third-party tort claim in Michigan

2026In Great Lakes American Life Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 191 Mich App 589, 595 ; 479 NW2d 20 (1991), this Court stated, “As originally enacted, the no-fault act was arguably ambiguous regarding the extent to which an insurance carrier could seek reimbursement for personal protection insurance benefit payments from an insured’s third-party tort recovery.” The Court further stated that the 1978 amendment of MCL 500.3116 “unequivocally resolved” any uncertainty, and “[i]t is now clear that an insurance carrier responsible for no-fault benefits may realize reimbursement from an insured’s third-party

2026In Great Lakes American Life Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 191 Mich App 589, 595 ; 479 NW2d 20 (1991), this Court stated, “As originally enacted, the no-fault act was arguably ambiguous regarding the extent to which an insurance carrier could seek reimbursement for personal protection insurance benefit payments from an insured’s third-party tort recovery.” The Court further stated that the 1978 amendment of MCL 500.3116 “unequivocally resolved” any uncertainty, and “[i]t is now clear that an insurance carrier responsible for no-fault benefits may realize reimbursement from an insured’s third-party

2017This Court held that the insurer’s claim against the non- motorist tortfeasors was barred by MCL 500.3116, reasoning: It is well settled that an insurance carrier responsible for no-fault benefits may realize reimbursement from an insured’s third-party tort claim only in the following situations: (1) accidents occurring outside the state, (2) actions against uninsured owners or operators, or (3) intentional torts [Great Lakes American Life Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 191 Mich App 589, 596 ; 479 NW2d 20 (1991).] See also Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Henley, 130 Mich App 767, 770 ; 344 NW2d 363 (1983); S

2017This Court held that the insurer’s claim against the non- motorist tortfeasors was barred by MCL 500.3116, reasoning: It is well settled that an insurance carrier responsible for no-fault benefits may realize reimbursement from an insured’s third-party tort claim only in the following situations: (1) accidents occurring outside the state, (2) actions against uninsured owners or operators, or (3) intentional torts [Great Lakes American Life Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 191 Mich App 589, 596 ; 479 NW2d 20 (1991).] See also Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Henley, 130 Mich App 767, 770 ; 344 NW2d 363 (1983); S

2017This Court held that the insurer’s claim against the non- motorist tortfeasors was barred by MCL 500.3116, reasoning: It is well settled that an insurance carrier responsible for no-fault benefits may realize reimbursement from an insured’s third-party tort claim only in the following situations: (1) accidents occurring outside the state, (2) actions against uninsured owners or operators, or (3) intentional torts [Great Lakes American Life Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 191 Mich App 589, 596 ; 479 NW2d 20 (1991).] See also Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Henley, 130 Mich App 767, 770 ; 344 NW2d 363 (1983); S

2017This Court held that the insurer’s claim against the non- motorist tortfeasors was barred by MCL 500.3116, reasoning: It is well settled that an insurance carrier responsible for no-fault benefits may realize reimbursement from an insured’s third-party tort claim only in the following situations: (1) accidents occurring outside the state, (2) actions against uninsured owners or operators, or (3) intentional torts [Great Lakes American Life Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 191 Mich App 589, 596 ; 479 NW2d 20 (1991).] See also Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Henley, 130 Mich App 767, 770 ; 344 NW2d 363 (1983); S

2017However, this Court recognized that the evidence plaintiff presented, along with that presented by defendant, created a question of fact for the jury to resolve. 293 Mich App at 441-444 . -5- Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude that he suffered a threshold injury, a serious impairment of an important body function, to assert a third party tort claim against Visser.

2017However, this Court recognized that the evidence plaintiff presented, along with that presented by defendant, created a question of fact for the jury to resolve. 293 Mich App at 441-444 . -5- Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to conclude that he suffered a threshold injury, a serious impairment of an important body function, to assert a third party tort claim against Visser.

2003In Sibley [supra] the issue was whether benefits initially tendered to the insured under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 USC 8101 et seq., but recouped by the federal government pursuant to its statutory right of subrogation, 5 USC 8132, from the insured’s third-party tort claim, should nonetheless be treated as “[b]enefits provided or required to be provided under the laws of. .. the federal government” for purposes of MCL 500.3109(1); MSA 24.13109(1).

