warrantless blood test in Minnesota

2019See Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2160 , 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (holding that warrantless breath testing of suspected impaired drivers was categorically permissible under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, but that blood testing was not); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 , 156, 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (holding that "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant," and that "[w]hether a warra

2019See Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2160 , 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (holding that warrantless breath testing of suspected impaired drivers was categorically permissible under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, but that blood testing was not); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 , 156, 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (holding that "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant," and that "[w]hether a warra

2019See Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2160 , 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (holding that warrantless breath testing of suspected impaired drivers was categorically permissible under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, but that blood testing was not); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 , 156, 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (holding that "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant," and that "[w]hether a warra

2019See Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2160 , 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (holding that warrantless breath testing of suspected impaired drivers was categorically permissible under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, but that blood testing was not); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 , 156, 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (holding that "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant," and that "[w]hether a warra

2016Ayers argues that McDonnell stands for the principle that “[i]t is fundamentally unfair to mislead an individual by threatening a criminal charge when an officer knows, or should know, that criminal liability is impossible.” As support for his argument under McDonnell, Ayers cites State v. Trahan, in which this court held that because a warrantless blood test of a driver would not have been constitutional under either the search-incident-to-arrest or exigent-circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the test-refusal statute as applied to that driver violated

2016To support this argument, Morehouse cites State v. Trahan, a case decided after Morehouse’s arrest, in which this court held that the statute criminalizing refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test violates due process. 870 N.W.2d 396, 404 (Minn. App. 2015), review granted (Minn. Nov. 25, 2015).

2016In arguing that a warrantless blood test or a warrantless urine test would have been a valid search under the Fourth Amendment, the state relies heavily, if not solely, on the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (Minn.), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015).

2015We conclude that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test “relates to the state’s ability to prosecute drunk drivers and keep Minnesota roads safe,” Bernard, 859 N.W.2d at 774 , but it is not precisely tailored to serve that .compelling state interest.

2016See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186 n.9 (stating that if the court on remand finds that consent was not voluntary, it must determine whether the evidence obtained in the search must be suppressed when the search was done pursuant to a state statute and is offered in an administrative rather than criminal proceeding); see also State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 876-77 (Minn. 2015) (describing good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule). 5 violated).

2016See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186 n.9 (stating that if the court on remand finds that consent was not voluntary, it must determine whether the evidence obtained in the search must be suppressed when the search was done pursuant to a state statute and is offered in an administrative rather than criminal proceeding); see also State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 876 (Minn. 2015) (describing good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule). 6

2019See Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 2160 , 2184-85, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (holding that warrantless breath testing of suspected impaired drivers was categorically permissible under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, but that blood testing was not); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 , 156, 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (holding that "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant," and that "[w]hether a warra

2016See State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 , 230 n.4 (Thompson II) (noting that the Court, in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), concluded that the warrantless blood test violated the Fourth Amendment and did not engage in a due-process analysis); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (explaining that where a particular amendment 4 provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for ana

2016Ayers also cites State v. Thompson, in which this court held that because a warrantless urine test of a driver would not have been constitutional under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, the test-refusal statute violated the driver’s right to substantive due process by criminalizing his refusal of an unconstitutional search. 873 N.W.2d 873, 876-80 (Minn. App. 2015), review granted (Minn. Feb. 24, 2016). 4 Ayers argues that under Trahan and Thompson, Minnesota’s implied-consent advisory is misleading regarding his obligation to submit to testing because he “is n

2016Thompson I, 873 N.W.2d at 878-80 , aff’d, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016); State v. Trahan, 870 N.W.2d 396, 403-05 (Minn. App. 2015) (Trahan I), aff’d, 886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016).

2016See also State v. Trahan, No. A13-0931, 886 N.W.2d 216, 224 , 2016 WL 5930153 (Minn. filed Oct. 12, 2016) (holding that test refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied to a driver prosecuted for refusing a warrantless blood test).

2016See also State v. Trahan, No. A13-0931, 886 N.W.2d 216, 224 , 2016 WL 5930153 (Minn. filed Oct. 12, 2016) (holding that test refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied to a driver prosecuted for refusing a warrantless blood test).

2016Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848, 855 (Minn. 1991) (stating that, when an officer threatens criminal charges the state is not authorized to impose, an individual’s due-process rights are 1 In reassessing the voluntariness of O’Gara’s consent, the district court may also consider whether the warrantless blood test supports license revocation on other grounds.

2016See State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 , 230 n.4 (Thompson II) (noting that the Court, in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), concluded that the warrantless blood test violated the Fourth Amendment and did not engage in a due-process analysis); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (explaining that where a particular amendment 4 provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for ana

2016See State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 , 230 n.4 (Thompson II) (noting that the Court, in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), concluded that the warrantless blood test violated the Fourth Amendment and did not engage in a due-process analysis); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (explaining that where a particular amendment 4 provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for ana

2016The state supreme court observed that the United States Supreme Court in Birchfield “did not examine whether criminalizing the refusal to submit to an unconstitutional search violated the Due Process Clause” but rather decided the case based on whether “the warrantless blood test violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 230 n.4; see also State v. Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563, 568 (Minn. 2013) (analyzing validity of a suspected drunk driver’s consent to chemical testing under the Fourth Amendment).

2015“There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 , 109 S.Ct. at 1413 (quotation omitted).

2015“There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 , 109 S.Ct. at 1413 (quotation omitted).

2015McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1563 (“Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.”). 9 . . . allowed collateral attacks only in ‘unique cases.’”); see also State v. Warren 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988) (“[v]iolation of a defendant’s right to counsel, which is violation of a pivotal constitutional right, qualifies as a unique case”).

2015A narrowly tailored law is “neither overinclusive nor underinclusive; rather, it must be precisely tailored to serve the compelling state interest.” R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 135 (quotation omitted).