelihood.” Horton, 327 Or App at 266 ; see id. (declining to exercise dis- cretion to correct the trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on the culpable mental state requirement for the value element of criminal mischief); see also Inman, 275 Or App at 936 (“[T]he error in thi | 1 | 1 |
State v. Prophetgreen2 sentences2024See id. at 537 n 2 (explaining that the foregoing propositions apply to offenses outside the Oregon Criminal Code, unless the Cite as 336 Or App 21 (2024) 25 statute defining the offense “ ‘clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state require- ment for the offense or for any material element thereof’ ” (quoting ORS 161.105(1)(b)); State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486, 491 , 268 P3d 568 (2011) (describing application of ORS 161.105(1)(b)); see also, e.g., State v. Prophet, 318 Or App 330 , 335 n 3, 507 P3d 735 , rev den, 370 Or 472 (2022) (explaining the legal fram 2024See id. at 537 n 2 (explaining that the foregoing propositions apply to offenses outside the Oregon Criminal Code, unless the Cite as 336 Or App 21 (2024) 25 statute defining the offense “ ‘clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state require- ment for the offense or for any material element thereof’ ” (quoting ORS 161.105(1)(b)); State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486, 491 , 268 P3d 568 (2011) (describing application of ORS 161.105(1)(b)); see also, e.g., State v. Prophet, 318 Or App 330 , 335 n 3, 507 P3d 735 , rev den, 370 Or 472 (2022) (explaining the legal fram | 1 | 1 |
State v. Simonovgreen1 sentence2024See id. at 537 n 2 (explaining that the foregoing propositions apply to offenses outside the Oregon Criminal Code, unless the Cite as 336 Or App 21 (2024) 25 statute defining the offense “ ‘clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state require- ment for the offense or for any material element thereof’ ” (quoting ORS 161.105(1)(b)); State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486, 491 , 268 P3d 568 (2011) (describing application of ORS 161.105(1)(b)); see also, e.g., State v. Prophet, 318 Or App 330 , 335 n 3, 507 P3d 735 , rev den, 370 Or 472 (2022) (explaining the legal fram | 1 | 1 |
State v. Maskellgreen1 sentence2024See id. at 537 n 2 (explaining that the foregoing propositions apply to offenses outside the Oregon Criminal Code, unless the Cite as 336 Or App 21 (2024) 25 statute defining the offense “ ‘clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state require- ment for the offense or for any material element thereof’ ” (quoting ORS 161.105(1)(b)); State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486, 491 , 268 P3d 568 (2011) (describing application of ORS 161.105(1)(b)); see also, e.g., State v. Prophet, 318 Or App 330 , 335 n 3, 507 P3d 735 , rev den, 370 Or 472 (2022) (explaining the legal fram | 1 | 1 |
State v. Owengreen1 sentence2022However, notwithstanding that error, we will affirm the judgment below if we deter- mine that “there was little likelihood that the error affected the verdict.” Owen, 369 Or at 323 (so stating); State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003) (same). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wolfegreen2 sentences2010E.g., Cho, 297 Or at 201 (state’s substantial interest in enacting statute does not clearly indicate intent to dispense with culpable mental state); State v. Wolfe, 288 Or 521 , 525 n 3, 605 P2d 1185 (1980) (“The legislative history indicates that the provision for offenses ‘outside the Oregon Criminal Code’ was designed to * * * avoid strict liability for offenses potentially punishable by imprisonment.”). 2010E.g., Cho, 297 Or at 201 (state’s substantial interest in enacting statute does not clearly indicate intent to dispense with culpable mental state); State v. Wolfe, 288 Or 521 , 525 n 3, 605 P2d 1185 (1980) (“The legislative history indicates that the provision for offenses ‘outside the Oregon Criminal Code’ was designed to * * * avoid strict liability for offenses potentially punishable by imprisonment.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andrewsgreen1 sentence2010Especially in light of the emphatic legislative and judicial hostility toward strict liability crimes, ORS 161.025(l)(d) (purposes of criminal code include to “limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is without fault”); Cho, 297 Or at 200 (noting “legal maxim” that “to punish a person for a crime, the person must have acted with mens rea in breaching the terms of an offense”); Andrews, 174 Or App at 363 (noting “the Criminal Code’s fundamental hostility toward imposing criminal liability without fault”), we conclude that, in enacting and amending ORS 166.270(1), the legislature h | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rainoldi
