20 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Denise Brown v. State of New Jersey (076656) (Cumberland County and Statewide)green2 sentences2025Super. 272 , 277 (App. Div. 2022) (affirming the trial court 's grant of the defendants' Rule 4:6-2(e) motion premised on statutory immunity enjoyed by the defendants); see also Brown v. State, 230 N.J. 84, 98-99 (2017) ("Ordinarily, application of the defense of qualified immunity is a legal question for the court rather than the jury; therefore, the defense should be raised and resolved 'long before trial.'" (quoting Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 356 (2000))). 2022A court’s determination whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity in summary judgment motions is governed by a two-pronged test: first, the “court must determine whether, ‘[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,’ the facts alleged ‘show that the challenged conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right’”; and second, the court “must determine ‘whether the right was clearly established.’” Baskin v. Martinez, 243 N.J. 112 , 139-40 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Morillo, 222 N.J. at 117 ); see also Brow | 5 | 7 |
Hunter v. Bryantgreen2 sentences2022“Generally, ‘application of the defense of qualified immunity is a legal question for the court rather than the jury’ that should be raised before trial.” Baskin, 243 N.J. at 139 (quoting Brown, 230 N.J. at 98-99 ); see also Brown, 230 N.J. at 99 (recognizing that “[q]ualified immunity relieves an eligible defendant from the burden of trial,” and acknowledging “the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest stage in litigation” (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)). 2017Ordinarily, application of the defense of qualified immunity is a legal question for the court rather than the jury; therefore, the defense should be raised and resolved “long before trial.” Schneider, supra, 163 N.J. at 356 , 749 A.2d 336 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 , 112 S.Ct. 534, 537 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589, 596 (1991)). | 3 | 3 |
Schneider v. Simoninigreen2 sentences2025Super. 272 , 277 (App. Div. 2022) (affirming the trial court 's grant of the defendants' Rule 4:6-2(e) motion premised on statutory immunity enjoyed by the defendants); see also Brown v. State, 230 N.J. 84, 98-99 (2017) ("Ordinarily, application of the defense of qualified immunity is a legal question for the court rather than the jury; therefore, the defense should be raised and resolved 'long before trial.'" (quoting Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 356 (2000))). 2021Defendants contend that N.J.S.A. 4:19-9, titled "Right to destroy offending dogs," allows a person to kill a dog "which is found chasing, worrying, wounding or destroying any . . . domestic animal." A-4560-19 17 "Ordinarily, application of the defense of qualified immunity is a legal question for the court rather than the jury . . . ." Brown, 230 N.J. at 98 -99 (citing Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 356 (2000)). | 2 | 4 |
Eric Morillo v. Monmouth County Sheriff'sgreen2 sentences2022A court’s determination whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity in summary judgment motions is governed by a two-pronged test: first, the “court must determine whether, ‘[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,’ the facts alleged ‘show that the challenged conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right’”; and second, the court “must determine ‘whether the right was clearly established.’” Baskin v. Martinez, 243 N.J. 112 , 139-40 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Morillo, 222 N.J. at 117 ); see also Brow 2022A motion for summary judgment “is an appropriate vehicle for deciding [the] threshold question of immunity when raised.” Baskin, 243 N.J. at 139 (quoting Morillo, 222 N.J. at 119 ). | 2 | 3 |
Pearson v. Callahangreen2 sentences2012The defense of qualified immunity acknowledges that an officer may make “reasonable mistakes ... as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 2158, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 , 284 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, supra, 555 U.S. at 236 , 129 S.Ct. at 818 , 172 L.Ed.2d at 576 (concluding that the sequence of analysis set forth in Saucier is not mandatory). 2012The defense of qualified immunity acknowledges that an officer may make “reasonable mistakes ... as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 2158, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 , 284 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, supra, 555 U.S. at 236 , 129 S.Ct. at 818 , 172 L.Ed.2d at 576 (concluding that the sequence of analysis set forth in Saucier is not mandatory). | 2 | 2 |
Daniel Tumpson v. James Farina (072813)green1 sentence2022A court’s determination whether a law enforcement officer is entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity in summary judgment motions is governed by a two-pronged test: first, the “court must determine whether, ‘[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,’ the facts alleged ‘show that the challenged conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right’”; and second, the court “must determine ‘whether the right was clearly established.’” Baskin v. Martinez, 243 N.J. 112 , 139-40 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Morillo, 222 N.J. at 117 ); see also Brow | 1 | 1 |
