20 North Dakota opinions name it 2 courts 1954–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Willman v. Harty Co.green2 sentences2015(Emphasis added.) [¶ 30] Although Aggregate suggests its leases were renewed as a matter of law *865 under this statute, “our Court has held section 47-16-06, N.D.C.C., does not automatically renew a lease for up to one year when a tenant holds over and a landlord accepts a rent payment; rather, the ‘section only raises a disputable presumption that the lease was renewed on the same terms.’” Working Capital # 1, LLC v. Quality Auto Body, Inc., 2012 ND 115, ¶ 8 , 817 N.W.2d 346 (quoting Willman v. Harty Co., 305 N.W.2d 909, 911 (N.D.1981)). [¶ 31] Here, in construing the relevant lease provisio 2012However, our Court has held section 47-16-06, N.D.C.C., does not automatically renew a lease for up to one year when a tenant holds over and a landlord accepts a rent payment; rather, the “section only raises a disputable presumption that the lease was renewed on the same terms.” Willman v. Harty Co., 305 N.W.2d 909, 911 (N.D.1981) (citing Foster v. Nat’l Tea Co., 74 N.D. 37 , 19 N.W.2d 760, 763 (1945)). [¶ 9] The trial court specifically found that the presumption was rebutted by the evidence and entered specific findings of fact. | 3 | 3 |
Foster v. National Tea Co.green2 sentences2012However, our Court has held section 47-16-06, N.D.C.C., does not automatically renew a lease for up to one year when a tenant holds over and a landlord accepts a rent payment; rather, the “section only raises a disputable presumption that the lease was renewed on the same terms.” Willman v. Harty Co., 305 N.W.2d 909, 911 (N.D.1981) (citing Foster v. Nat’l Tea Co., 74 N.D. 37 , 19 N.W.2d 760, 763 (1945)). [¶ 9] The trial court specifically found that the presumption was rebutted by the evidence and entered specific findings of fact. 2012However, our Court has held section 47-16-06, N.D.C.C., does not automatically renew a lease for up to one year when a tenant holds over and a landlord accepts a rent payment; rather, the “section only raises a disputable presumption that the lease was renewed on the same terms.” Willman v. Harty Co., 305 N.W.2d 909, 911 (N.D.1981) (citing Foster v. Nat’l Tea Co., 74 N.D. 37 , 19 N.W.2d 760, 763 (1945)). [¶ 9] The trial court specifically found that the presumption was rebutted by the evidence and entered specific findings of fact. | 2 | 3 |
Haugland v. City of Bismarckgreen2 sentences2020No. 24 v. Porter, 130 N.W.2d 76, 80 (N.D. 1964); see also Haugland v. City of Bismarck, 2014 ND 51, ¶ 12 , 843 N.W.2d 840 (“Under N.D.C.C. § 31-11-03(15), there is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been performed regularly, which may be contradicted.”). [¶13] “A party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of rebutting the presumption by proving the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.” Stenehjem ex rel State v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 2014 ND 71, ¶ 25 , 844 N.W.2d 892 . 2020No. 24 v. Porter, 130 N.W.2d 76, 80 (N.D. 1964); see also Haugland v. City of Bismarck, 2014 ND 51, ¶ 12 , 843 N.W.2d 840 (“Under N.D.C.C. § 31-11-03(15), there is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been performed regularly, which may be contradicted.”). [¶13] “A party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of rebutting the presumption by proving the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.” Stenehjem ex rel State v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 2014 ND 71, ¶ 25 , 844 N.W.2d 892 . | 2 | 2 |
Linden School District No. 24 v. Portergreen2 sentences2026Dist. case, we emphasized the disputable presumption means “where there is evidence that official duty has not been regularly performed, the burden of going forward with the evidence is cast upon the officials whose acts are challenged.” Id. [¶56] The presumption of regularity has been applied to when public bodies engage in an executive session. 2020No. 24 v. Porter, 130 N.W.2d 76, 80 (N.D. 1964); see also Haugland v. City of Bismarck, 2014 ND 51, ¶ 12 , 843 N.W.2d 840 (“Under N.D.C.C. § 31-11-03(15), there is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been performed regularly, which may be contradicted.”). [¶13] “A party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of rebutting the presumption by proving the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.” Stenehjem ex rel State v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 2014 ND 71, ¶ 25 , 844 N.W.2d 892 . | 1 | 2 |
