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20 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tedford v. Dempseygreen2 sentences2009Jay argues that, according to the supreme court’s decision in Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410, 419 (Miss.1983), an escalation clause should be based on the children’s expenses, the parents’ earning capacities, and the annual inflation rate for that clause to be enforceable. 2000Regarding escalation clauses in child support awards, we said in Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410, 419 (Miss.1983), that "the parties generally ought to be required to include escalation clauses tied to the parent's earnings or to the annual inflation rate or to some factored combination of the two." We further elaborated on this idea in Wing v. Wing, 549 So.2d 944 (Miss.1989), holding that: Tedford dictates that an escalation clause should be tied to: (1) the inflation rate, (2) the non-custodial parent's increase or decrease in income, (3) the child's expenses, and (4) the custodial parent' | 10 | 14 |
Bruce v. Brucegreen2 sentences2009In Bruce v. Bruce, 687 So.2d 1199, 1202 (Miss.1996) (citing Bedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410, 419 (Miss.1983)), our supreme court said as much. 2009In Bruce, 687 So.2d at 1202 , the supreme court suggests that an escalation clause, even if a part of a property settlement agreement, has to be related to (1) the inflation rate, (2) the non-custodial parent's increase or decrease in income, (3) the child’s expenses, and (4) the custodial parent's separate income. | 4 | 4 |
Adams v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2000See also Adams v. Adams, 467 So.2d 211, 215 (Miss.1985). 2000Id. | 4 | 4 |
Wing v. Winggreen2 sentences2019Ct. App. 2002) (reversing contempt order due to its ambiguity, among other reasons, where the chancery court offered no guidance on how the mother was to “rectify” her contempt of the court’s visitation order 14 when the parties’ daughter refused to comply with the visitation schedule by visiting her father); see also Gutierrez, 153 So. 3d at 713-14 (¶¶32-33) (reversing contempt order against former husband where temporary order entered by the court created ambiguities in former husband’s support obligations); Wing, 549 So. 2d at 947 (reversing contempt judgment against former husband for fail 2000Regarding escalation clauses in child support awards, we said in Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410, 419 (Miss.1983), that "the parties generally ought to be required to include escalation clauses tied to the parent's earnings or to the annual inflation rate or to some factored combination of the two." We further elaborated on this idea in Wing v. Wing, 549 So.2d 944 (Miss.1989), holding that: Tedford dictates that an escalation clause should be tied to: (1) the inflation rate, (2) the non-custodial parent's increase or decrease in income, (3) the child's expenses, and (4) the custodial parent' | 3 | 10 |
Gillespie v. Gillespiegreen2 sentences1996The chancellor determined that James and Patricia had, in essence, created an escalation clause which was void because it was "uncertain and indefinite with regard to escalation each year based on net pay." Aldridge v. Parr, 396 So.2d 1027 (Miss. 1981); Wing v. Wing, 549 So.2d 944 (Miss. 1989); Brown v. Brown, 566 So.2d 718 (Miss. 1990); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 594 So.2d 620 (Miss. 1992). 1993The chancellor determined that James and Patricia had, in essence, created an escalation clause which was void because it was "uncertain and indefinite with regard to escalation each year based on net pay." Aldridge v. Parr, 396 So. 2d 1027 (Miss. 1983); Wing v. Wing, 549 So. 2d 944 (Miss. 1989); Brown v. Brown, 566 So. 2d 718 (Miss. 1990); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 594 So. 2d 620 (Miss. 1992). | 3 | 6 |
Stigler v. Stiglergreen2 sentences2025Id. at 550 (¶3). 2013Id. at 551 (¶ 9). | 2 | 2 |
West v. Westgreen2 sentences2025West v. West, 891 So. 2d 203, 210 (¶13) (Miss. 2004). 2006Furthermore, “[escalation clauses in property settlement agreements are enforceable absent fraud, overreaching, or mistake, even though one party may, in the future, find that he or she entered into the agreement imprudently.” West, 891 So.2d at 214 (¶ 29) (citing Speed v. Speed, 757 So.2d 221, 227 (¶ 18) (Miss.2000)). | 2 | 2 |
Speed v. Speedgreen2 sentences2013But more recently, in Speed v. Speed, 757 So.2d 221 (Miss.2000), the supreme court considered an escalation clause related to periodic alimony payments. 2013The property-settlement agreement provided alimony of $1500 per month and read: “In addition to the foregoing said payments herein above provided shall increase or decrease directly in relation to the increases and the cost of living as determined by the U.S. Department of Commerce Consumers Cost of Living Index, to be adjusted annually.” Id. at 223 (¶ 2). | 2 | 2 |
Morris v. Stacygreen2 sentences1999An automatic adjustment clause without regard to all of the above factors runs the risk of overemphasizing one side of the support equation." Wing v. Wing, 549 So.2d 944, 947 (Miss.1989); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 594 So.2d 620, 623 (Miss.1992); Morris v. Stacy, 641 So.2d 1194, 1201 (Miss.1994). ¶ 8. 1998Morris v. Stacy, 641 So.2d 1194, 1200 (Miss.1994). | 2 | 2 |