green
2 sentences2013But the fact remains that the exception set out in ORS 166.270(3)(a) requires that the declaration reducing a felony conviction to a misdemeanor be made “at the time of judgment.” Although it may seem unfair, defendant’s belief that he was a misdemeanant, not a felon, is irrelevant under ORS 166.270: As this court recently stated in State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486, 506 , 268 P3d 568 (2011), that statute “exhibits a clear legislative intent to dispense with the culpable mental state requirement as to the element that a defendant ‘has been convicted of a felony.’” 12 Defendant adverts to the curre 2013But the fact remains that the exception set out in ORS 166.270(3)(a) requires that the declaration reducing a felony conviction to a misdemeanor be made “at the time of judgment.” Although it may seem unfair, defendant’s belief that he was a misdemeanant, not a felon, is irrelevant under ORS 166.270: As this court recently stated in State v. Rainoldi, 351 Or 486, 506 , 268 P3d 568 (2011), that statute “exhibits a clear legislative intent to dispense with the culpable mental state requirement as to the element that a defendant ‘has been convicted of a felony.’” 12 Defendant adverts to the curre | 3 | 2012–2024 |
State v. Person
neutral
2 sentences2025Defendant defends Cite as 342 Or App 724 (2025) 729 that conclusion on appeal, arguing that, because the proceed- ing retained characteristics of a “criminal prosecution,” he “had the right under Article I, section 11, to have the state prove each element of the crime of wasting a game mammal beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in defendant’s brief.) It is undisputed that the criminal version of waste of a game mammal, i.e., the Class A misdemeanor version, includes a culpable mental state requirement as an element of the crime under ORS 496.992(1)—although the parties disagree on which culp 2025Defendant defends Cite as 342 Or App 724 (2025) 729 that conclusion on appeal, arguing that, because the proceed- ing retained characteristics of a “criminal prosecution,” he “had the right under Article I, section 11, to have the state prove each element of the crime of wasting a game mammal beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in defendant’s brief.) It is undisputed that the criminal version of waste of a game mammal, i.e., the Class A misdemeanor version, includes a culpable mental state requirement as an element of the crime under ORS 496.992(1)—although the parties disagree on which culp | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Pipkin
green
2 sentences2025Defendant cites to State v. Fuller, 354 Or 295, 301 , 311 P3d 861 (2013), and State v. Pipkin, 354 Or 513, 527 , 316 P3d 255 (2013), but they support only the proposition that, in a “criminal prosecution,” Article I, section 11, requires the state to prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, not that the state must prove the elements of a Class A misdemeanor to obtain a conviction for a Class A violation. 730 State v. Person Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court should have imposed a higher culpable mental state requirement for waste of a game animal a 2025Defendant cites to State v. Fuller, 354 Or 295, 301 , 311 P3d 861 (2013), and State v. Pipkin, 354 Or 513, 527 , 316 P3d 255 (2013), but they support only the proposition that, in a “criminal prosecution,” Article I, section 11, requires the state to prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, not that the state must prove the elements of a Class A misdemeanor to obtain a conviction for a Class A violation. 730 State v. Person Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court should have imposed a higher culpable mental state requirement for waste of a game animal a | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Fuller
neutral
2 sentences2025Defendant cites to State v. Fuller, 354 Or 295, 301 , 311 P3d 861 (2013), and State v. Pipkin, 354 Or 513, 527 , 316 P3d 255 (2013), but they support only the proposition that, in a “criminal prosecution,” Article I, section 11, requires the state to prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, not that the state must prove the elements of a Class A misdemeanor to obtain a conviction for a Class A violation. 730 State v. Person Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court should have imposed a higher culpable mental state requirement for waste of a game animal a 2025Defendant cites to State v. Fuller, 354 Or 295, 301 , 311 P3d 861 (2013), and State v. Pipkin, 354 Or 513, 527 , 316 P3d 255 (2013), but they support only the proposition that, in a “criminal prosecution,” Article I, section 11, requires the state to prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, not that the state must prove the elements of a Class A misdemeanor to obtain a conviction for a Class A violation. 730 State v. Person Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court should have imposed a higher culpable mental state requirement for waste of a game animal a | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Miller