Harlow v. Fitzgeraldgreen1 sentence2021“The doctrine of qualified immunity generally protects government officials from 24 civil liability for discretionary acts that do ‘not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Baskin, 243 N.J. at 127 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Crawford-El v. Brittongreen1 sentence2018It must exercise its discretion s o that officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings." Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (noting that qualified immunity is intended to avoid "subject[ing] government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery."). | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Forsythgreen1 sentence2018It must exercise its discretion s o that officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings." Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (noting that qualified immunity is intended to avoid "subject[ing] government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery."). | 1 | 1 |
Wildoner v. Borough of Ramseygreen1 sentence2017Ed. 2d 271, 276 (1986), . . . the Supreme Court considered "the question of the degree of immunity accorded a defendant police officer in a damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it is alleged that the officer caused the plaintiff[] to be unconstitutionally arrested . . . [without] probable cause." [Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 386 (2000) (second, third and fourth alterations in original).] The Court, concluding that an officer applying for a warrant is entitled to assert qualified but not absolute immunity, observed that the defense of qualified immunity: provides ample pr | 1 | 1 |
Donald Saucier v. Elliot M. Katz and in Defense of Animalsred2 sentences2012The defense of qualified immunity acknowledges that an officer may make “reasonable mistakes ... as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 2158, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 , 284 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, supra, 555 U.S. at 236 , 129 S.Ct. at 818 , 172 L.Ed.2d at 576 (concluding that the sequence of analysis set forth in Saucier is not mandatory). 2012The defense of qualified immunity acknowledges that an officer may make “reasonable mistakes ... as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 2158, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 , 284 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, supra, 555 U.S. at 236 , 129 S.Ct. at 818 , 172 L.Ed.2d at 576 (concluding that the sequence of analysis set forth in Saucier is not mandatory). | 1 | 1 |
Reale v. Tp. of Waynegreen1 sentence1982However, it has been held that where public policy calls for it a defense will be considered properly before the court although not pleaded (subject impliedly to absence of prejudice). [ 94 N.J.Super. at 514 ; emphasis supplied] In Reale v. Tp. of Wayne, 132 N.J.Super. 100, 106 (Law Div. 1975), late pleading of the failure to comply with the notice requirements of N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. was permitted since “[p]laintiffs have complained of no surprise or prejudice and the court perceives none.” In Seskine v. Cone, supra, 139 N.J.Super. *538 at 310, a trial court dismissed a complaint on ground | 1 | 1 |
Devlin v. Greinergreen1 sentence1979See Devlin v. Greiner, supra, 147 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kirk v. City of Newark
green
2 sentences2004Kirk v. City of Newark, 109 N.J. 173, 184 , 536 A. 2d 229 (1988). 2004Kirk v. City of Newark, 109 N.J. 173, 184 , 536 A. 2d 229 (1988). | 2 | 1998–2004 |
Pierson v. Ray
green
2 sentences1998Several years later, in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 288 (1967), the Court recognized that an official could defend against a section 1983 action by asserting a defense of qualified immunity. 1998Several years later, in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 288 (1967), the Court recognized that an official could defend against a section 1983 action by asserting a defense of qualified immunity. | 2 | 1988–1998 |
Jackson v. Hankinson and Bd. of Ed. of New Shrewsbury
green
2 sentences1975Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd 51 N.J. 230 (1968), the court determined that under R.R. 4:8-3, the source rule of R. 4:5-4, the defense of qualified immunity of a municipality had to be specifically pleaded in order to avoid surprise, which purpose it identified as "the spirit of the rule." However, it went on to qualify this pleading requirement where *255 public policy compelled having the defense before the court and the other party was not prejudiced, citing Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270 (1961), as authority. [at 106] In the instant case the court perceives no basis for denying t 1975Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd. 51 N.J. 230 (1968), the court determined that under R.R. 4:8-3, the source rule of R. 4:5-4, the defense of qualified immunity of a municipality had to be specifically pleaded in order to avoid surprise, which purpose it identified as "the spirit of the rule." However, it went on to qualify this pleading requirement where public policy compelled having the defense before the court and the other party was not prejudiced, citing Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270 (1961), as authority. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Douglas v. Harris
