Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
29 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1963–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pritchett v. Alfordgreen2 sentences1999Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992). 1995Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992). | 3 | 4 |
Harlow v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences2007App. 68, 75-76 , 547 *135 S.E.2d 117, 122, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 215 , 553 S.E.2d 907 (2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L. 2007App. 68, 75-76 , 547 *135 S.E.2d 117, 122, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 215 , 553 S.E.2d 907 (2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L. | 2 | 3 |
Presnell v. Pellgreen2 sentences1986App. at 436 , 293 S.E. 2d at 915 , quoting Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 720 , 260 S.E. 2d 611, 614 (1979) (emphases in original). 1986App. at 436 , 293 S.E. 2d at 915 , quoting Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 720 , 260 S.E. 2d 611, 614 (1979) (emphases in original). | 2 | 2 |
Toomer v. Garrettgreen2 sentences2017"The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials from personal liability under § 1983 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Toomer v. Garrett , 155 N.C. 2014“The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials from personal liability under § 1983 ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C. | 1 | 2 |
Lee v. Greenegreen2 sentences2007Lee v. Greene, 114 N.C. 2003“Therefore, ruling on a defense of qualified immunity requires (1) identification of the specific right allegedly violated; (2) determining whether at the time of the alleged violation the right was clearly established; and (3) if so, then determining whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have known that his actions violated that right.” Lee v. Greene, 114 N.C. | 1 | 2 |
Gregory v. Kilbridegreen2 sentences2007Defendants rely upon a prior holding of this Court that “[t]he denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity does affect a substantial right and is immediately appealable.” Gregory v. Kilbride, 150 N.C. 2007When stating that “[t]he denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity does affect a substantial right and is immediately appealable[,]” Gregory, 150 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Rousselo v. Starlinggreen2 sentences2002See Rousselo v. Starling, 128 N.C.App. 439 , 495 S.E.2d 725 (1998). 2002See Rousselo v. Starling, 128 N.C.App. 439 , 495 S.E.2d 725 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Nationwide Insurance Companygreen2 sentences1979Where a statement is “libel per se,” that is, “a false written statement which on its face is defamatory,” Robinson v. Insurance Co., 273 N.C. 391, 393 , 159 S.E. 2d 896, 899 (1968), there is a presumption of malice. 1979Where a statement is “libel per se,” that is, “a false written statement which on its face is defamatory,” Robinson v. Insurance Co., 273 N.C. 391, 393 , 159 S.E. 2d 896, 899 (1968), there is a presumption of malice. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Corum v. University of North Carolina
green
2 sentences2014Corum, 330 N.C. at 772 , 413 S.E.2d at 283 . 2014Corum, 330 N.C. at 772 , 413 S.E.2d at 283 . | 4 | 1995–2014 |
Washington Water Power Co. v. Spokane Indian Tribe
green
2 sentences2001Id. 1998In Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761 , 413 S.E.2d 276 , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985 , 121 L. | 4 | 1995–2001 |
Andrews v. Crump
green
2 sentences2007The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials from personal liability “ ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Andrews v. Crump, 144 N.C. 2002The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials from personal liability under § 1983 “ ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Andrews v. Crump, 144 N.C. | 3 | 2002–2014 |
Long v. Vertical Technologies, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Judgment on the pleadings was improper. ¶ 16 Additionally, even assuming arguendo that qualified privilege applies, Plaintiff has alleged actual malice sufficient to defeat Sheriff Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. “[A] qualified privilege may be lost by proof of actual malice on the part of the defendant.” Long v. Vertical Techs., Inc., 113 N.C. 2022Judgment on the pleadings was improper. ¶ 16 Additionally, even assuming arguendo that qualified privilege applies, Plaintiff has alleged actual malice sufficient to defeat Sheriff Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. “[A] qualified privilege may be lost by proof of actual malice on the part of the defendant.” Long v. Vertical Techs., Inc., 113 N.C. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Cheek v. Sutton
neutral
2 sentences2007App. 68, 75-76 , 547 *135 S.E.2d 117, 122, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 215 , 553 S.E.2d 907 (2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L. 2002App. 68, 75-76 , 547 S.E.2d 117, 122 , disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 215 , 553 S.E.2d 907 (2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 73 L. | 2 | 2002–2007 |
Andrews v. Crump
neutral
2 sentences2007App. 68, 75-76 , 547 *135 S.E.2d 117, 122, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 215 , 553 S.E.2d 907 (2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L. 2002App. 68, 75-76 , 547 S.E.2d 117, 122 , disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 215 , 553 S.E.2d 907 (2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 73 L. | 2 | 2002–2007 |
Kroh v. Kroh
green
1 sentence2013Kroh v. Kroh, 152 N.C. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Webb Ex Rel. Bumgarner v. Nicholson
green
2 sentences2009Plaintiff sued defendant in his individual capacity, but in order to surmount the defense of qualified immunity, she must show that defendant’s alleged tortious conduct was “ ‘malicious,’ ” “ ‘corrupt,’ ” or “ ‘outside the scope of [his] official authority.’ ” Webb v. Nicholson, 178 N.C. 2009Plaintiff sued defendant in his individual capacity, but in order to surmount the defense of qualified immunity, she must show that defendant’s alleged tortious conduct was “ ‘malicious,’ ” “ ‘corrupt,’ ” or “ ‘outside the scope of [his] official authority.’ ” Webb v. Nicholson, 178 N.C. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Mabrey v. Smith
green
1 sentence2009App. 362, 366 , 634 S.E.2d 545, 547 (2006) (quoting Mabrey v. Smith, 144 N.C. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gregory v. Kilbride
green
2 sentences2007App. 601, 615 , 565 S.E.2d 685, 695 (2002), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 164 , 580 S.E.2d 365 (2003). 2007App. 601, 615 , 565 S.E.2d 685, 695 (2002), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 164 , 580 S.E.2d 365 (2003). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114
green
2 sentences2003In Bouligny, our Supreme Court interpreted the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 , 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966) to mean that, the defense of qualified privilege extends to statements spoken or published in good faith by a labor union in the course of a campaign to solicit members or to establish itself as the authorized representative of the employees in a business enterprise in their collective bargaining with their employer, provided there is a reasonable relation between such objective and the statement made. 2003In Bouligny, our Supreme Court interpreted the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 , 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966) to mean that, the defense of qualified privilege extends to statements spoken or published in good faith by a labor union in the course of a campaign to solicit members or to establish itself as the authorized representative of the employees in a business enterprise in their collective bargaining with their employer, provided there is a reasonable relation between such objective and the statement made. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Simeon v. Hardin
green
1 sentence2003Ed. 2d 396, 410 , (1982)), cert. denied, 347 N.C. 270 , 493 S.E.2d 746 (1997). *375 To determine whether a legitimate defense of qualified immunity exists, this Court has summarized the analysis as follows: “Ruling on a defense of qualified immunity requires (1) identification of the specific right allegedly violated; (2) determining whether at the time of the alleged violation the right was clearly established; and (3) if so, then determining whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have known that his actions violated that right. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
RH Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Amer.
