21 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1990–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gomez v. Stategreen2 sentences2015In Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Tex. Crim.App. 1985), the Court held that a prosecutor’s juror argument accusing defense counsel of manufacturing evidence was not cured by an instruction to disregard and was thus reversible error. 2008In Gomez v. State, 704 S.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Tuan Anh Dang v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Dang v. State, 154 S.W.3d 616 , 621–22 (Tex. Crim. 2009See Dang v. State , 154 S.W.3d 616 , 621–22 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Felder v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 94-95 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829 , 114 S.Ct. 95 , 126 L.Ed.2d 62 (1993); Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 126-27 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. granted). 2006See Felder v. State , 848 S.W.2d 85, 94-95 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
High Plains Nat. Gas Co. v. Railroad Com'n of Tex.green2 sentences1998Cf. Destec Energy Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 966 S.W.2d 792 , 795 n. 3 (Tex.App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (comments to statute persuasive but not binding); High Plains Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Tex., 467 S.W.2d 532, 539 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (caption to statutory enactment has no enacting force). 7 . 1998Cf. Destec Energy Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co ., 966 S.W.2d 792 , 795 n.3 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, no pet.) (comments to statute persuasive but not binding); High Plains Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. , 467 S.W.2d 532, 539 (Tex. Civ. | 2 | 2 |
Aghili v. Banksgreen1 sentence2024The comments to rule 3.08 state that if “the lawyer’s testimony concerns a controversial or contested matter, combining the roles of advocate and witness can unfairly prejudice the opposing party.” Id. cmt. 4. “[T]he appearance of a testifying advocate tends to cast doubt on the ethics and propriety of the judicial system.” Aghili v. Banks, 63 S.W.3d 812, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See Gonzalez, 616 S.W.3d at 594 (determining any harm from comment was minimal where prosecutor “immediately clarified that she meant the reasonable inferences the jury could draw from [defendant]’s statements to the police, the expert witnesses who interviewed him, family members, and friends”); Cooper, 959 S.W.2d at 686 (concluding trial court and prosecutor cured any harm because court instructed jury to disregard comments, and “the prosecutor’s continued argument revealed that he was not speaking to Cooper’s absent testimony, but to the substance of the testimony presented through other wi | 1 | 1 |
Bayer Corp. v. DX Terminals, Ltd.green1 sentence2021See id.; Bayer Corp. v. DX Terminals, Ltd., 214 S.W.3d 586, 604 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see also Swank v. Sverdlin, 121 S.W.3d 785, 802 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“We are not authorized to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence under calculations different from those the jury were instructed to employ.”). 8 8 In their reply brief, Appellants state that the language in the charge is from Texas Pattern Jury Charge 115.8 and then proceed to discuss comment 1 to the instruction: That the Pattern Jury Charge committee believed this language req | 1 | 1 |
Swank v. Sverdlingreen1 sentence2021See id.; Bayer Corp. v. DX Terminals, Ltd., 214 S.W.3d 586, 604 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); see also Swank v. Sverdlin, 121 S.W.3d 785, 802 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (“We are not authorized to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence under calculations different from those the jury were instructed to employ.”). 8 8 In their reply brief, Appellants state that the language in the charge is from Texas Pattern Jury Charge 115.8 and then proceed to discuss comment 1 to the instruction: That the Pattern Jury Charge committee believed this language req | 1 | 1 |
Blue v. Stategreen1 sentence2010In Blue , a plurality of the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a trial court’s comments during voir dire that “tainted [the defendant’s] presumption of innocence in front of the venire, were fundamental error of constitutional dimension and required no objection.” Id. at 132. | 1 | 1 |
Flanagan v. Shivelygreen1 sentence2006See Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 94-95 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829 , 114 S.Ct. 95 , 126 L.Ed.2d 62 (1993); Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 126-27 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. granted). | 1 | 1 |
Pope v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 94-95 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829 , 114 S.Ct. 95 , 126 L.Ed.2d 62 (1993); Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 126-27 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. granted). | 1 | 1 |
F.P. Corp. v. Twin Modal, Inc.green1 sentence2006See Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 94-95 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829 , 114 S.Ct. 95 , 126 L.Ed.2d 62 (1993); Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 126-27 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. granted). | 1 | 1 |
Lesesne v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroadgreen1 sentence2006See Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 94-95 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829 , 114 S.Ct. 95 , 126 L.Ed.2d 62 (1993); Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 126-27 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. granted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Destec Energy, Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.
green
2 sentences1998Cf. Destec Energy Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 966 S.W.2d 792 , 795 n. 3 (Tex.App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) (comments to statute persuasive but not binding); High Plains Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Tex., 467 S.W.2d 532, 539 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (caption to statutory enactment has no enacting force). 7 . 1998Cf. Destec Energy Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co ., 966 S.W.2d 792 , 795 n.3 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, no pet.) (comments to statute persuasive but not binding); High Plains Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. , 467 S.W.2d 532, 539 (Tex. Civ. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Jones v. State
green
1 sentence2019Moreover, appellant failed to present that purported admission of non-readiness to the trial court at the hearing on his habeas application to rebut the State’s prima facie showing of readiness. 8 The record before us supports the trial court’s implied conclusion that the State met its initial burden of a prima facie showing of readiness by demonstrating the existence of an indictment and communicating after the fact, through the prosecutor’s comments at the hearing, that the State was ready for trial “well within 90 days.” See Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 717–18; Jackson, 2018 WL 1598919 , at *4. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Mays
green
1 sentence2018Based on our de novo review, considering the language of the charging instrument and the State’s comments at the hearing, we conclude that the notice requirement was met.7 See id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Fuentes v. State
green
1 sentence2015In Fuentes v. State, 664 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim.App. 1984), it was held that a prosecutor’s comments that defense counsel was acting “in bad faith like usual” and that evidence which defense counsel was seeking to elicit was “garbage,” were manifestly improper, harmful, and prejudicial, and thus constituted reversible error. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Grant v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals
green
1 sentence2010The comments to this rule specify that the screening provisions “contemplate that the screened lawyer has not furnished and will not furnish other lawyers with information relating to the matter, will not have access to the files pertaining to the matter, and will not participate in any way as a lawyer or adviser in the matter.” Id. cmt. 3. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences2000In Bander I, we held that ... a successive prosecution is jeopardy barred [under the Texas Constitution] after declaration of a mistrial at the defendant’s request, not only when the objectionable conduct of the prosecutor was intended to induce a motion for mistrial[, the Fifth Amendment standard under Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982),] but also when the prosecutor was aware but consciously disregarded the risk that an objectionable event for which he was responsible would require a mistrial at the defendant’s request. 2000In Bander I, we held that ... a successive prosecution is jeopardy barred [under the Texas Constitution] after declaration of a mistrial at the defendant’s request, not only when the objectionable conduct of the prosecutor was intended to induce a motion for mistrial[, the Fifth Amendment standard under Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982),] but also when the prosecutor was aware but consciously disregarded the risk that an objectionable event for which he was responsible would require a mistrial at the defendant’s request. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Madden v. State
green
2 sentences1991Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2); Madden, 799 S.W.2d at 700 . 1991Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2); Madden, 799 S.W.2d at 700 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Sifford v. State
green
1 sentence1991Id. at 869 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Martin v. State
green
1 sentence1990Having authored the majority opinion in Martin v. State, 744 S.W.2d 658 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1988, no pet.), I certainly do not adopt the majority writer’s comments or analysis concerning that ease and frankly see no relevance in “replowing” that ground. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.