similarity requirement in Florida

2010The Florida Supreme Court in McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 1255 (Fla.2006) explained the substantial similarity requirement, stating: [I]n cases where the purported relevancy of the collateral crime evidence is the identity of the defendant, we have required “identifiable points of similarity” between the collateral act and charged crime that “have some special character or [are] so unusual as to point to the defendant.” Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla.1981).

2009In McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 1255 (Fla.2006), this Court explained the substantial similarity requirement, stating: [I]n cases where the purported relevancy of the collateral crime evidence is the identity of the defendant, we have required “identifiable points of similarity” between the collateral act and charged crime that “have some special character or [are] so unusual as to point to the defendant.” Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla.1981).

2010The Florida Supreme Court in McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 1255 (Fla.2006) explained the substantial similarity requirement, stating: [I]n cases where the purported relevancy of the collateral crime evidence is the identity of the defendant, we have required “identifiable points of similarity” between the collateral act and charged crime that “have some special character or [are] so unusual as to point to the defendant.” Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla.1981).

2009In McLean v. State, 934 So.2d 1248, 1255 (Fla.2006), this Court explained the substantial similarity requirement, stating: [I]n cases where the purported relevancy of the collateral crime evidence is the identity of the defendant, we have required “identifiable points of similarity” between the collateral act and charged crime that “have some special character or [are] so unusual as to point to the defendant.” Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217, 1219 (Fla.1981).

1993In Calloway v. State, 520 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), rev. denied, 529 So.2d 693 , (Fla. 1988), this court specifically stated [t]he rigidity with which the similarity requirement is applied in cases wherein the collateral crimes are introduced to prove a fact such as identity of the perpetrator is not necessary in other situations as in the instant case where the evidence is relevant to corroborate the victim's testimony.

1993See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, 583 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (admission of similar-fact evidence under relaxed Heuring standard approved, although the victim of the collateral crime stated only that she awoke to find the defendant unfastening her pajama bottoms, whereas the victim in the charged offense related that she awoke to find the defendant rubbing his hand on her private parts); Calloway v. State, 520 So.2d 665, 668 (Fla. 1st DCA), ("The rigidity with which the similarity requirement is applied in cases wherein the collateral crimes are introduced to prove a fact such as the identi

2010Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122, 124 (Fla.1987) (“The charged and collateral offenses must be not only strikingly similar, but they must also share some unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses.”), quashed on other grounds, 559 So.2d 207 (Fla.1990).

2007Calloway stated that "the rigidity with which the similarity requirement is applied in cases wherein the collateral crimes are introduced to prove a fact such as the identity of the perpetrator is not necessary in other situations such as . . . where the evidence is relevant to corroborate the victim's testimony." Id. at 668 .

2003The court did, however, state that the applicable standard "lies somewhere in between the stringent similarity requirement of the usual Williams rule case and the liberal similarity rule" that would allow the admission of collateral crime evidence of any sex crimes committed in the familial context. 660 So.2d at 671 .

2003The court did, however, state that the applicable standard "lies somewhere in between the stringent similarity requirement of the usual Williams rule case and the liberal similarity rule" that would allow the admission of collateral crime evidence of any sex crimes committed in the familial context. 660 So.2d at 671 .

2000Therefore, the court concluded, a defendant's evidence of past criminal conduct by another person must be "of such nature that it would be admissible if that person were on trial for the present offense." Savino, 567 So.2d at 894 .

1997Furthermore, the state argues that the information would have never been admissible in evidence under State v. Savino, 567 So.2d 892, 894 (Fla. 1990), which held that although a defendant may present "reverse Williams rule evidence" for exculpatory purposes if relevant, such evidence must still meet the similarity requirement showing that the crimes sought to be admitted have a close similarity of facts, a unique "fingerprint" type of evidence.

