30 California opinions name it 3 courts 2014–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2018The Court "h[e]ld that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation *444 of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." ( Id. at p. 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 .) "Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." ( Id . at p. 156, 133 S.Ct. 1552 .) The People argued that McNeely was inapplicable because "unlike the defendant in McNeely who was subjected to a nonconsensual blood draw, [appellant] 2018The Court "h[e]ld that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation *444 of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." ( Id. at p. 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 .) "Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." ( Id . at p. 156, 133 S.Ct. 1552 .) The People argued that McNeely was inapplicable because "unlike the defendant in McNeely who was subjected to a nonconsensual blood draw, [appellant] | 4 | 7 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2025Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 543, quoting McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 156 ; see also People v. Bolourchi (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 243 , 258; Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016) 579 U.S. 438 , 456–457.) In McNeely, the Supreme Court explained, “In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fo 2025Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 543, quoting McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 156 ; see also People v. Bolourchi (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 243 , 258; Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016) 579 U.S. 438 , 456–457.) In McNeely, the Supreme Court explained, “In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fo | 3 | 15 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamontegreen2 sentences2018The Court "h[e]ld that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation *444 of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." ( Id. at p. 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 .) "Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." ( Id . at p. 156, 133 S.Ct. 1552 .) The People argued that McNeely was inapplicable because "unlike the defendant in McNeely who was subjected to a nonconsensual blood draw, [appellant] 2018The Court "h[e]ld that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation *444 of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." ( Id. at p. 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552 .) "Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." ( Id . at p. 156, 133 S.Ct. 1552 .) The People argued that McNeely was inapplicable because "unlike the defendant in McNeely who was subjected to a nonconsensual blood draw, [appellant] | 3 | 4 |
Espinoza v. Shiomotogreen2 sentences2024(Espinoza, at p. 113.) The Espinoza court went on to state, however, “it is unclear whether the high court would approve of a civil license suspension based solely on a motorist’s refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test.” (Ibid.) Elaborating on this point, the Espinoza court noted that, under Birchfield and McNeely, “[t]he police could not force Espinoza to submit to a blood test against her will unless they obtained a warrant or showed there were exigent circumstances that justified a warrantless search.” (Espinoza, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 113 .) The Espinoza court stated: “Conseque 2024Rather than decide whether Espinoza’s license could be lawfully suspended based solely on her refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test, we conclude her license was lawfully suspended because she did not submit to a warrantless breath test.” (Espinoza, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 114 .) Here, of course, the facts differ from those in Espinoza. | 2 | 3 |
Hall v. Superior Court of San Diego Countygreen2 sentences2017True, the court in Birchfield stated its “prior opinions have referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply,” and that “nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on them.” (Birchfield, supra, 579 U.S. at p. ___ [ 136 S.Ct. at p. 2185 ], italics added; see Hall v. Superior Court (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 792, 802, fn. 8 .) But the legality of civil penalties for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood test was not squarely presented in Birchfield, and we remain somewhat doubtful 2017True, the court in Birchfleld stated its “prior opinions have referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply,” and that “nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on them.” (Birchfleld, supra, 579 U.S. at p. _ [ 136 S.Ct. at p. 2185 ], italics added; see Hall v. Superior Court (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 792, 802, fn. 8 [ 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 ].) But the legality of civil penalties for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood test was not squarely presented in Birchfleld. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Ryangreen2 sentences2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 | 2 | 2 |
Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Fordgreen2 sentences2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Fiscalinigreen2 sentences2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 | 2 | 2 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2019In Schmerber , the United States Supreme Court upheld a warrantless blood test of an individual arrested for DUI because the officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.' " ( Schmerber , supra , 384 U.S. at p. 770 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 .) In Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 569 U.S. 141 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 ( McNeely ), the high court reaffirmed Schmerber 's consideration of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the exigen 2019In Schmerber , the United States Supreme Court upheld a warrantless blood test of an individual arrested for DUI because the officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.' " ( Schmerber , supra , 384 U.S. at p. 770 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 .) In Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 569 U.S. 141 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 185 L.Ed.2d 696 ( McNeely ), the high court reaffirmed Schmerber 's consideration of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the exigen | 1 | 10 |
Mitchell v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2025That is just what it means for these situations to be emergencies.’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 544.) Despite the absence of a per se rule, “[w]hen police have probable cause to believe a person has committed a drunk-driving offense and the driver’s unconsciousness or stupor requires him to be taken to the hospital or similar facility before police have a reasonable opportunity to administer a standard evidentiary breath test, they may almost always order a warrantless blood test to measure the driver’s BAC without offending the Fourth Amendment.” (Mitchell, supra, 588 U.S. at p. 8 2025That is just what it means for these situations to be emergencies.’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 544.) Despite the absence of a per se rule, “[w]hen police have probable cause to believe a person has committed a drunk-driving offense and the driver’s unconsciousness or stupor requires him to be taken to the hospital or similar facility before police have a reasonable opportunity to administer a standard evidentiary breath test, they may almost always order a warrantless blood test to measure the driver’s BAC without offending the Fourth Amendment.” (Mitchell, supra, 588 U.S. at p. 8 | 1 | 4 |
Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty.green2 sentences2017(See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593 , 597-598 [ 92 S.Ct. 2694 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 ]...; Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) 391 U.S. 563 , 568 [ 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 ]...." ( California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435 , 457, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 351 P.3d 974 .) Espinoza's license was not suspended merely because she invoked her right under McNeely to be free from a warrantless blood test, but because she refused to submit to and complete a chemical test. 2017(See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593 , 597-598 [ 92 S.Ct. 2694 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 ]...; Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) 391 U.S. 563 , 568 [ 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 ]...." ( California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435 , 457, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 351 P.3d 974 .) Espinoza's license was not suspended merely because she invoked her right under McNeely to be free from a warrantless blood test, but because she refused to submit to and complete a chemical test. | 1 | 3 |
Perry v. Sindermanngreen2 sentences2017(See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593 , 597-598 [ 92 S.Ct. 2694 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 ]...; Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) 391 U.S. 563 , 568 [ 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 ]...." ( California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435 , 457, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 351 P.3d 974 .) Espinoza's license was not suspended merely because she invoked her right under McNeely to be free from a warrantless blood test, but because she refused to submit to and complete a chemical test. 2017(See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593 , 597-598 [ 92 S.Ct. 2694 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 ]...; Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) 391 U.S. 563 , 568 [ 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 ]...." ( California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435 , 457, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 351 P.3d 974 .) Espinoza's license was not suspended merely because she invoked her right under McNeely to be free from a warrantless blood test, but because she refused to submit to and complete a chemical test. | 1 | 3 |
California Building Industry Ass'n v. City of San Josegreen2 sentences2017(See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593 , 597-598 [ 92 S.Ct. 2694 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 ]...; Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) 391 U.S. 563 , 568 [ 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 ]...." ( California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435 , 457, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 351 P.3d 974 .) Espinoza's license was not suspended merely because she invoked her right under McNeely to be free from a warrantless blood test, but because she refused to submit to and complete a chemical test. 2017(See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593 , 597-598 [ 92 S.Ct. 2694 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 ]...; Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) 391 U.S. 563 , 568 [ 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 ]...." ( California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435 , 457, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 351 P.3d 974 .) Espinoza's license was not suspended merely because she invoked her right under McNeely to be free from a warrantless blood test, but because she refused to submit to and complete a chemical test. | 1 | 3 |
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.green2 sentences2015An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-155 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 157 , 158 P.3d 731 ]; accord, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. (2004) 543 U.S. 157, 170 [ 160 L.Ed.2d 548 , 125 S.Ct. 577 ] [“ ‘Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.’ ”].) Therefore, we must determine whether another recognized exception to the warrant requirement will justify defendant’s blo 2015An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-155 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 157 , 158 P.3d 731 ]; accord, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. (2004) 543 U.S. 157, 170 [ 160 L.Ed.2d 548 , 125 S.Ct. 577 ] [“ ‘Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.’ ”].) Therefore, we must determine whether another recognized exception to the warrant requirement will justify defendant’s blo | 1 | 1 |
Herring v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015The Fourth Amendment “ ‘contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands’ ” (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 139 [ 172 L.Ed.2d 496 , 129 S.Ct. 695 ]), but the United States Supreme Court “established] an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial” (ibid.). 2015The Fourth Amendment “ ‘contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands’ ” (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 139 [ 172 L.Ed.2d 496 , 129 S.Ct. 695 ]), but the United States Supreme Court “established] an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial” (ibid.). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Knollergreen2 sentences2015An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-155 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 157 , 158 P.3d 731 ]; accord, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. (2004) 543 U.S. 157, 170 [ 160 L.Ed.2d 548 , 125 S.Ct. 577 ] [“ ‘Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.’ ”].) Therefore, we must determine whether another recognized exception to the warrant requirement will justify defendant’s blo 2015An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-155 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 157 , 158 P.3d 731 ]; accord, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. (2004) 543 U.S. 157, 170 [ 160 L.Ed.2d 548 , 125 S.Ct. 577 ] [“ ‘Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.’ ”].) Therefore, we must determine whether another recognized exception to the warrant requirement will justify defendant’s blo | 1 | 1 |