Rotenberry v. Hookergreen1 sentence2025Because the parties in the case at hand had no clarifying features in their agreement similar to those in Stigler and Short, and since the parties clearly do not share the same interpretation of the escalation clause, we find that the clause is ambiguous and therefore unenforceable.3 3 “A contract is unenforceable if the material terms are not sufficiently definite.” Rotenberry v. Hooker, 864 So. 2d 266, 270 (¶13) (Miss. 2003). 9 II. | 1 | 1 |
Short v. Shortgreen2 sentences2025In Short v. Short, 131 So. 3d 1149, 1153 (¶12) (Miss. 2014), the Mississippi Supreme Court explained, “This Court’s evolving interpretation on including escalation clauses in 5 child-support agreements breaks ground in Tedford v. Dempsey, [ 437 So. 2d 410, 419 (Miss. 1983),] in which we explained that escalation clauses could save parties from the distress that accompanies support-modification proceedings.” More specifically, in Tedford, the supreme court held: In the child support provisions of their separation agreements, the parties generally ought to be required to include escalation claus 2025Id. at 1151 (¶1). | 1 | 1 |
Tidmore v. Tidmoregreen1 sentence2025In Shumake v. Shumake, 233 So. 3d 234, 240-41 (¶21) (Miss. 2017), the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the decision in Tidmore v. Tidmore, 114 So. 3d 753, 759 (¶14) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Leslie B. Shumake, Jr. v. Katarina Sitton Shumakegreen1 sentence2025In Shumake v. Shumake, 233 So. 3d 234, 240-41 (¶21) (Miss. 2017), the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the decision in Tidmore v. Tidmore, 114 So. 3d 753, 759 (¶14) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Gutierrez v. Gutierrezgreen1 sentence2019Ct. App. 2002) (reversing contempt order due to its ambiguity, among other reasons, where the chancery court offered no guidance on how the mother was to “rectify” her contempt of the court’s visitation order 14 when the parties’ daughter refused to comply with the visitation schedule by visiting her father); see also Gutierrez, 153 So. 3d at 713-14 (¶¶32-33) (reversing contempt order against former husband where temporary order entered by the court created ambiguities in former husband’s support obligations); Wing, 549 So. 2d at 947 (reversing contempt judgment against former husband for fail | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2009Mark also argues that the escalation clause at issue does not meet this criteria, and since it does not, the chancellor erred in finding that under the authority of Rogers v. Rogers, 919 So.2d 184, 189 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2005), parties may agree on their own volition to do more than the law requires of them. ¶ 10. 2009Mark also argues that the escalation clause at issue does not meet this criteria, and since it does not, the chancellor erred in finding that under the authority of Rogers v. Rogers, 919 So.2d 184, 189 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2005), parties may agree on their own volition to do more than the law requires of them. ¶ 10. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Brown
green
2 sentences1996The chancellor determined that James and Patricia had, in essence, created an escalation clause which was void because it was "uncertain and indefinite with regard to escalation each year based on net pay." Aldridge v. Parr, 396 So.2d 1027 (Miss. 1981); Wing v. Wing, 549 So.2d 944 (Miss. 1989); Brown v. Brown, 566 So.2d 718 (Miss. 1990); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 594 So.2d 620 (Miss. 1992). 1993The chancellor determined that James and Patricia had, in essence, created an escalation clause which was void because it was "uncertain and indefinite with regard to escalation each year based on net pay." Aldridge v. Parr, 396 So. 2d 1027 (Miss. 1983); Wing v. Wing, 549 So. 2d 944 (Miss. 1989); Brown v. Brown, 566 So. 2d 718 (Miss. 1990); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 594 So. 2d 620 (Miss. 1992). | 2 | 1993–1996 |
Aldridge v. Parr
green
2 sentences1996The chancellor determined that James and Patricia had, in essence, created an escalation clause which was void because it was "uncertain and indefinite with regard to escalation each year based on net pay." Aldridge v. Parr, 396 So.2d 1027 (Miss. 1981); Wing v. Wing, 549 So.2d 944 (Miss. 1989); Brown v. Brown, 566 So.2d 718 (Miss. 1990); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 594 So.2d 620 (Miss. 1992). 1993The chancellor determined that James and Patricia had, in essence, created an escalation clause which was void because it was "uncertain and indefinite with regard to escalation each year based on net pay." Aldridge v. Parr, 396 So. 2d 1027 (Miss. 1983); Wing v. Wing, 549 So. 2d 944 (Miss. 1989); Brown v. Brown, 566 So. 2d 718 (Miss. 1990); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 594 So. 2d 620 (Miss. 1992). | 2 | 1993–1996 |
In Re the Marriage of Edwards
green
2 sentences1989Tedford, supra; Edwards v. Edwards, *948 99 Wash.2d 913 , 665 P.2d 883 (1983); In re Marriage of Peters, 33 Wash. App. 48 , 651 P.2d 262 (1982). 1989Tedford, supra; Edwards v. Edwards, *948 99 Wash.2d 913 , 665 P.2d 883 (1983); In re Marriage of Peters, 33 Wash. App. 48 , 651 P.2d 262 (1982). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
In the Matter of Marriage of Peters
neutral
2 sentences1989Tedford, supra; Edwards v. Edwards, *948 99 Wash.2d 913 , 665 P.2d 883 (1983); In re Marriage of Peters, 33 Wash. App. 48 , 651 P.2d 262 (1982). 1989Tedford, supra; Edwards v. Edwards, *948 99 Wash.2d 913 , 665 P.2d 883 (1983); In re Marriage of Peters, 33 Wash. App. 48 , 651 P.2d 262 (1982). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.