Hillard test in Maryland

2021“Both prongs of the Hillard test must be satisfied before a confession is deemed to be involuntary.” Lee, 418 Md. at 161 , 12 A.3d at 1253 (quoting Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 310 , 765 A.2d 97, 116 (2001)) (brackets omitted).

2021“Both prongs of the Hillard test must be satisfied before a confession is deemed to be involuntary.” Lee, 418 Md. at 161 , 12 A.3d at 1253 (quoting Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 310 , 765 A.2d 97, 116 (2001)) (brackets omitted).

2008“The second prong of the Hillard test triggers a causation analysis to determine whether there was a nexus between the promise or inducement and the accused’s confession.” Winder, supra, 362 Md. at 311 , 765 A.2d 97 ; see Knight, supra, 381 Md. at 537-38 , 850 A.2d 1179 (holding in the first of two consolidated cases that an interrogating officer’s promise to exercise advocacy on the suspect’s part with the prosecutor, although improper, did not induce the suspect’s statement, which he made twice, both before and after the improper promise); Johnson, supra, 348 Md. at 350-52, 703 A.2d 1267 (ho

2008“The second prong of the Hillard test triggers a causation analysis to determine whether there was a nexus between the promise or inducement and the accused’s confession.” Winder, supra, 362 Md. at 311 , 765 A.2d 97 ; see Knight, supra, 381 Md. at 537-38 , 850 A.2d 1179 (holding in the first of two consolidated cases that an interrogating officer’s promise to exercise advocacy on the suspect’s part with the prosecutor, although improper, did not induce the suspect’s statement, which he made twice, both before and after the improper promise); Johnson, supra, 348 Md. at 350-52, 703 A.2d 1267 (ho

2014The Court held that detective’s remarks — that the victim and the victim’s mother “did not want to see him get into trouble, but they only wanted an apology” — constituted an improper inducement under prong one of the Hillard test because a reasonable layperson in the suspect’s position would *278 have taken the detective’s statements to mean that “he could gain the advantage of non-prosecution or some other form of assistance, upon making an apology to the victim and his family.” Id. at 78-79, 12 A.3d 1193 .

2014The Court held that detective’s remarks — that the victim and the victim’s mother “did not want to see him get into trouble, but they only wanted an apology” — constituted an improper inducement under prong one of the Hillard test because a reasonable layperson in the suspect’s position would *278 have taken the detective’s statements to mean that “he could gain the advantage of non-prosecution or some other form of assistance, upon making an apology to the victim and his family.” Id. at 78-79, 12 A.3d 1193 .

2020The thrust of the Hillard test is to ensure that an incriminating remark is “free of any coercive barnacles that may have attached by improper means to prevent the expression from being voluntary.” Hillard, 286 Md. at 150 [.] “Coercive barnacles” can take many forms and are not limited to instances in which interrogating officers promise their assistance to the accused.

2011The thrust of the Hillard test is to ensure that an incriminating remark is "free of any coercive barnacles that may have attached by improper means to prevent the expression from being voluntary." Hillard, 286 Md. at 150 , 406 A.2d at 418 .

2007As noted above, once it is shown that the interrogating officer made an improper promise of advantage or benefit to a suspect during custodial interrogation, it is the State’s burden to prove the causation prong of the Hillard test: that the suspect’s statement “was ‘not made in reliance on a promise or inducement made by a police officer or agent of the police.’ ” Taylor, supra, 388 Md. at 401 , 879 A.2d 1074 (quoting Winder, supra, 362 Md. at 310 , 765 A.2d 97 ).

2007As noted above, once it is shown that the interrogating officer made an improper promise of advantage or benefit to a suspect during custodial interrogation, it is the State’s burden to prove the causation prong of the Hillard test: that the suspect’s statement “was ‘not made in reliance on a promise or inducement made by a police officer or agent of the police.’ ” Taylor, supra, 388 Md. at 401 , 879 A.2d 1074 (quoting Winder, supra, 362 Md. at 310 , 765 A.2d 97 ).

2021“Both prongs of the Hillard test must be satisfied before a confession is deemed to be involuntary.” Lee, 418 Md. at 161 , 12 A.3d at 1253 (quoting Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 310 , 765 A.2d 97, 116 (2001)) (brackets omitted).

