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9 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Creditgreen2 sentences2015Under the defense of qualified privilege, "one who publishes defamatory matter concerning another is not liable for the publication if (1) the matter is published upon an occasion that makes it [qualifiedly or] conditionally privileged, and (2) the privilege is not abused." Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 334 S.C. 469, 484 , 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1999) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 593 (1977)). 2015Under the defense of qualified privilege, "one who publishes defamatory matter concerning another is not liable for the publication if (1) the matter is published upon an occasion that makes it [qualifiedly or] conditionally privileged, and (2) the privilege is not abused." Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 334 S.C. 469, 484 , 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1999) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 593 (1977)). | 2 | 2 |
Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.green2 sentences2013Qualified Privilege: Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 484 , 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1999) (holding that to overcome the defense of qualified privilege in a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove "actual malice or that the scope of the privilege has been exceeded"); Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 228 S.C. 384, 388 , 90 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1955) ("A communication on a subject in which the person communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is qualifiedly privileged if made in good faith, limited in its scope to the requirements of such int 2013Qualified Privilege: Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 334 S.C. 469, 484 , 514 S.E.2d 126, 134 (1999) (holding that to overcome the defense of qualified privilege in a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove "actual malice or that the scope of the privilege has been exceeded"); Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 228 S.C. 384, 388 , 90 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1955) ("A communication on a subject in which the person communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is qualifiedly privileged if made in good faith, limited in its scope to the requirements of such int | 1 | 2 |
Brown v. Ivesgreen1 sentence2004Dist., 93 F.Supp.2d 1011 , 1042 n. 21 (E.D.Wis.2000) (finding defense of qualified immunity may not be rebutted by evidence that defendant’s conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated); Brown v. Ives, 129 F.3d 209, 211 (1st Cir.1997) (“The test is objective; claims of malice do not *180 overcome qualified immunity.”); Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892, 896 (5th Cir.1982) (“Qualified immunity now depends on the objective reasonableness of an officials conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, not upon malice or other subjective factors.”). | 1 | 1 |
Golino v. City of New Havengreen1 sentence2004If the plaintiff alleges “an arrest without probable cause, an arresting officer may assert the defense of qualified immunity if ‘either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.’ ” Rogers, 303 F.3d at 158 (quoting Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir.1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Hayes Williams and Arthur Mitchell v. David C. Treen, Governor of the State of Louisianagreen1 sentence2004Dist., 93 F.Supp.2d 1011 , 1042 n. 21 (E.D.Wis.2000) (finding defense of qualified immunity may not be rebutted by evidence that defendant’s conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated); Brown v. Ives, 129 F.3d 209, 211 (1st Cir.1997) (“The test is objective; claims of malice do not *180 overcome qualified immunity.”); Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892, 896 (5th Cir.1982) (“Qualified immunity now depends on the objective reasonableness of an officials conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, not upon malice or other subjective factors.”). | 1 | 1 |
Harlow v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences1994We disagree. “[Gjovernment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed. (2d) 396, 410 (1982). 1994We disagree. “[Gjovernment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed. (2d) 396, 410 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cartwright v. HERALD PUB. CO.
green
2 sentences1971Cartwright v. Herald Publishing Company, 220 S. C. 492, 68 S. E. (2d) 415 . 1970Cartwright v. Herald Publishing Co., 220 S. C. 492, 68 S. E. (2d) 415 . | 3 | 1962–1971 |
Mark Rogers, Eric Pelcher and Mark Emigh v. City of Amsterdam, Thomas McQuade and Todd Stark, Mary Ann Smith
green
1 sentence2004If the plaintiff alleges “an arrest without probable cause, an arresting officer may assert the defense of qualified immunity if ‘either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.’ ” Rogers, 303 F.3d at 158 (quoting Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir.1991)). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Crawford-El v. Britton
green
2 sentences2004In Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 , 118 S.Ct. 1584 , 140 L.Ed.2d 759 , (1998), the United States Supreme Court noted “a defense of qualified immunity may not be rebutted by evidence that the defendant’s conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated.” Id. at 588 , 118 S.Ct. at 1592 , 140 L.Ed.2d at 773 ; see Ulichny v. Merton Cmty. Sch. 2004In Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 , 118 S.Ct. 1584 , 140 L.Ed.2d 759 , (1998), the United States Supreme Court noted “a defense of qualified immunity may not be rebutted by evidence that the defendant’s conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated.” Id. at 588 , 118 S.Ct. at 1592 , 140 L.Ed.2d at 773 ; see Ulichny v. Merton Cmty. Sch. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ulichny v. Merton Community School District
green
1 sentence2004Dist., 93 F.Supp.2d 1011 , 1042 n. 21 (E.D.Wis.2000) (finding defense of qualified immunity may not be rebutted by evidence that defendant’s conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated); Brown v. Ives, 129 F.3d 209, 211 (1st Cir.1997) (“The test is objective; claims of malice do not *180 overcome qualified immunity.”); Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892, 896 (5th Cir.1982) (“Qualified immunity now depends on the objective reasonableness of an officials conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, not upon malice or other subjective factors.”). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Jones v. Garner
green
1 sentence1970Strong and violent language or insinuation disproportionate to the occasion may raise an inference of malice and thus lose the privilege which might otherwise attach to the occasion.” In Jones v. Garner, 250 S. C. 479, 158 S. E. (2d) 909 , we held that a statement which abuses or goes beyond the requirement of the occasion loses the protection of the privilege. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Bell v. Bank of Abbeville
green
1 sentence1962Again, we quote from Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, supra: “Reverting to the primary question wherther there is in the record any credible testimony pointing to the fact that the occasion was used for the unlawful purpose of defaming and injuring the respondent, rather than to make a bona fide inquiry into complaints against the handling of the bank’s affairs, we are unable to find in the record anything substantial upon which to support the burden which rested on the respondent to prove his case.” Having reached the conclusion that the communication sent by the appellant to its office in Greenvil | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Kirby v. Gulf Refining Co.
neutral
1 sentence1962Cartwright v. Herald Publishing Company et al., 220 S. C. 492, 68 S. E. (2d) 415 ; Kirby v. Gulf Refining Company et al., 173 S. C. 224, 175 S. E. 535 ; Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S. C. 490, 38 S. E. (2d) 641 . *182 We have carefully examined the record in this case for any evidence showing that the appellant was actuated by ill will or malice in making the communication here involved. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Bell v. Bank of Abbeville
green
1 sentence1962Cartwright v. Herald Publishing Company et al., 220 S. C. 492, 68 S. E. (2d) 415 ; Kirby v. Gulf Refining Company et al., 173 S. C. 224, 175 S. E. 535 ; Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S. C. 490, 38 S. E. (2d) 641 . *182 We have carefully examined the record in this case for any evidence showing that the appellant was actuated by ill will or malice in making the communication here involved. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Duncan v. the Record Publishing Co.
green
1 sentence1935Co., 145 S. C., 276, 143 S. E., 31, 56 . | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.