single-subject requirement in Oregon

2020Reviewing for legal error, State v. Mercer, 269 Or App 135, 137 , 344 P3d 109 , rev den, 357 Or 299 (2015), we conclude that none of the measures violates the single- subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), and that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2020Reviewing for legal error, State v. Mercer, 269 Or App 135, 137 , 344 P3d 109 , rev den, 357 Or 299 (2015), we conclude that none of the measures violates the single- subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d), and that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2003Armatta makes the point this way: "[W]e acknowledge that, under Baum, 200 Or. at 581 , 267 P.2d 220 , the separate-vote requirement encompasses the notion that a single constitutional amendment must contain what the court there referred to as a single `subject[].' Indeed, if a proposed amendment contained two different subjects, then it could not be considered a single amendment, regardless of the existence of the single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d).

2003Armatta makes the point this way: "[W]e acknowledge that, under Baum, 200 Or. at 581 , 267 P.2d 220 , the separate-vote requirement encompasses the notion that a single constitutional amendment must contain what the court there referred to as a single `subject[].' Indeed, if a proposed amendment contained two different subjects, then it could not be considered a single amendment, regardless of the existence of the single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d).

2024Id.

2020Cite as 302 Or App 196 (2020) 201 Under that case law, a two-part framework governs the determination whether a proposed law or constitutional amendment comports with the single-subject requirement.

2020The secretary notes that, on those forms, plaintiffs described all measures as pertaining to “forest waters.” The secretary contends further that, if we treat “forest waters” as the subject of each measure, then each measure violates Cite as 302 Or App 196 (2020) 205 the single-subject requirement because each measure con- tains provisions that address forest practices more broadly, and not forest waters particularly.

2020Id.

2015Both provisions are aimed at the prevention of “logrolling,” or “‘the practice of inserting in one bill two or more unrelated provisions so that those favoring one provision could be compelled, in order to secure its adoption, to combine with those favoring another provision, and by this process of log-rolling the adoption of both provisions could be accomplished, when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own merits.’” Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or App 1,8-9 , 882 P2d 91 (1994), rev dismissed, 320 Or 570 (1995) (quoting Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Or 459, 465 , 188 P 207 (1920)).

2015Both provisions are aimed at the prevention of “logrolling,” or “‘the practice of inserting in one bill two or more unrelated provisions so that those favoring one provision could be compelled, in order to secure its adoption, to combine with those favoring another provision, and by this process of log-rolling the adoption of both provisions could be accomplished, when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own merits.’” Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or App 1,8-9 , 882 P2d 91 (1994), rev dismissed, 320 Or 570 (1995) (quoting Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Or 459, 465 , 188 P 207 (1920)).

2015Both provisions are aimed at the prevention of “logrolling,” or “‘the practice of inserting in one bill two or more unrelated provisions so that those favoring one provision could be compelled, in order to secure its adoption, to combine with those favoring another provision, and by this process of log-rolling the adoption of both provisions could be accomplished, when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own merits.’” Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or App 1,8-9 , 882 P2d 91 (1994), rev dismissed, 320 Or 570 (1995) (quoting Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Or 459, 465 , 188 P 207 (1920)).

2015Both provisions are aimed at the prevention of “logrolling,” or “‘the practice of inserting in one bill two or more unrelated provisions so that those favoring one provision could be compelled, in order to secure its adoption, to combine with those favoring another provision, and by this process of log-rolling the adoption of both provisions could be accomplished, when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own merits.’” Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or App 1,8-9 , 882 P2d 91 (1994), rev dismissed, 320 Or 570 (1995) (quoting Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Or 459, 465 , 188 P 207 (1920)).

2015Both provisions are aimed at the prevention of “logrolling,” or “‘the practice of inserting in one bill two or more unrelated provisions so that those favoring one provision could be compelled, in order to secure its adoption, to combine with those favoring another provision, and by this process of log-rolling the adoption of both provisions could be accomplished, when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own merits.’” Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or App 1,8-9 , 882 P2d 91 (1994), rev dismissed, 320 Or 570 (1995) (quoting Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Or 459, 465 , 188 P 207 (1920)).

2015As we recently held in State v. Urie, 268 Or App 362, 367 , 341 P3d 855 (2014), “ORS 813.011(3) does not permit a sentencing court to suspend execution of, or reduce in any way, the mandatory minimum 90-day term of incarceration provided in the statute.” Defendant argues in the alternative that ORS 813.011, which was enacted by voters in 2011 as part of Measure 73, is invalid because Measure 73 violated the single-subject rule found in Article IV, section 1(2)(d), of the Oregon Constitution.

2015As we recently held in State v. Urie, 268 Or App 362, 367 , 341 P3d 855 (2014), “ORS 813.011(3) does not permit a sentencing court to suspend execution of, or reduce in any way, the mandatory minimum 90-day term of incarceration provided in the statute.” Defendant argues in the alternative that ORS 813.011, which was enacted by voters in 2011 as part of Measure 73, is invalid because Measure 73 violated the single-subject rule found in Article IV, section 1(2)(d), of the Oregon Constitution.

2006The separate-vote provision does not impose a stricter standard requiring a showing of `close' or `functional' relatedness." Id. at 777 , 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 , 134 P.3d 299 .

2006The separate-vote provision does not impose a stricter standard requiring a showing of `close' or `functional' relatedness." Id. at 777 , 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 , 134 P.3d 299 .

2003Contrary to the majority's suggestion, see 188 Or.App. at 549-50 , 72 P.3d at 980-981 , I recognize that an amendment that runs afoul of the single-subject requirement will necessarily run afoul of the separate-vote requirement because an amendment cannot satisfy that latter requirement if it includes provisions *991 addressed to two different subjects.

2003Contrary to the majority's suggestion, see 188 Or.App. at 549-50 , 72 P.3d at 980-981 , I recognize that an amendment that runs afoul of the single-subject requirement will necessarily run afoul of the separate-vote requirement because an amendment cannot satisfy that latter requirement if it includes provisions *991 addressed to two different subjects.

1998In Fugate , we concluded that the various provisions of SB 936 are related in that they “directly concern the prosecution and conviction of persons who have committed criminal acts, and it is that unifying principle that logically connects all of the provisions of the act.” 154 Or App at 654 .