2021“Both prongs of the Hillard test must be satisfied before a confession is deemed to be involuntary.” Lee, 418 Md. at 161 , 12 A.3d at 1253 (quoting Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 310 , 765 A.2d 97, 116 (2001)) (brackets omitted).

2023Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966) (emphasis added). 59 prong of the Hillard test requires an objective analysis.

2023Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966) (emphasis added). 59 prong of the Hillard test requires an objective analysis.

2021In other words, when determining whether a police officer’s 6 The exclusionary rule of involuntary confessions articulated in Hillard stretches back to the 1873 case, Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140, 152 (1873).

2021In other words, when determining whether a police officer’s 6 The exclusionary rule of involuntary confessions articulated in Hillard stretches back to the 1873 case, Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140, 152 (1873).

2021The absence of such testimony would support the conclusion that Madrid did not confess in reliance on the alleged implicit inducement, i.e., the second prong of the Hillard test is also not satisfied. - 47 - and we consider factors this Court set forth in Hof, 337 Md. at 596-97 , 655 A.2d at 377 - 78, as well as factors for defendants who were juveniles at the time of an interview that this Court set forth in Moore, 422 Md. at 531-32 , 30 A.3d at 954-55 .

2021The absence of such testimony would support the conclusion that Madrid did not confess in reliance on the alleged implicit inducement, i.e., the second prong of the Hillard test is also not satisfied. - 47 - and we consider factors this Court set forth in Hof, 337 Md. at 596-97 , 655 A.2d at 377 - 78, as well as factors for defendants who were juveniles at the time of an interview that this Court set forth in Moore, 422 Md. at 531-32 , 30 A.3d at 954-55 .

2021See Madrid, 247 Md.

2021See Madrid, 247 Md.

2021While “care must be taken to assure that statements made to the police by juveniles are voluntary before being permitted in evidence[,]” id. at 531 , 30 A.3d at 954 (citation omitted), “the age of a [defendant], in itself, does not render a confession involuntary[,]” Miller, 251 Md. at 379 , 247 A.2d at 539 (citations omitted).

2021While “care must be taken to assure that statements made to the police by juveniles are voluntary before being permitted in evidence[,]” id. at 531 , 30 A.3d at 954 (citation omitted), “the age of a [defendant], in itself, does not render a confession involuntary[,]” Miller, 251 Md. at 379 , 247 A.2d at 539 (citations omitted).

2005See also State v. Anderson, 404 N.W.2d 856, 858 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (affirming trial court’s decision to suppress defendant’s confession upon finding that police officer told defendant that if he confessed they would arrange drug treatment in lieu of prosecution); cf. McCarthy v. Bronson, 683 F.Supp. 880, 884-86 (D.Conn.1988) (tacitly acknowledging that a promise of drug treatment as an alternative to incarceration may be improper but holding that the totality of the circumstances supported the trial court’s determination that no such inducement occurred).

2005See also State v. Anderson, 404 N.W.2d 856, 858 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (affirming trial court’s decision to suppress defendant’s confession upon finding that police officer told defendant that if he confessed they would arrange drug treatment in lieu of prosecution); cf. McCarthy v. Bronson, 683 F.Supp. 880, 884-86 (D.Conn.1988) (tacitly acknowledging that a promise of drug treatment as an alternative to incarceration may be improper but holding that the totality of the circumstances supported the trial court’s determination that no such inducement occurred).

2005See also State v. Anderson, 404 N.W.2d 856, 858 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (affirming trial court’s decision to suppress defendant’s confession upon finding that police officer told defendant that if he confessed they would arrange drug treatment in lieu of prosecution); cf. McCarthy v. Bronson, 683 F.Supp. 880, 884-86 (D.Conn.1988) (tacitly acknowledging that a promise of drug treatment as an alternative to incarceration may be improper but holding that the totality of the circumstances supported the trial court’s determination that no such inducement occurred).

2005See also State v. Anderson, 404 N.W.2d 856, 858 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (affirming trial court’s decision to suppress defendant’s confession upon finding that police officer told defendant that if he confessed they would arrange drug treatment in lieu of prosecution); cf. McCarthy v. Bronson, 683 F.Supp. 880, 884-86 (D.Conn.1988) (tacitly acknowledging that a promise of drug treatment as an alternative to incarceration may be improper but holding that the totality of the circumstances supported the trial court’s determination that no such inducement occurred).