green
2 sentences2003Bouligny, 270 N.C. at 172 , 154 S.E.2d at 355 . 2003Bouligny, 270 N.C. at 172 , 154 S.E.2d at 355 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Roberts v. Swain
green
1 sentence2003Ed. 2d 396, 410 , (1982)), cert. denied, 347 N.C. 270 , 493 S.E.2d 746 (1997). *375 To determine whether a legitimate defense of qualified immunity exists, this Court has summarized the analysis as follows: “Ruling on a defense of qualified immunity requires (1) identification of the specific right allegedly violated; (2) determining whether at the time of the alleged violation the right was clearly established; and (3) if so, then determining whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have known that his actions violated that right. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Barnett v. Karpinos
green
1 sentence1998Barnett v. Karpinos, 119 N.C. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Espelita v. Derwinski
green
1 sentence1998In Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761 , 413 S.E.2d 276 , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985 , 121 L. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences1986The cases relied on in Cameron for the existence of such a privilege were libel actions in which the defense of qualified privilege arises where: ‘(1) a communication is made in good faith, (2) the subject and scope of the communication is one in which the party uttering it has a valid interest to uphold, or in reference to which he has a legal right or duty, and (3) the communication is made to a person or persons having a corresponding interest, right, or duty.’ Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hospital, 58 N.C. 1986App. at 436 , 293 S.E. 2d at 915 , quoting Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 720 , 260 S.E. 2d 611, 614 (1979) (emphases in original). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Jones v. Hester
green
2 sentences1978Jones v. Hester, 260 N.C. 264 , 132 S.E.2d 586 (1963). 1978Jones v. Hester, 260 N.C. 264 , 132 S.E.2d 586 (1963). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Yancey v. Gillespie
green
2 sentences1963Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N.C. 172 , 43 S.E. 594 ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N.C. 106 , 52 S.E. 249 ; Riley v. Stone, 174 N.C. 588 , 94 S.E. 434 ; Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227 , 87 S.E. 2d 210 ; Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285 , 86 P. 627 . 1963Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N.C. 172 , 43 S.E. 594 ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N.C. 106 , 52 S.E. 249 ; Riley v. Stone, 174 N.C. 588 , 94 S.E. 434 ; Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227 , 87 S.E. 2d 210 ; Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285 , 86 P. 627 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Riley v. . Stone
green
2 sentences1963Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N.C. 172 , 43 S.E. 594 ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N.C. 106 , 52 S.E. 249 ; Riley v. Stone, 174 N.C. 588 , 94 S.E. 434 ; Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227 , 87 S.E. 2d 210 ; Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285 , 86 P. 627 . 1963Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N.C. 172 , 43 S.E. 594 ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N.C. 106 , 52 S.E. 249 ; Riley v. Stone, 174 N.C. 588 , 94 S.E. 434 ; Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227 , 87 S.E. 2d 210 ; Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285 , 86 P. 627 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Gattis v. Kilgo. green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Harrison v. Garrett.
green
2 sentences1963Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N.C. 172 , 43 S.E. 594 ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N.C. 106 , 52 S.E. 249 ; Riley v. Stone, 174 N.C. 588 , 94 S.E. 434 ; Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227 , 87 S.E. 2d 210 ; Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285 , 86 P. 627 . 1963Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N.C. 172 , 43 S.E. 594 ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N.C. 106 , 52 S.E. 249 ; Riley v. Stone, 174 N.C. 588 , 94 S.E. 434 ; Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227 , 87 S.E. 2d 210 ; Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285 , 86 P. 627 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Chambers v. Leiser
green
2 sentences1963Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N.C. 172 , 43 S.E. 594 ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N.C. 106 , 52 S.E. 249 ; Riley v. Stone, 174 N.C. 588 , 94 S.E. 434 ; Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227 , 87 S.E. 2d 210 ; Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285 , 86 P. 627 . 1963Harrison v. Garrett, 132 N.C. 172 , 43 S.E. 594 ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N.C. 106 , 52 S.E. 249 ; Riley v. Stone, 174 N.C. 588 , 94 S.E. 434 ; Yancey v. Gillespie, 242 N.C. 227 , 87 S.E. 2d 210 ; Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285 , 86 P. 627 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.