1998In Sibley v DAIIE, 431 Mich 164 ; 427 NW2d 528 (1988), the issue was whether benefits initially tendered to the insured under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 USC 8101 et seq., but recouped by the federal government pursuant to its statutory right of subrogation, 5 USC 8132, from the insured’s third-party tort claim, should nonetheless be treated as “[b]enefits provided or required to be provided under the laws of . . . the federal government” for purposes of MCL 500.3109(1); MSA 24.13109(1).

2026On appeal, this Court cited Great Lakes and other caselaw for the proposition that an insurer is entitled to “reimbursement from an insured’s third-party tort claim only in the following situations: (1) accidents occurring outside the state, (2) actions against uninsured owners or operators, or (3) intentional torts[.]” Id.

2026The Pezzani Court also correctly stated that MCL 500.3116 “essentially limits a no-fault insurer’s right to reimbursement to recoveries from motorist tortfeasors or for intentional torts.” Id. at 280 .

2026In Dunn v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 254 Mich App 256, 267 ; 657 NW2d 153 (2002), this Court stated that “[a] no-fault insurer cannot seek reimbursement for medical benefits paid from an insured’s third-party tort recovery except under the limited circumstances set forth in § 3116 of the no-fault act, MCL § 500.3116.” Further, in Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co v Mich Assigned Claims Plan, 507 Mich 498 , 506 n 9; 968 NW2d 482 (2021), our Supreme Court noted that MCL 500.3116 “provid[es] rights of reimbursement and indemnity to no-fault insurers for cases in which a claimant recovers on a tort cla

2026In Dunn v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 254 Mich App 256, 267 ; 657 NW2d 153 (2002), this Court stated that “[a] no-fault insurer cannot seek reimbursement for medical benefits paid from an insured’s third-party tort recovery except under the limited circumstances set forth in § 3116 of the no-fault act, MCL § 500.3116.” Further, in Esurance Prop & Cas Ins Co v Mich Assigned Claims Plan, 507 Mich 498 , 506 n 9; 968 NW2d 482 (2021), our Supreme Court noted that MCL 500.3116 “provid[es] rights of reimbursement and indemnity to no-fault insurers for cases in which a claimant recovers on a tort cla

2023Id. 2 “A third-party tort claim is distinct from a claim for first-party benefits because a third-party tort claim involves an adversarial process in which the plaintiff must prove fault in order to recover.” Atkins v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 492 Mich 707, 718 ; 822 NW2d 522 (2012). -2- noted in the police report and on the application for first-party benefits that they lived in Michigan.

2023“The plain language of MCL 691.1405 and MCL 500.3135 may be read harmoniously to provide that a plaintiff may avoid governmental immunity if he suffers “bodily injury” under the motor vehicle exception of MCL 691.1405, but he must also satisfy the no-fault act threshold for bringing a third-party tort claim, i.e., a plaintiff must establish a serious impairment of a body function as stated in MCL 500.3135.” Allen v Bloomfield Hills Sch Dist, 281 Mich App 49, 55-56 ; 760 NW2d 811 (2008). -12- (5) As used in this section, “serious impairment of body function” means an impairment that satisfies a

2023“The plain language of MCL 691.1405 and MCL 500.3135 may be read harmoniously to provide that a plaintiff may avoid governmental immunity if he suffers “bodily injury” under the motor vehicle exception of MCL 691.1405, but he must also satisfy the no-fault act threshold for bringing a third-party tort claim, i.e., a plaintiff must establish a serious impairment of a body function as stated in MCL 500.3135.” Allen v Bloomfield Hills Sch Dist, 281 Mich App 49, 55-56 ; 760 NW2d 811 (2008). -12- (5) As used in this section, “serious impairment of body function” means an impairment that satisfies a

2023A party may file a third-party tort claim for noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress, resulting from an automobile accident under MCL 500.3135(1) of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., if the person has suffered “death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” The threshold question “should be determined by the court as a matter of law as long as there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of the person’s injuries that is material to determining whether the threshold standards are met.” McCormick v Carrier, 487