Stenehjem, ex rel. v. National Audubon Society, Inc.green2 sentences2020No. 24 v. Porter, 130 N.W.2d 76, 80 (N.D. 1964); see also Haugland v. City of Bismarck, 2014 ND 51, ¶ 12 , 843 N.W.2d 840 (“Under N.D.C.C. § 31-11-03(15), there is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been performed regularly, which may be contradicted.”). [¶13] “A party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of rebutting the presumption by proving the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.” Stenehjem ex rel State v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 2014 ND 71, ¶ 25 , 844 N.W.2d 892 . 2020No. 24 v. Porter, 130 N.W.2d 76, 80 (N.D. 1964); see also Haugland v. City of Bismarck, 2014 ND 51, ¶ 12 , 843 N.W.2d 840 (“Under N.D.C.C. § 31-11-03(15), there is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been performed regularly, which may be contradicted.”). [¶13] “A party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of rebutting the presumption by proving the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence.” Stenehjem ex rel State v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 2014 ND 71, ¶ 25 , 844 N.W.2d 892 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Ericksongreen2 sentences1986Erickson, supra. VandeHoven also argues that pursuant to § 39-20-07(6) (1983) (since amended but applicable here), the method, equipment, and persons used by the State Toxicologist to perform the blood test must be approved by the State Toxicologist and that such approval must be filed with the clerk of the district court in each County. 1984In State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854, 865 (N.D.1976), we said that a laboratory technician performing a service under the supervision and direction of the State Toxicologist is performing an official act which is entitled to a disputable presumption of regularity pursuant to Section 31-11-03(15), N.D.C.C. | 1 | 2 |
Wilson v. Divide Countygreen2 sentences2014See Wilson v. Divide Cnty., 76 N.W.2d 896, 900-01 (N.D.1956); Coulter v. Ramberg, 79 N.D. 208, 213-14 , 55 N.W.2d 516, 518 (1952). [¶ 13] The district court granted Bismarck summary judgment, meaning Haugland was entitled to all inferences favorable to him, including all inferences unfavorable to Bismarck, in relation to Bismarck’s claim it cannot find the crucial page of its official public record. 2014See Wilson v. Divide Cnty. , 76 N.W.2d 896, 900-01 (N.D. 1956); Coulter v. Ramberg , 79 N.D. 208 , 213- 14, 55 N.W.2d 516, 518 (1952). [¶13] The district court granted Bismarck summary judgment, meaning Haugland was entitled to all inferences favorable to him, including all inferences unfavorable to Bismarck, in relation to Bismarck’s claim it cannot find the crucial page of its official public record. | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Nettumgreen2 sentences2014Section 31-11-03(15), N.D.C.C., establishes as a disputable presumption that an “official duty has been performed regularly.” This Court has previously held that “identical conflicting presumptions balance and cancel each other.” Thompson v. Nettum, 163 N.W.2d 91, 97 (N.D.1968). 2014Section 31-11-03(15), N.D.C.C., establishes as a disputable presumption that an “official duty has been performed regularly.” This Court has previously held that “identical conflicting presumptions balance and cancel each other.” Thompson v. Nettum , 163 N.W.2d 91, 97 (N.D. 1968). | 1 | 1 |
Coulter v. Ramberggreen2 sentences2014See Wilson v. Divide Cnty. , 76 N.W.2d 896, 900-01 (N.D. 1956); Coulter v. Ramberg , 79 N.D. 208 , 213- 14, 55 N.W.2d 516, 518 (1952). [¶13] The district court granted Bismarck summary judgment, meaning Haugland was entitled to all inferences favorable to him, including all inferences unfavorable to Bismarck, in relation to Bismarck’s claim it cannot find the crucial page of its official public record. 2014See Wilson v. Divide Cnty. , 76 N.W.2d 896, 900-01 (N.D. 1956); Coulter v. Ramberg , 79 N.D. 208 , 213- 14, 55 N.W.2d 516, 518 (1952). [¶13] The district court granted Bismarck summary judgment, meaning Haugland was entitled to all inferences favorable to him, including all inferences unfavorable to Bismarck, in relation to Bismarck’s claim it cannot find the crucial page of its official public record. | 1 | 1 |
