parental fitness hearing in Illinois

2022See Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 30 (indicating that to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must show that a reasonable probability exists that, but for defense counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different). ¶ 36 III.

2022See Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 30 (indicating that to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must show that a reasonable probability exists that, but for defense counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different). ¶ 36 III.

2019In this case, after a parental fitness hearing where the trial court received testimony from several doctors and clinicians, the trial court found that respondent was unfit under the Adoption Act because of her lifelong intellectual disability and failure to make reasonable progress toward the minors returning home. ¶5 As Illinois law requires (In re O.S., 364 Ill.

2018In this case, after a parental fitness hearing where the trial court received testimony from several doctors and clinicians, the trial court found that respondent was unfit under the Adoption Act because of her lifelong intellectual disability and failure to make reasonable progress toward the minors returning home. ¶ 5 As Illinois law requires ( In re O.S. , 364 Ill.

2021See A.W., 231 Ill. 2d at 104 . ¶ 79 At the parental fitness hearing, the State presented only three witnesses in support of its petition that alleged Shalyn M. was an unfit parent, and most of that testimony was not - 11 - unfavorable toward him.

2020See A.W., 231 Ill. 2d at 104 . ¶ 79 At the parental fitness hearing, the State presented only three witnesses in support of its petition that alleged Shalyn M. was an unfit parent, and most of that testimony was not unfavorable toward him.

2000See, e.g., In re C.R., 221 Ill.App.3d 373 , 381, 163 Ill.

2000See, e.g., In re C.R., 221 Ill.App.3d 373 , 381, 163 Ill.

2023In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255 , 276 (1990). ¶ 21 Section 1(D) of the Adoption Act sets forth several grounds on which a parent may be found unfit.

2002Syck, 138 Ill.2d at 276, 149 Ill.Dec. 710 , 562 N.E.2d 174 .

2024In deciding whether that definition of an “ ‘[u]nfit person’ ” has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the circuit court “must focus on the reasonableness of the parent’s efforts to show interest, concern, or responsibility and not necessarily on the success of those efforts.” In re M.J., 314 Ill.

2022App. 3d 492, 505 , 949 N.E.2d 1123, 1133 (2011) that “we expect the court and parties to comply with J.G.” (Emphasis added.). ¶ 55 Therefore, before examining respondent’s claim of ineffective assistance in this case based upon the trial court’s taking of judicial notice, we deem it advisable to again discuss the proper procedure for the taking of judicial notice of contents of the court file in a parental fitness hearing. ¶ 56 1.

2022Id. at 627; A.B., 308 Ill.

2020See id. ¶ 74 Nor does respondent dispute that as of the date of the parental-fitness hearing, May 31, 2018, she was still confined at McFarland, where, because of her mental illness, she was - 10 - involuntarily admitted more than two years earlier.

2020A reasonable trier of fact could take the view that a parent confined at a mental-health institution had a present “[i]nability to discharge parental responsibilities.” Id. ¶ 75 The remaining question, then, was whether “there [was] sufficient justification to believe that the inability to discharge parental responsibilities [would] extend beyond a reasonable time period.” Id.

2020See id.

2016See In re Kenneth J., 352 Ill.