fiduciary shield doctrine in Illinois

1992The fiduciary shield doctrine provides that “if an individual has contact with a State only by virtue of his acts as a fiduciary of a corporation” (Olinski v. Duce (1987), 155 Ill.

1990In its order denying Ellwood’s motion to quash service of process for lack of personal jurisdiction, the circuit court indicated that it did not think that the fiduciary shield doctrine was established in Illinois; rather, those appellate court opinions referring to the concept that an employee’s conduct solely on behalf of an employer cannot be invoked to assert personal jurisdiction over the employee did so only in dicta, and based their holdings that the defendants were not subject to personal jurisdiction either on the fact that, no matter to whom a defendant employee’s conduct could be at

1998App.3d 826 , 86 Ill.Dec. 100 , 474 N.E.2d 1297 (assertions by non-residents that their activities were conducted in their corporate capacities and were thus subject to protection under the fiduciary shield doctrine).

1998App.3d 826 , 86 Ill.Dec. 100 , 474 N.E.2d 1297 (assertions by non-residents that their activities were conducted in their corporate capacities and were thus subject to protection under the fiduciary shield doctrine).

1994In that opinion, the court adopted the fiduciary shield doctrine, which provides that "the conduct of a person in a representative capacity cannot be relied upon to exercise individual personal jurisdiction over that person.” (Rollins, 141 Ill. 2d at 276 , 565 N.E.2d at 1316 , citing Hurletron Whittier, Inc. v. Barda (1980), 82 Ill.

1990The fiduciary shield doctrine was firmly established in Hurletron Whittier, Inc., where the court declared, as partial basis for its holding, that “[t]he existence of personal jurisdiction must be established by acts of the defendant; however, the conduct of a person in a representative capacity cannot be relied upon to exercise individual personal jurisdiction over that person.” (Hurletron Whittier, Inc., 82 Ill.

2013Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in granting Everly’s motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.” Id. at 747- 48. -12- ¶ 43 The First District followed Morse in International Business Machines Corp. v. Martin Property & Casualty Insurance Agency, Inc., 281 Ill.

1996To avail himself of the benefits of Illinois law and to then claim Illinois courts have no personal jurisdiction over him was not a result the Rollins court envisioned in adopting the fiduciary shield doctrine.” Morse, 261 Ill.

1990Rollins further argues that the fiduciary shield doctrine is to be applied in the discretion of the court (Washburn v. Becker (1989), 186 Ill.

1990App. 3d 629 , 542 N.E.2d 764 , appeal denied (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 643 , 545 N.E.2d 134 (application of fiduciary shield doctrine is discretionary, and equitable principles governing application should be analyzed in light of the particular facts of the case).) For the latest formulation of the fiduciary shield doctrine, as well as the applicability of the Illinois due process clause to the question of personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, see Rollins v. Ellwood (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 244 .

2013Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in granting Everly’s motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.” Id. at 747- 48. -12- ¶ 43 The First District followed Morse in International Business Machines Corp. v. Martin Property & Casualty Insurance Agency, Inc., 281 Ill.

2007Defendants point out that ZEEKS and SKEEZ are Delaware corporations and that under Delaware law, the corporate veil may be pierced only “in the interest of justice, when such matters as fraud, contravention of law or contract, public wrong, or where equitable consideration among members of the corporation require it, are involved.” Pauley Petroleum, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Del.

1990Ill. 1984), 594 F. Supp. 341 ; Oxmans’ Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer (1979), 86 Wis. 2d 683 , 273 N.W.2d 285 .) The circuit court concluded by explaining that because Ellwood’s contacts with Illinois gave rise to Rollins’ cause of action, circumstances which did not exist in those cases which had alluded to the fiduciary shield doctrine (and which circumstances the circuit court seemed to think were prerequisites for application of the doctrine), it would not apply the fiduciary shield doctrine and would not quash service of process on Ellwood.

1990Ill. 1984), 594 F. Supp. 341 ; Oxmans’ Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer (1979), 86 Wis. 2d 683 , 273 N.W.2d 285 .) The circuit court concluded by explaining that because Ellwood’s contacts with Illinois gave rise to Rollins’ cause of action, circumstances which did not exist in those cases which had alluded to the fiduciary shield doctrine (and which circumstances the circuit court seemed to think were prerequisites for application of the doctrine), it would not apply the fiduciary shield doctrine and would not quash service of process on Ellwood.

1990Ill. 1981), 530 F. Supp. 94 .) Initially, we find, contrary to the suggestion of the circuit court here, that the appellate court has established the fiduciary shield doctrine in Illinois law and has not merely referred to the doctrine in dicta.

1990The basis for the holding in Washburn was more obscure; in that case, the court found the rationale for the fiduciary shield doctrine in a Federal district court opinion from the Northern District of Illinois (State Security Insurance Co., 530 F. Supp. at 97 ), which had quoted a Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion (Marine Midland Bank v. Miller (2d Cir. 1981), 664 F.2d 899, 902 ) interpreting New York’s long-arm statute, which is basically identical to Illinois’ statute.

1990The basis for the holding in Washburn was more obscure; in that case, the court found the rationale for the fiduciary shield doctrine in a Federal district court opinion from the Northern District of Illinois (State Security Insurance Co., 530 F. Supp. at 97 ), which had quoted a Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion (Marine Midland Bank v. Miller (2d Cir. 1981), 664 F.2d 899, 902 ) interpreting New York’s long-arm statute, which is basically identical to Illinois’ statute.

1990App. 3d at 632 (quoting State Security Insurance Co., 530 F. Supp. at 97 , which quoted Marine Midland Bank, 664 F.2d at 902 ).) Though the court in State Security Insurance Co. explained that it, like the court in Marine Midland Bank, was basing its recognition of the doctrine in the name of fairness on a judicial construction of the applicable long-arm statute, there was no reasoned analysis of the statute to justify this claim of authority; furthermore, a close reading of both Federal cases leaves the impression that the basis for those courts’ recognition of the fiduciary shield doctrine w

1990Ill. 1984), 594 F. Supp. 341 ; Oxmans’ Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer (1979), 86 Wis. 2d 683 , 273 N.W.2d 285 .) The circuit court concluded by explaining that because Ellwood’s contacts with Illinois gave rise to Rollins’ cause of action, circumstances which did not exist in those cases which had alluded to the fiduciary shield doctrine (and which circumstances the circuit court seemed to think were prerequisites for application of the doctrine), it would not apply the fiduciary shield doctrine and would not quash service of process on Ellwood.