Myra Foundation v. Harveygreen1 sentence1998Myra Found. v. Harvey, 100 N.W.2d 435, 438 (N.D.1959). | 1 | 1 |
Erickson v. Director, North Dakota Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence1993See Erickson, 507 N.W.2d at 589 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. VandeHovengreen1 sentence1990See State v. VandeHoven, 388 N.W.2d 857, 859 (N.D.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.green1 sentence1990NDCC 31 — 11— 03(24); Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 434 N.W.2d 348, 350 (N.D.1989). | 1 | 1 |
Newell v. McMurraygreen2 sentences1986Parties may by agreement “give to fixtures the legal character of realty or personalty at their option.” Newell v. McMurray, 51 N.D. 901 , 201 N.W. 845, 847 (1924). 1986Parties may by agreement “give to fixtures the legal character of realty or personalty at their option.” Newell v. McMurray, 51 N.D. 901 , 201 N.W. 845, 847 (1924). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Working Capital 1, LLC v. Quality Auto Body, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015(Emphasis added.) [¶ 30] Although Aggregate suggests its leases were renewed as a matter of law *865 under this statute, “our Court has held section 47-16-06, N.D.C.C., does not automatically renew a lease for up to one year when a tenant holds over and a landlord accepts a rent payment; rather, the ‘section only raises a disputable presumption that the lease was renewed on the same terms.’” Working Capital # 1, LLC v. Quality Auto Body, Inc., 2012 ND 115, ¶ 8 , 817 N.W.2d 346 (quoting Willman v. Harty Co., 305 N.W.2d 909, 911 (N.D.1981)). [¶ 31] Here, in construing the relevant lease provisio 2015(Emphasis added.) [¶ 30] Although Aggregate suggests its leases were renewed as a matter of law *865 under this statute, “our Court has held section 47-16-06, N.D.C.C., does not automatically renew a lease for up to one year when a tenant holds over and a landlord accepts a rent payment; rather, the ‘section only raises a disputable presumption that the lease was renewed on the same terms.’” Working Capital # 1, LLC v. Quality Auto Body, Inc., 2012 ND 115, ¶ 8 , 817 N.W.2d 346 (quoting Willman v. Harty Co., 305 N.W.2d 909, 911 (N.D.1981)). [¶ 31] Here, in construing the relevant lease provisio | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Working Capital 1 v. Quality Auto Body
green
2 sentences2015(Emphasis added.) [¶ 30] Although Aggregate suggests its leases were renewed as a matter of law *865 under this statute, “our Court has held section 47-16-06, N.D.C.C., does not automatically renew a lease for up to one year when a tenant holds over and a landlord accepts a rent payment; rather, the ‘section only raises a disputable presumption that the lease was renewed on the same terms.’” Working Capital # 1, LLC v. Quality Auto Body, Inc., 2012 ND 115, ¶ 8 , 817 N.W.2d 346 (quoting Willman v. Harty Co., 305 N.W.2d 909, 911 (N.D.1981)). [¶ 31] Here, in construing the relevant lease provisio 2015(Emphasis added.) [¶ 30] Although Aggregate suggests its leases were renewed as a matter of law *865 under this statute, “our Court has held section 47-16-06, N.D.C.C., does not automatically renew a lease for up to one year when a tenant holds over and a landlord accepts a rent payment; rather, the ‘section only raises a disputable presumption that the lease was renewed on the same terms.’” Working Capital # 1, LLC v. Quality Auto Body, Inc., 2012 ND 115, ¶ 8 , 817 N.W.2d 346 (quoting Willman v. Harty Co., 305 N.W.2d 909, 911 (N.D.1981)). [¶ 31] Here, in construing the relevant lease provisio | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Sprague v. Evanson
green
2 sentences2014“Whether a presumption arises, and whether a presumption has been rebutted, are questions of fact governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a).” In re Estate of Clemetson, 2012 ND 28, ¶ 11 , 812 N.W.2d 388 . [¶ 26] The district court found that Audubon filed the deed in question with the Stutsman County Recorder in November, 1988. 2014“Whether a presumption arises, and whether a presumption has been rebutted, are questions of fact governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a).” In re Estate of Clemetson , 2012 ND 28, ¶ 11 , 812 N.W.2d 388 . [¶26] The district court found that Audubon filed the deed in question with the Stutsman County Recorder in November, 1988. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Estate of Clemetson
