mandatory minimum sentence violation in Pennsylvania

2017Herein, Appellant presents three issues for our review, which we have reordered for ease of disposition: A. Is Appellant[’s] sentence unconstitutional in that it involved a mandatory minimum sentence in violation of Alleyne…? ____________________________________________ 1 In Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 811-12 (Pa. Super. 2014), this Court held that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712 is unconstitutional under Alleyne. 2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). -3- J-S10005-17 B.

2016In Alleyne, “the United States Supreme Court [] held that any facts leading to an increase in a mandatory minimum sentence are elements of the crime and must be presented to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 809 (Pa. Super. 2014).

2021In Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651, 661 (Pa. 2016), our Supreme Court concluded that Alleyne had rendered the mandatory minimum sentence framework at § 9718 constitutionally infirm. -3- J-A25003-20 (per curiam order).

2018In his remaining issue appellant contends that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence because he was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence in violation of Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 140 A.3d 651 (Pa. 2016) which applied Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), on a direct appeal.

2015In Merolla, we distinguished the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185 (Pa. 2005), which considered the mandatory minimum sentence requirement of the Three Strikes Statute, noting that both the language and purpose of the two laws are different: [T]he Three Strikes Statute applies “[w]here the person had at the time of the commission of the current offense previously been convicted of two or more such crimes . . .” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2) (emphasis added).

2014We distinguished Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185 (2005), which held that the mandatory minimum sentence requirement of the Three Strikes Statute4 embodies a recidivist philosophy under which a defendant could not be sentenced as a repeat offender unless he (1) committed a first offense, then (2) was convicted and sentenced for the first offense, then (3) committed a second offense, and then (4) was convicted and sentenced for the second offense.

2018A panel of our Court denied [Appellant] relief on the issues raised, but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing based upon sua sponte recognition that [Appellant’s] sentence was illegal based upon the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence in violation of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). [(]See Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206 (Pa. Super. 2015)[)]. [Appellant] was resentenced on February 24, 2015, as noted above.

2016See Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2007Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 560 Pa. 381 , 744 A.2d 1280 (2000). “[T]he determination as to whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a question of law; our standard of review in cases dealing with questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 868 A.2d 529, 532 (Pa.Super.2005) (citations omitted). ¶ 5 This case concerns the sentencing court’s interpretation of the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions set forth in section 3806 of the Vehicle Code, in relation to the mandatory minimum sentence requirement set forth in section 9714.