1991This court found the credibility of the victim to be the focal issue in the case, and rejected the argument that the collateral crimes were not sufficiently similar to the charged offenses: "The rigidity with which the similarity requirement is applied in cases wherein the collateral crimes are introduced to prove a fact such as the identity of the perpetrator is not necessary in other situations such as the instant case where the evidence is relevant to corroborate the victim's testimony," citing Mitchell v. State, 491 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. den., 500 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1986). [3] It fou

1988See Mitchell v. State, 491 So.2d 596, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 404.9 (2d Ed. 1984).

2015See, e.g., Fike v, State, 63 So.3d 847, 848-49 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (holding that defendant’s Michigan conviction did not qualify him for sexual predator designation without considering the underlying facts); see also Dautel v. State, 658 So.2d 88, 89 (Fla.1995) (“[Ojnly the elements of the out-of-state crime should be considered in determining whether that conviction is analogous to a Florida statute for the purpose of calculating points for a sentencing guidelines scoresheet.”).

2015See, e.g., Fike v, State, 63 So.3d 847, 848-49 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (holding that defendant’s Michigan conviction did not qualify him for sexual predator designation without considering the underlying facts); see also Dautel v. State, 658 So.2d 88, 89 (Fla.1995) (“[Ojnly the elements of the out-of-state crime should be considered in determining whether that conviction is analogous to a Florida statute for the purpose of calculating points for a sentencing guidelines scoresheet.”).

2010“The substantial similarity doctrine does not apply to situations ... where the evidence is ‘pointedly dissimilar’ and ‘not offered to reenact the accident.’ ” Tran, 420 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Heath v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 126 F.3d 1391, 1396-97 (11th Cir.1997)).

2010"The substantial similarity doctrine does not apply to situations . . . where the evidence is `pointedly dissimilar' and `not offered to reenact the accident.'" Tran, 420 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Heath v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 126 F.3d 1391, 1396-97 (11th Cir.1997)).

2010See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Dunn, 977 So.2d 594, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

2010See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Dunn, 977 So.2d 594, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

2010Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 907-08 (Fla.2002).

1999The charged and collateral offenses must be not only strikingly similar, but they must also share some unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses." In addition to this similarity requirement, "[a] critical aspect of the test of admissibility under section 90.404(2)(a) ... [is] whether such evidence tends to prove a material fact issue that is in dispute." Thomas v. State, 599 So.2d 158, 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

1999"Whether a relevant material fact is in issue ... must be determined from the particular facts and circumstances involved in each case, i.e., has the defendant put such fact in issue." Id. at 163 .

1995Heuring and Beasley do not stand for the proposition that in a case involving the sexual abuse of a child in a familial context any evidence of the familial sexual abuse of another child is per se admissible. *672 See Feller v. State, 637 So.2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1994).

1995Heuring and Beasley do not stand for the proposition that in a case involving the sexual abuse of a child in a familial context any evidence of the familial sexual abuse of another child is per se admissible. *672 See Feller v. State, 637 So.2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1994).

1993See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, 583 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (admission of similar-fact evidence under relaxed Heuring standard approved, although the victim of the collateral crime stated only that she awoke to find the defendant unfastening her pajama bottoms, whereas the victim in the charged offense related that she awoke to find the defendant rubbing his hand on her private parts); Calloway v. State, 520 So.2d 665, 668 (Fla. 1st DCA), ("The rigidity with which the similarity requirement is applied in cases wherein the collateral crimes are introduced to prove a fact such as the identi

1993See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, 583 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (admission of similar-fact evidence under relaxed Heuring standard approved, although the victim of the collateral crime stated only that she awoke to find the defendant unfastening her pajama bottoms, whereas the victim in the charged offense related that she awoke to find the defendant rubbing his hand on her private parts); Calloway v. State, 520 So.2d 665, 668 (Fla. 1st DCA), ("The rigidity with which the similarity requirement is applied in cases wherein the collateral crimes are introduced to prove a fact such as the identi

1989See also United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1497 (11th Cir.1985).