21 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hall v. Stategreen2 sentences2015App. 2011) (“[T]he prosecutor’s remark about the appellant’s lack of remorse in the courtroom was an objectionable comment on the appellant’s failure to testify because it highlighted for the jury the appellant’s failure to take the stand and claim present remorse.”); Hall v. State, 13 S.W.3d 115, 117 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000), pet. dism’d, 46 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. Crim. 2015App. 2011) (“[T]he prosecutor’s remark about the appellant’s lack of remorse in the courtroom was an objectionable comment on the appellant’s failure to testify because it highlighted for the jury the appellant’s failure to take the stand and claim present remorse.”); Hall v. State, 13 S.W.3d 115, 117 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000), pet. dism’d, 46 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Johnson, Charles Michaelgreen2 sentences2013See Johnson v. State, 357 S.W.3d 653 (Tex.Crim.App.2012); Chapman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). 2013See Johnson v. State , 357 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Fuentes v. Stategreen2 sentences2012App. 2011) (“[T]he prosecutor’s remark about the appellant’s lack of remorse in the courtroom was an objectionable comment on the appellant’s failure to testify because it highlighted for the jury the appellant’s failure to take the stand and claim present remorse.”); see also Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 275 (Tex. Crim. 2012App. 2011) (“[T]he prosecutor’s remark about the appellant’s lack of remorse in the courtroom was an objectionable comment on the appellant’s failure to testify because it highlighted for the jury the appellant’s failure to take the stand and claim present remorse.”); see also Fuentes v. State , 991 S.W.2d 267, 275 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Lopez v. Stategreen2 sentences2007If the accused testifies during trial, “he or she is subject to the same rules as any other witness and may be impeached, contradicted, made to give evidence against himself or herself, cross-examined on new matters, and treated in every respect as any other witness, except where there are overriding constitutional or statutory provisions.” Lopez v. State, 990 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.). 2007If the accused testifies during trial , "he or she is subject to the same rules as any other witness and may be impeached, contradicted, made to give evidence against himself or herself, cross-examined on new matters, and treated in every respect as any other witness, except where there are overriding constitutional or statutory provisions." Lopez v. State , 990 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Tex. App.--Austin 1999, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Snowden, Rion Phealgreen2 sentences2019On the other hand, it can be improper for the State to reference the defendant’s current lack of remorse because it “highlight[s] for the jury the appellant’s failure to take the stand and claim present remorse.” See Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 824 (Tex. Crim. 2016A prosecutor’s argument concerning whether a defendant is presently remorseful as he sits in the courtroom at trial is “a circumstance that only [the defendant] could have testified to,” it “highlight[s] for the jury the [defendant’s] failure to take the stand and claim present remorse,” and “a jury is not entitled to infer as much from its impression of his courtroom demeanor.” Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815 , 823–24 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2 |
Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Drewery Construction Co.green1 sentence2014Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. 2006) (explaining that “default generally must be set aside” when the defendant did not receive the suit papers but that there is an exception to this rule “when nonreceipt is uncorroborated”); Osborn, 961 S.W.2d at 413 (defendant did not show that his failure to attend trial was unintentional when he took the stand at hearing but never testified that he did not receive notice). | 1 | 1 |
Osborn v. Osborngreen1 sentence2014Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. 2006) (explaining that “default generally must be set aside” when the defendant did not receive the suit papers but that there is an exception to this rule “when nonreceipt is uncorroborated”); Osborn, 961 S.W.2d at 413 (defendant did not show that his failure to attend trial was unintentional when he took the stand at hearing but never testified that he did not receive notice). | 1 | 1 |
Doyle v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1979I think a state court is free to regard the defendant’s decision to take the stand as a waiver of his objection to the use of his failure to testify at an earlier proceeding or his failure to offer his version of the events prior to trial.” 426 U.S. at 632, 633 , 96 S.Ct. at 2251-52 . 1979I think a state court is free to regard the defendant’s decision to take the stand as a waiver of his objection to the use of his failure to testify at an earlier proceeding or his failure to offer his version of the events prior to trial.” 426 U.S. at 632, 633 , 96 S.Ct. at 2251-52 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hall v. State
green
2 sentences2015App. 2011) (“[T]he prosecutor’s remark about the appellant’s lack of remorse in the courtroom was an objectionable comment on the appellant’s failure to testify because it highlighted for the jury the appellant’s failure to take the stand and claim present remorse.”); Hall v. State, 13 S.W.3d 115, 117 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000), pet. dism’d, 46 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. Crim. 2015App. 2011) (“[T]he prosecutor’s remark about the appellant’s lack of remorse in the courtroom was an objectionable comment on the appellant’s failure to testify because it highlighted for the jury the appellant’s failure to take the stand and claim present remorse.”); Hall v. State, 13 S.W.3d 115, 117 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000), pet. dism’d, 46 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Lenoir v. Kerley
green
