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20 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1902–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
HOUSING AUTHORITY CHAMPAIGN COUNTY v. Lylesgreen2 sentences2025“It is a rudimentary rule of appellate practice that an appellant may not make a point merely by stating it without presenting any argument in support.” Housing Authority of Champaign County v. Lyles, 395 Ill. 2022And plaintiff cites no more than three cases in her entire brief. “[I]t is a rudimentary rule of appellate practice that an appellant may not make a point merely by stating it without presenting any argument in support.” Housing Authority of Champaign County v. Lyles, 395 Ill. | 4 | 4 |
Girard v. Whitegreen2 sentences2009See Girard v. White, 356 Ill. 2005See Girard, 356 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
U.S. Bank Trust National Association v. Juniorgreen1 sentence2021May 25, 2018) (“Argument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.”); see Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 370 (2010) (even argument developed “beyond mere list or vague allegations may be insufficient if it does not include citations to authority.”); U.S. Bank Trust National Association v. Junior, 2016 IL App (1st) 152109, ¶ 19 (“It is a rudimentary rule of appellate practice that an appellant may not make a point merely by stating it without presenting any argument in support.” (I | 1 | 1 |
Vancura v. Katrisgreen1 sentence2021May 25, 2018) (“Argument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.”); see Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 370 (2010) (even argument developed “beyond mere list or vague allegations may be insufficient if it does not include citations to authority.”); U.S. Bank Trust National Association v. Junior, 2016 IL App (1st) 152109, ¶ 19 (“It is a rudimentary rule of appellate practice that an appellant may not make a point merely by stating it without presenting any argument in support.” (I | 1 | 1 |
Prairie Rivers Network v. Illinois Pollution Control Boardgreen1 sentence2020“It is a rudimentary rule of appellate practice that an appellant may not make a point merely by stating it without presenting any argument [or appropriate legal authority] in support.” Prairie Rivers Network v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 335 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Rivera v. Aranagreen1 sentence2002See Rivera v. Arana, 322 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1993To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. at 131 , 19 L. 1993To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. at 131 , 19 L. | 5 | 1971–1993 |
Alford v. United States
green
2 sentences1971To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part on Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693 , where the court held that inquiry into the residence of the witness was essential to identify him with his environment. 1969To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” In Smith v. Illinois, the opinion quotes the principles set forth in Alford v. United States, 282 US 687, 694 , and includes (pp 132-33): “The extent of cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court. | 3 | 1969–1971 |
People v. Shaw
green
2 sentences1971After the Supreme Court decided Smith v. Illinois, supra, this court was directed to re-evaluate our earlier decision of People v. Shaw, 89 Ill. 1970To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” Since the Smith case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the cases of United States v. Garafalo, 385 F 2d 200 (7th Cir) and People v. Shaw, 89 Ill App2d 285, 233 NE2d 73 . | 2 | 1970–1971 |
Pointer v. Texas
green
2 sentences1993Ed. 2d at 959 , 88 S. Ct. at 750 , quoting Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400, 404 , 13 L. 1993Ed. 2d at 959 , 88 S. Ct. at 750 , quoting Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400, 404 , 13 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Eddington
green
1 sentence1981(People v. Eddington (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 41, 46 .) Defendant correctly argues that, despite the prosecutor’s averments that no promises of leniency were made and the court’s doubts that Jones’ testimony could affect the sentence already imposed upon him, the defendant was entitled to inquiry into Jones’ expectations or hopes for leniency whether based on fact or imaginary. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
cluster 283689
green
1 sentence1973To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” ( 390 U.S. at 131 .) Also see: United States v. Palermo (7th Cir. 1969), 410 F.2d 468 , and United States v. Varelli (7th Cir. 1969), 407 F.2d 735 , where in both instances the court held that the address of a witness should have been disclosed. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
cluster 284679
green
1 sentence1973To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” ( 390 U.S. at 131 .) Also see: United States v. Palermo (7th Cir. 1969), 410 F.2d 468 , and United States v. Varelli (7th Cir. 1969), 407 F.2d 735 , where in both instances the court held that the address of a witness should have been disclosed. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
United States v. Sheldon R. Teller and John D. Sullivan
green
1 sentence1971In United States v. Teller (7th Cir.1969), 412 F.2d 374, 380 , the witness, *895 Washington, during cross-examination, was asked "his present address"; the government objected and the objection was sustained by the court. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
United States v. Sam Garafolo
green
1 sentence1970To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” Since the Smith case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the cases of United States v. Garafalo, 385 F 2d 200 (7th Cir) and People v. Shaw, 89 Ill App2d 285, 233 NE2d 73 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Anderson v. Talcott
neutral
1 sentence1906Anderson v. Talcott, 6 Ill., 365, 371 ; Reynolds v. McCormick, 62 Ill., 412 ; and many other cases. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Reynolds v. McCormick
neutral
1 sentence1906Anderson v. Talcott, 6 Ill., 365, 371 ; Reynolds v. McCormick, 62 Ill., 412 ; and many other cases. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
McFarlan v. McClellan
neutral
1 sentence1902McFarland v. McClellan, 3 Ill. | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.