Troppman v. Valverdegreen2 sentences2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brannongreen2 sentences2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 2014(See, e.g., Mercer v. Department of Motor *1264 Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 759-760 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 809 P.2d 404 ]; People v. Superior Court (Hawkins) (1972) 6 Cal.3d 757, 761 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 281 , 493 P.2d 1145 ]; People v. Fiscalini (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1639, 1642 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 682 ]; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 168, 182 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 854 ]; People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 974-975 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 620 ].)” (People v. Ford (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 32, 35-36 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 ]; see Troppman v. Valverde (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1121, 1136 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 306 , 156 P.3 | 1 | 1 |
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| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
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Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard
green
2 sentences2025Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 543, quoting McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 156 ; see also People v. Bolourchi (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 243 , 258; Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016) 579 U.S. 438 , 456–457.) In McNeely, the Supreme Court explained, “In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fo 2024There must be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public roads.” (Birchfield, at pp. 476–477.) The Supreme Court then applied these legal conclusions to the three cases before it. ( Birchfield, supra, 579 U.S. at pp. 477–478.) The court held Birchfield could not be forced to submit to a warrantless blood test incident to his arrest. | 9 | 2017–2025 |
People v. Gutierrez
neutral
2 sentences2020(People v. Nzolameso (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1181 , 1186; People v. Gutierrez (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1161 , review granted Jan. 2, 2019, S252532.) As to the exigent circumstances exception, the fact that alcohol dissipates naturally does not by itself justify a warrantless blood test. 2019As the First District stated in People v. Gutierrez (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1155 , review granted January 2, 2019, S252532 (Gutierrez), just because “the state cannot compel a warrantless blood test does not mean that it cannot offer one as an alternative to the breath test that it clearly can compel.” (Id. at p. 1161.)1 Hence, Birchfield does not prohibit a finding of implied consent under California’s former law under these circumstances. | 3 | 2019–2020 |
People v. Youn CA2/8
green
2 sentences2015(People v. Youn, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574-575.) The Court of Appeal recognized that "[Youn's] case is governed by the rule in McNeeley." (People v. Youn, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 578 .) However, it affirmed the order without deciding whether the warrantless blood test was reasonable, pointing 5 "Prior to McNeely, all binding judicial precedent in this state, both at the Supreme Court and intermediate appellate levels, consistently interpreted Schmerber to permit warrantless blood draws incident to a valid arrest and done in a medically approved manner. [Citation.] '[W]hen binding appella 2015Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances. [¶] . . . [¶] We hold that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.” ( McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at pp. _-_, _, _[133 S.Ct. at pp. 1558-1561, 1563, 1568], fn. omitted.) Notwithstanding McNeely and the general rule the United States Supreme Court’s new interpretation of the federal Constitution | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Duncan
green
1 sentence2025That is just what it means for these situations to be emergencies.’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 544.) Despite the absence of a per se rule, “[w]hen police have probable cause to believe a person has committed a drunk-driving offense and the driver’s unconsciousness or stupor requires him to be taken to the hospital or similar facility before police have a reasonable opportunity to administer a standard evidentiary breath test, they may almost always order a warrantless blood test to measure the driver’s BAC without offending the Fourth Amendment.” (Mitchell, supra, 588 U.S. at p. 8 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Mitchell v. Wisconsin
green
1 sentence2020(Missouri v. McNeely (2013) 569 U.S. 141, 152 [ 185 L.Ed.2d 696 ].) An exigent circumstance exists when blood-alcohol evidence is dissipating and “some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law- enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application.” ( Mitchell, supra, 204 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1050-1051.) The United States Supreme Court found such factors 7 when a drunk-driving suspect was unconscious, and when the suspect was in a vehicle accident that required police to attend to other pressing needs. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Rossetti
green
1 sentence2015Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances. [¶] . . . [¶] We hold that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.” ( McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at pp. _-_, _, _[133 S.Ct. at pp. 1558-1561, 1563, 1568], fn. omitted.) Notwithstanding McNeely and the general rule the United States Supreme Court’s new interpretation of the federal Constitution | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Jones
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Youn, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574-575.) The Court of Appeal recognized that "[Youn's] case is governed by the rule in McNeeley." (People v. Youn, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 578 .) However, it affirmed the order without deciding whether the warrantless blood test was reasonable, pointing 5 "Prior to McNeely, all binding judicial precedent in this state, both at the Supreme Court and intermediate appellate levels, consistently interpreted Schmerber to permit warrantless blood draws incident to a valid arrest and done in a medically approved manner. [Citation.] '[W]hen binding appella | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Harris
green
1 sentence2014This was because the officer “ ‘might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened “the destruction of evidence.” ’ ” ( McNeely, supra, 133 S.Ct. at pp. 1559-1560, quoting Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 770 .) Schmerber observed that evidence could have been lost because “the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops,” and “[p]articularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Davis v. United States
green
1 sentence2014This is because in 2011, the high court held that “searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.” ( Davis, supra, 131 S.Ct. at pp. 2423-2424.) This is a species of the “good-faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.