green
2 sentences2010See Rutley, 343 Or at 376-77 (holding that the state need not prove that a defendant knew that he was distributing drugs within 1,000 feet of a school; likelihood that legislature intended such a requirement “is virtually nonexistent”); State v. Miller, 309 Or 362, 368 , 788 P2d 974 (1990) (holding that the state need not prove that a DUII defendant knew he was intoxicated; such requirement “seems preposterous”); State v. Engen, 164 Or App 591, 603 , 993 P2d 161 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 331 (2000) (legislative intent to dispense with culpable mental state requirement can be inferred where such 2010See Rutley, 343 Or at 376-77 (holding that the state need not prove that a defendant knew that he was distributing drugs within 1,000 feet of a school; likelihood that legislature intended such a requirement “is virtually nonexistent”); State v. Miller, 309 Or 362, 368 , 788 P2d 974 (1990) (holding that the state need not prove that a DUII defendant knew he was intoxicated; such requirement “seems preposterous”); State v. Engen, 164 Or App 591, 603 , 993 P2d 161 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 331 (2000) (legislative intent to dispense with culpable mental state requirement can be inferred where such | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Hatchell
green
2 sentences2025Viewing the record as a whole, the evidence of the assaultive conduct and resulting injuries in this case, and the absence of an alter- native theory at trial as to defendant’s mental state regard- ing the result of his conduct, the likelihood that the verdict would have been different “is an extremely low likelihood.” Horton, 327 Or App at 266 ; see id. (declining to exercise dis- cretion to correct the trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on the culpable mental state requirement for the value element of criminal mischief); see also Inman, 275 Or App at 936 (“[T]he error in thi 2025Viewing the record as a whole, the evidence of the assaultive conduct and resulting injuries in this case, and the absence of an alter- native theory at trial as to defendant’s mental state regard- ing the result of his conduct, the likelihood that the verdict would have been different “is an extremely low likelihood.” Horton, 327 Or App at 266 ; see id. (declining to exercise dis- cretion to correct the trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury on the culpable mental state requirement for the value element of criminal mischief); see also Inman, 275 Or App at 936 (“[T]he error in thi | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2022However, notwithstanding that error, we will affirm the judgment below if we deter- mine that “there was little likelihood that the error affected the verdict.” Owen, 369 Or at 323 (so stating); State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003) (same). 2022However, notwithstanding that error, we will affirm the judgment below if we deter- mine that “there was little likelihood that the error affected the verdict.” Owen, 369 Or at 323 (so stating); State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 33 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003) (same). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Gray
green
2 sentences2016We considered whether a trial court’s failure to give a culpable mental state instruction for the forcible compulsion element was harmless in Gray, 261 Or App 121 , and Ross, 271 Or App 1 . 2016In Gray, we concluded that the failure to give the instruction was plain error and not harmless because, on the record in that case, it was possible that the jury could have found that the defendant engaged in the charged conduct—specifically, that he forcibly compelled the victim to submit to sexual intercourse and sexual contact—but that he did not do so knowingly. 261 Or App at 131-32 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Ross
green
1 sentence2016We considered whether a trial court’s failure to give a culpable mental state instruction for the forcible compulsion element was harmless in Gray, 261 Or App 121 , and Ross, 271 Or App 1 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Crosby