green
2 sentences1975Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd 51 N.J. 230 (1968), the court determined that under R.R. 4:8-3, the source rule of R. 4:5-4, the defense of qualified immunity of a municipality had to be specifically pleaded in order to avoid surprise, which purpose it identified as "the spirit of the rule." However, it went on to qualify this pleading requirement where *255 public policy compelled having the defense before the court and the other party was not prejudiced, citing Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270 (1961), as authority. [at 106] In the instant case the court perceives no basis for denying t 1975Super. 505, 514 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd. 51 N.J. 230 (1968), the court determined that under R.R. 4:8-3, the source rule of R. 4:5-4, the defense of qualified immunity of a municipality had to be specifically pleaded in order to avoid surprise, which purpose it identified as "the spirit of the rule." However, it went on to qualify this pleading requirement where public policy compelled having the defense before the court and the other party was not prejudiced, citing Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270 (1961), as authority. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee of the Township of Manalapan
green
1 sentence2017"The affirmative defense of qualified immunity protects government officials from personal liability for discretionary actions taken in the course of their public responsibilities, 'insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Ibid. (quoting Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 116 (2015)). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Malley v. Briggs
green
2 sentences2017Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue, but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized. [Ibid. (alterations in original) (citing Malley, supra, 475 U.S. at 341 , 106 S. Ct. at 1096 , 89 L. 2017Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue, but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized. [Ibid. (alterations in original) (citing Malley, supra, 475 U.S. at 341 , 106 S. Ct. at 1096 , 89 L. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ramos v. Flowers
green
2 sentences2013Ramos v. Flowers, 429 N.J.Super. 13, 32 , 56 A.3d 869 (App.Div.2012). 2013Ramos v. Flowers, 429 N.J.Super. 13, 32 , 56 A.3d 869 (App.Div.2012). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police
green
2 sentences2012First, police officers need to be free to discharge “their duties without the fear of constantly defending themselves against insubstantial claims for damages____” Orsatti, supra, 71 F.3d at 483 . 2012First, police officers need to be free to discharge “their duties without the fear of constantly defending themselves against insubstantial claims for damages____” Orsatti, supra, 71 F.3d at 483 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Sokolay v. Edlin
green
1 sentence1989Super. 112, 126-127 , 167 A. 2d 211 (App.Div. 1961) (summary judgment granted where there was no finding of malice sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to defeat the defense of qualified privilege). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Polyard v. Terry
green
1 sentence1982However, it has been held that where public policy calls for it a defense will be considered properly before the court although not pleaded (subject impliedly to absence of prejudice). [ 94 N.J.Super. at 514 ; emphasis supplied] In Reale v. Tp. of Wayne, 132 N.J.Super. 100, 106 (Law Div. 1975), late pleading of the failure to comply with the notice requirements of N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. was permitted since “[p]laintiffs have complained of no surprise or prejudice and the court perceives none.” In Seskine v. Cone, supra, 139 N.J.Super. *538 at 310, a trial court dismissed a complaint on ground | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Jackson v. Hankinson
green
2 sentences1982Judge Conford, S.J.A.D., said this in Jackson v. Hankinson, supra: The spirit of the rule called for pleading the defense of qualified immunity of a municipality to avoid surprise. 1982However, it has been held that where public policy calls for it a defense will be considered properly before the court although not pleaded (subject impliedly to absence of prejudice). [ 94 N.J.Super. at 514 ; emphasis supplied] In Reale v. Tp. of Wayne, 132 N.J.Super. 100, 106 (Law Div. 1975), late pleading of the failure to comply with the notice requirements of N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq. was permitted since “[p]laintiffs have complained of no surprise or prejudice and the court perceives none.” In Seskine v. Cone, supra, 139 N.J.Super. *538 at 310, a trial court dismissed a complaint on ground | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.