2 sentences2012App.) (noting that State’s comment, “We respect his right to remain silent and we’ve done that . . . ,” was a recognition that appellant possessed a right not to testify and was distinguishable “from cases in which the State comments negatively on the defendant’s failure to testify”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1026 (1999). 7 (“Defendants who take the stand are subject to the same rules governing the cross-examination of any other witness.”); Jefferson v. State, No. 14-97-01018- CR, 1999 WL 496915 , at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 15, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (c 2012App.) (noting that State’s comment, “We respect his right to remain silent and we’ve done that . . . ,” was a recognition that appellant possessed a right not to testify and was distinguishable “from cases in which the State comments negatively on the defendant’s failure to testify”), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 1026 (1999). [6] Counsel requested a lesser-included offense instruction on assault causing bodily injury, which the trial court also granted. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Long v. State
red
2 sentences1992The court also concluded that the statute violated the guarantees of due process and due course of law by exposing the accused to the choice of relinquishing his right to call the child victim to the stand to test her credibility or risking the wrath of the fact finder for subjecting the child to the very trauma the statute was supposed to prevent. 742 S.W.2d at 321 . 1991The court also concluded that the statute violated the guarantees of due process and due course of law by exposing the accused to the choice of relinquishing his right to call the child victim to the stand to test her credibility or risking the wrath of the fact finder for subjecting the child to the very trauma the statute was supposed to prevent. 742 S.W.2d at 321 . | 2 | 1991–1992 |
Santiago v. State
green
2 sentences1987Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App. [(1969)], 444 S.W.2d 758 .” Brumfield, 445 S.W.2d at 740 . 1969Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758 . | 2 | 1969–1987 |
Dickinson v. State
green
1 sentence2016App. 2011); Dickinson v. State, 685 S.W.2d 320 , 324–25 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Beathard v. State
green
1 sentence2016The cases cited by appellant in support of his argument—Beathard v. State, 767 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Chapman v. State
green
1 sentence2013See Johnson v. State, 357 S.W.3d 653 (Tex.Crim.App.2012); Chapman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Cates v. State
green
1 sentence2004Id. at 354-55 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Brumfield v. State
green
1 sentence1987Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App. [(1969)], 444 S.W.2d 758 .” Brumfield, 445 S.W.2d at 740 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Douglas v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1983Now does that just happen to be mere coincidence that they got married right after this murder was committed?" An objection to this argument was sustained and the jury was instructed to disregard it. [18] See n. 16, ante, and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 , 85 S.Ct. 1074 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). [19] We have already stated appellant invited, and perforce waived, this error in his own trial. [20] Since the witness could testify for appellant under Article 38.11, supra, and as a coindictee, the State had no reason to believe she would do otherwise when called to the stand by the defense. 1983Now does that just happen to be mere coincidence that they got married right after this murder was committed?" An objection to this argument was sustained and the jury was instructed to disregard it. [18] See n. 16, ante, and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 , 85 S.Ct. 1074 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). [19] We have already stated appellant invited, and perforce waived, this error in his own trial. [20] Since the witness could testify for appellant under Article 38.11, supra, and as a coindictee, the State had no reason to believe she would do otherwise when called to the stand by the defense. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Vessels v. State
green
2 sentences1969The State may prove the same by witnesses, establish the same by certified copies of the judgment and sentence and records of the Texas Department of Corrections or a county jail including fingerprints of the defendant, supported by expert testimony identifying them as identical with known prints of the defendant, Vessels v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 432 S.W.2d 108 , or by stipulations, etc. And if the defendant takes the stand at the hearing on punishment he is on for all purposes of such hearing. 1969The State may prove the same by witnesses, establish the same by certified copies of the judgment and sentence and records of the Texas Department of Corrections or a county jail including fingerprints of the defendant, supported by expert testimony identifying them as identical with known prints of the defendant, Vessels v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 432 S.W.2d 108 , or by stipulations, etc. And if the defendant takes the stand at the hearing on punishment he is on for all purposes of such hearing. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Washington v. State
green
2 sentences1967In Washington v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 400 S.W.2d 756 , the court sustained the objection of the state to the calling of Fuller, a co-principal who had been convicted of the murder for which Washington was on trial. 1967In Washington v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 400 S.W.2d 756 , the court sustained the objection of the state to the calling of Fuller, a co-principal who had been convicted of the murder for which Washington was on trial. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Duran v. State
neutral
2 sentences1967Don’t you know that you can put your wife up here and let her tell this story to the jury?” Duran v. State, 144 Tex.Cr.R. 614 , 165 S.W.2d 192 , is authority for the rule that an allusion to a defendant’s failure to place his wife on the stand is not error. 1967Don’t you know that you can put your wife up here and let her tell this story to the jury?” Duran v. State, 144 Tex.Cr.R. 614 , 165 S.W.2d 192 , is authority for the rule that an allusion to a defendant’s failure to place his wife on the stand is not error. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.