2023A party may file a third-party tort claim for noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress, resulting from an automobile accident under MCL 500.3135(1) of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., if the person has suffered “death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” The threshold question “should be determined by the court as a matter of law as long as there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of the person’s injuries that is material to determining whether the threshold standards are met.” McCormick v Carrier, 487

2023“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183 ; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). -2- A plaintiff may file a third-party tort claim for noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress, resulting from an automobile accident under MCL 500.3135(1) of the no-fault act,3 “if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 4

2023“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183 ; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). -2- A plaintiff may file a third-party tort claim for noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress, resulting from an automobile accident under MCL 500.3135(1) of the no-fault act,3 “if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 4

2023“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183 ; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). -2- A plaintiff may file a third-party tort claim for noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress, resulting from an automobile accident under MCL 500.3135(1) of the no-fault act,3 “if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” Hannay v Dep’t of Transp, 4

2019Id. at 649 .

2017Therefore, defendant’s reliance on the “based solely on contract” language is misguided. 37 Id. at 349 . 38 See MCR 7.215(J). 39 Griswold, 276 Mich App at 553-554 . 40 Arco Indus Corp v American Motorists Ins Co (On Second Remand, On Rehearing), 233 Mich App 143 ; 594 NW2d 74 (1998), aff’d by equal division 462 Mich 896 (2000). 13 concluded that Yaldo was not binding on this point and held that an insurer was not obligated to pay a claimant-insured penalty interest under the UTPA if the claim was reasonably in dispute. 41 The conflict panel in Griswold held: [T]he “reasonably in dispute” langu

2017Therefore, defendant’s reliance on the “based solely on contract” language is misguided. 37 Id. at 349 . 38 See MCR 7.215(J). 39 Griswold, 276 Mich App at 553-554 . 40 Arco Indus Corp v American Motorists Ins Co (On Second Remand, On Rehearing), 233 Mich App 143 ; 594 NW2d 74 (1998), aff’d by equal division 462 Mich 896 (2000). 13 concluded that Yaldo was not binding on this point and held that an insurer was not obligated to pay a claimant-insured penalty interest under the UTPA if the claim was reasonably in dispute. 41 The conflict panel in Griswold held: [T]he “reasonably in dispute” langu

2017Therefore, defendant’s reliance on the “based solely on contract” language is misguided. 37 Id. at 349 . 38 See MCR 7.215(J). 39 Griswold, 276 Mich App at 553-554 . 40 Arco Indus Corp v American Motorists Ins Co (On Second Remand, On Rehearing), 233 Mich App 143 ; 594 NW2d 74 (1998), aff’d by equal division 462 Mich 896 (2000). 13 concluded that Yaldo was not binding on this point and held that an insurer was not obligated to pay a claimant-insured penalty interest under the UTPA if the claim was reasonably in dispute. 41 The conflict panel in Griswold held: [T]he “reasonably in dispute” langu

2017Therefore, defendant’s reliance on the “based solely on contract” language is misguided. 37 Id. at 349 . 38 See MCR 7.215(J). 39 Griswold, 276 Mich App at 553-554 . 40 Arco Indus Corp v American Motorists Ins Co (On Second Remand, On Rehearing), 233 Mich App 143 ; 594 NW2d 74 (1998), aff’d by equal division 462 Mich 896 (2000). 13 concluded that Yaldo was not binding on this point and held that an insurer was not obligated to pay a claimant-insured penalty interest under the UTPA if the claim was reasonably in dispute. 41 The conflict panel in Griswold held: [T]he “reasonably in dispute” langu

2017Therefore, defendant’s reliance on the “based solely on contract” language is misguided. 37 Id. at 349 . 38 See MCR 7.215(J). 39 Griswold, 276 Mich App at 553-554 . 40 Arco Indus Corp v American Motorists Ins Co (On Second Remand, On Rehearing), 233 Mich App 143 ; 594 NW2d 74 (1998), aff’d by equal division 462 Mich 896 (2000). 13 concluded that Yaldo was not binding on this point and held that an insurer was not obligated to pay a claimant-insured penalty interest under the UTPA if the claim was reasonably in dispute. 41 The conflict panel in Griswold held: [T]he “reasonably in dispute” langu

2016Id.

1987Franges, supra, 612-613 .