green
2 sentences2014“Whether a presumption arises, and whether a presumption has been rebutted, are questions of fact governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a).” In re Estate of Clemetson, 2012 ND 28, ¶ 11 , 812 N.W.2d 388 . [¶ 26] The district court found that Audubon filed the deed in question with the Stutsman County Recorder in November, 1988. 2014“Whether a presumption arises, and whether a presumption has been rebutted, are questions of fact governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a).” In re Estate of Clemetson , 2012 ND 28, ¶ 11 , 812 N.W.2d 388 . [¶26] The district court found that Audubon filed the deed in question with the Stutsman County Recorder in November, 1988. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
McManus v. Commow
green
2 sentences1986Since the purpose of the statute was to abrogate the common-law requirement of proof of execution by testimony of subscribing witnesses [McManus v. Commow, 10 N.D. 340 , 87 N.W. 8 (1901) ], it is questionable whether use of the word "not” in the second sentence resulted from intention or oversight. 6 . 1986Since the purpose of the statute was to abrogate the common-law requirement of proof of execution by testimony of subscribing witnesses [McManus v. Commow, 10 N.D. 340 , 87 N.W. 8 (1901) ], it is questionable whether use of the word "not” in the second sentence resulted from intention or oversight. 6 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Fancher v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
neutral
1 sentence1976State v. Berger, 148 N.W.2d 331 (N.D.1966); Fancher v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 105 (N.D.1963). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
State v. Berger
green
1 sentence1976State v. Berger, 148 N.W.2d 331 (N.D.1966); Fancher v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 105 (N.D.1963). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Cameron v. Great Northern Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1968Cameron v. Great Northern Railway Co., 8 N.D. 124 , 77 N.W. 1016 (1898); Kunkel et al. v. Minneapolis, St. 1968Cameron v. Great Northern Railway Co., 8 N.D. 124 , 77 N.W. 1016 (1898); Kunkel et al. v. Minneapolis, St. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
St. Leger's Appeal from Probate
green
2 sentences1954Leger's Appeal, 34 Conn. 434 , 91 Am.Dec. 735, it is held that when the relation of attorney and client subsists between the testator and legatee and the will is drawn by the latter, undue influence will be presumed but this presumption is one of fact which may be rebutted by proper evidence that satisfies the jury. 1954Leger’s Appeal, 34 Conn. 434 , 91 Am.Dec. 735, it is held that when the relation of attorney and client subsists between the testator and legatee and the will is drawn by the latter, undue influence will be presumed but this presumption is one of fact which may be rebutted by proper evidence that satisfies the jury. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Corp.
green
2 sentences1954In Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Corp., 190 Cal. 1 , 210 P. 269 , cited by plaintiff, it is held that a disputable presumption has no weight as against a fact proved by the uncontra-dicted testimony of a party or of his witnesses under circumstances which afford no indication that the testimony is the product of mistake or inadvertence and when the fact so proved is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption. 1954In Mar Shee v. Maryland Assurance Corp., 190 Cal. 1 , 210 P. 269 , cited by plaintiff, it is held that a disputable presumption has no weight as against a fact proved by the uncontra-dicted testimony of a party or of his witnesses under circumstances which afford no indication that the testimony is the product of mistake or inadvertence and when the fact so proved is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.