fact-intensive and objective analysis in Tennessee

2017Analyzing “whether reasonable suspicion existed in a particular traffic stop is a fact-intensive and objective analysis” and “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Tenn. 2003).

2015Analyzing “whether reasonable suspicion existed in a particular traffic stop is a fact-intensive and objective analysis.” Garcia, 123 S.W.3d at 344 .

2012The United State[s] Supreme Court has stated that “[i]n determining whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable facts, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see also State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997).

2009Garcia, 123 S.W.3d at 344 . “‘In determining whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable facts, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.’” State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992)); see also Garcia, 123 S.W.3d at 344 .

2020Therefore, “‘[i]n determining whether an investigatory detention is based upon reasonable suspicion, we engage in a fact-intensive and objective analysis, reviewing the record for specific and articulable facts, that the defendant had committed, or was about to commit, a criminal offense.’” Smith, 484 S.W.3d at 402 (quoting Hanning, 296 S.W.3d at 49 ) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2016Ac- *402 eordingly, “[i]n determining whether an investigatory detention is based upon reasonable suspicion, we engage in a fact-intensive and objective analysis, reviewing the record for specific and articulable facts, that the defendant had committed, or waá' about to commit, a criminal offense.” State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 49 (Tenn.2009) .(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 (recognizing that “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable fa

2015In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “„[R]easonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.‟” Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 866 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tenn. 1993)).

2014In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “‘[R]easonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.’” Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 866 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tenn. 1993)).

2015In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “„[R]easonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.‟” Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 866 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tenn. 1993)).

2014In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “‘[R]easonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.’” Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 866 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tenn. 1993)).

2016Ac- *402 eordingly, “[i]n determining whether an investigatory detention is based upon reasonable suspicion, we engage in a fact-intensive and objective analysis, reviewing the record for specific and articulable facts, that the defendant had committed, or waá' about to commit, a criminal offense.” State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 49 (Tenn.2009) .(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 (recognizing that “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable fa

2016Ac- *402 eordingly, “[i]n determining whether an investigatory detention is based upon reasonable suspicion, we engage in a fact-intensive and objective analysis, reviewing the record for specific and articulable facts, that the defendant had committed, or waá' about to commit, a criminal offense.” State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 49 (Tenn.2009) .(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 (recognizing that “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable fa

2016Ac- *402 eordingly, “[i]n determining whether an investigatory detention is based upon reasonable suspicion, we engage in a fact-intensive and objective analysis, reviewing the record for specific and articulable facts, that the defendant had committed, or waá' about to commit, a criminal offense.” State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 49 (Tenn.2009) .(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 (recognizing that “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable fa

2016See Alvarado, 430 F.3d at 1309 (opining that determining the constitutionality of a traffic stop made pursuant to Utah’s version of Section 123(1) “require[s] a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present during the incident in question in order to determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway”); see also Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 (“Determining whether reasonable suspicion exists in a particular traffic stop is a fact-intensive and objective analysis.”).

2016“The evaluation [of reasonable suspicion] is made from the perspective of the reasonable officer, not the reasonable person.” United States v. Quintanar-Garda, 343 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Valdez, 147 Fed.

2016“The evaluation [of reasonable suspicion] is made from the perspective of the reasonable officer, not the reasonable person.” United States v. Quintana-Garcia, 343 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Valdez, 147 Fed.

2016See Alvarado, 430 F.3d at 1309 (opining that determining the constitutionality of a traffic stop made pursuant to Utah’s version of Section 123(1) “require[s] a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present during the incident in question in order to determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway”); see also Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 (“Determining whether reasonable suspicion exists in a particular traffic stop is a fact-intensive and objective analysis.”).

2016See Alvarado, 430 F.3d at 1309 (opining that determining the constitutionality of a traffic stop made pursuant to Utah‟s version of Section 123(1) “require[s] a fact-specific inquiry into the particular circumstances present 13 We recognize that some lane excursions may be so egregious that they will support probable cause to stop the motorist. 17 during the incident in question in order to determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to maintain a straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway”); see also Day, 263 S.W.3d at 903 (“Determining whether reasonable suspi

2016“The evaluation [of reasonable suspicion] is made from the perspective of the reasonable officer, not the reasonable person.” United States v. Quintanar-Garda, 343 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Valdez, 147 Fed.

2016“The evaluation [of reasonable suspicion] is made from the perspective of the reasonable officer, not the reasonable person.” United States v. Quintana-Garcia, 343 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Valdez, 147 Fed.

2009Garcia, 123 S.W.3d at 344 . “‘In determining whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable facts, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.’” State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992)); see also Garcia, 123 S.W.3d at 344 .

2006See Garcia, *319 128 S.W.3d at 344. “ ‘In determining whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articula-ble facts, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn.1997) (quoting State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn.1992)); see also Garcia, 123 S.W.3d at 344 .

2010At a minimum, however, there must be more than an officer’s mere “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Hanning, 296 S.W.3d at 49 (quotation marks omitted). 2 In State v. Downey, our supreme court noted that “article I, section 7 is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment.” 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). -5- The analysis of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion is “a fact-intensive and objective analysis,” which requires “reviewing the record for specific and articulable facts.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also Brotherton

2010At a minimum, however, there must be more than an officer’s mere “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Hanning, 296 S.W.3d at 49 (quotation marks omitted). 2 In State v. Downey, our supreme court noted that “article I, section 7 is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment.” 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). -5- The analysis of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion is “a fact-intensive and objective analysis,” which requires “reviewing the record for specific and articulable facts.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also Brotherton

2010At a minimum, however, there must be more than an officer’s mere “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Hanning, 296 S.W.3d at 49 (quotation marks omitted). 2 In State v. Downey, our supreme court noted that “article I, section 7 is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment.” 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). -5- The analysis of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion is “a fact-intensive and objective analysis,” which requires “reviewing the record for specific and articulable facts.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also Brotherton

2010In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.” Garcia, 123 S.W.3d at 344 (quoting Alabama v. White, 469 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). “[R]easonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quality or content than that required to establish probable cause and can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Hanning, 296 S.W.3d at 49 (quotation marks omitted).

2008See generally Williams, 185 S.W.3d at 318 -19 (citing State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Tenn.2003)).

2008See generally Williams, 185 S.W.3d at 318 -19 (citing State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Tenn.2003)).

2006See Garcia, *319 128 S.W.3d at 344. “ ‘In determining whether a police officer’s reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articula-ble facts, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances.’ ” State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn.1997) (quoting State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn.1992)); see also Garcia, 123 S.W.3d at 344 .