green
1 sentence2012Because we conclude that that statute requires intent with regard to a result as well as with regard to conduct, and, therefore, that the use of the generic definition of “intentionally,” which refers to both conduct and result, was not error, we do not evaluate the culpable mental state requirement for unlawful use of a weapon, ORS 166.220. 3 In Crosby , the trial court’s general instruction regarding the required mental state — recklessness—referred to two types of elements: “particular result” and “particular circumstance.” 342 Or at 422 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Moroney
green
2 sentences2011In addition, defendant supports his claim that a proper construction of the DUII statute establishes that the driving element carries a culpable mental state requirement by proposing the following syllogism: (1) The elements of a greater crime subsume all elements of a lesser-included crime, State v. Moroney, 289 Or 597 , 616 P2d 471 (1980); (2) attempted DUII is a lesser-included offense of DUII, State v. Baty, 243 Or App 77 , 259 P3d 98 (2011); (3) attempt requires that a person “intentionally [engage] in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime,” ORS 161.4 2011In addition, defendant supports his claim that a proper construction of the DUII statute establishes that the driving element carries a culpable mental state requirement by proposing the following syllogism: (1) The elements of a greater crime subsume all elements of a lesser-included crime, State v. Moroney, 289 Or 597 , 616 P2d 471 (1980); (2) attempted DUII is a lesser-included offense of DUII, State v. Baty, 243 Or App 77 , 259 P3d 98 (2011); (3) attempt requires that a person “intentionally [engage] in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime,” ORS 161.4 | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Baty
green
2 sentences2011In addition, defendant supports his claim that a proper construction of the DUII statute establishes that the driving element carries a culpable mental state requirement by proposing the following syllogism: (1) The elements of a greater crime subsume all elements of a lesser-included crime, State v. Moroney, 289 Or 597 , 616 P2d 471 (1980); (2) attempted DUII is a lesser-included offense of DUII, State v. Baty, 243 Or App 77 , 259 P3d 98 (2011); (3) attempt requires that a person “intentionally [engage] in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime,” ORS 161.4 2011In addition, defendant supports his claim that a proper construction of the DUII statute establishes that the driving element carries a culpable mental state requirement by proposing the following syllogism: (1) The elements of a greater crime subsume all elements of a lesser-included crime, State v. Moroney, 289 Or 597 , 616 P2d 471 (1980); (2) attempted DUII is a lesser-included offense of DUII, State v. Baty, 243 Or App 77 , 259 P3d 98 (2011); (3) attempt requires that a person “intentionally [engage] in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime,” ORS 161.4 | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Engen
green
2 sentences2010See Rutley, 343 Or at 376-77 (holding that the state need not prove that a defendant knew that he was distributing drugs within 1,000 feet of a school; likelihood that legislature intended such a requirement “is virtually nonexistent”); State v. Miller, 309 Or 362, 368 , 788 P2d 974 (1990) (holding that the state need not prove that a DUII defendant knew he was intoxicated; such requirement “seems preposterous”); State v. Engen, 164 Or App 591, 603 , 993 P2d 161 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 331 (2000) (legislative intent to dispense with culpable mental state requirement can be inferred where such 2010See Rutley, 343 Or at 376-77 (holding that the state need not prove that a defendant knew that he was distributing drugs within 1,000 feet of a school; likelihood that legislature intended such a requirement “is virtually nonexistent”); State v. Miller, 309 Or 362, 368 , 788 P2d 974 (1990) (holding that the state need not prove that a DUII defendant knew he was intoxicated; such requirement “seems preposterous”); State v. Engen, 164 Or App 591, 603 , 993 P2d 161 (1999), rev den, 330 Or 331 (2000) (legislative intent to dispense with culpable mental state requirement can be inferred where such | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Boone
green
2 sentences1999State v. Boone, 294 Or 630, 634 , 661 P2d 917 (1983). 1999State v. Boone, 294 Or 630, 634 , 661 P2d 917 (1983). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.