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20 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Antierigreen2 sentences2020"The mandatory joinder rule deals with offenses, not indictments." State v. Antieri, 180 N.J. 2020"The mandatory joinder rule deals with offenses, not indictments." State v. Antieri, 180 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gregorygreen2 sentences2018In the latter two cases failure to enter judgment must be for a reason other than a motion of the defendant. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9(c) (emphasis added).] Here, there is no dispute that defendant's April 2015 guilty plea in Monmouth County, which was followed in June 2015 by his sentencing and the entry of judgment, comprises an eligible "conviction" for purposes of the mandatory joinder analysis. *59 *722 These mandatory joinder provisions derive from the Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Gregory , 66 N.J. 510 , 333 A.2d 257 (1975), one of the main cases cited in the parties' briefs in this appea 2018In the latter two cases failure to enter judgment must be for a reason other than a motion of the defendant. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9(c) (emphasis added).] Here, there is no dispute that defendant's April 2015 guilty plea in Monmouth County, which was followed in June 2015 by his sentencing and the entry of judgment, comprises an eligible "conviction" for purposes of the mandatory joinder analysis. *59 *722 These mandatory joinder provisions derive from the Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Gregory , 66 N.J. 510 , 333 A.2d 257 (1975), one of the main cases cited in the parties' briefs in this appea | 1 | 8 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2019Williams, 172 N.J. at 371 . 2018Id. at 366 , 799 A.2d 470 . | 1 | 5 |
State v. Yoskowitzgreen2 sentences2015In State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679 (1989), the Court identified the four criteria a defendant must satisfy in order to invoke the mandatory joinder rule: "(1) the multiple offenses are criminal; (2) the offenses are based on the same conduct or arose from the same episode; (3) the appropriate prosecuting officer knew of the offenses at the time the first trial commenced; and (4) the offenses were within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court." Id. at 701 . 2015In State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679 (1989), the Court identified the four criteria a defendant must satisfy in order to invoke the mandatory joinder rule: "(1) the multiple offenses are criminal; (2) the offenses are based on the same conduct or arose from the same episode; (3) the appropriate prosecuting officer knew of the offenses at the time the first trial commenced; and (4) the offenses were within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court." Id. at 701 . | 1 | 5 |
Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orangegreen2 sentences1993Thus, a rule that can control litigational extravagance and reduce piecemeal litigation is a necessity. [ Cogdell, supra, 116 N.J. at 23-24 , 560 A. 2d 1169 (footnotes omitted)]. *624 The Court, in its analysis of the development of the entire controversy doctrine, reasoned that "the doctrine has continually evolved through the common-law so that it currently encompasses a mandatory joinder rule for joinder of virtually all causes, claims and defenses relating to a controversy between the parties engaged in litigation." [ Id. at 25 , 560 A. 2d 1169 ]. 1993Thus, a rule that can control litigational extravagance and reduce piecemeal litigation is a necessity. [ Cogdell, supra, 116 N.J. at 23-24 , 560 A. 2d 1169 (footnotes omitted)]. *624 The Court, in its analysis of the development of the entire controversy doctrine, reasoned that "the doctrine has continually evolved through the common-law so that it currently encompasses a mandatory joinder rule for joinder of virtually all causes, claims and defenses relating to a controversy between the parties engaged in litigation." [ Id. at 25 , 560 A. 2d 1169 ]. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Antierigreen2 sentences2020Super. 267, 272 (Law Div. 1981), aff'd, 186 N.J. 2002See State v. Antieri, 180 N.J.Super. 267, 271 , 434 A.2d 668 (Law Div.1981), aff'd, 186 N.J.Super. 20 , 451 A.2d 189 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 546 , 453 A.2d 864 (1982) (explaining that commencement, as opposed to completion of trial on first indictment, is sufficient to invoke mandatory joinder rule). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Antierigreen1 sentence2002See State v. Antieri, 180 N.J.Super. 267, 271 , 434 A.2d 668 (Law Div.1981), aff'd, 186 N.J.Super. 20 , 451 A.2d 189 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 546 , 453 A.2d 864 (1982) (explaining that commencement, as opposed to completion of trial on first indictment, is sufficient to invoke mandatory joinder rule). | 1 | 1 |
Hunt v. City of Trentongreen1 sentence2002See State v. Antieri, 180 N.J.Super. 267, 271 , 434 A.2d 668 (Law Div.1981), aff'd, 186 N.J.Super. 20 , 451 A.2d 189 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 546 , 453 A.2d 864 (1982) (explaining that commencement, as opposed to completion of trial on first indictment, is sufficient to invoke mandatory joinder rule). | 1 | 1 |
Peter Petrocelli v. Daniel Woodhead Co.green1 sentence1995Cogdell, supra, 116 N.J. at 27-28, 560 A.2d 1169 ; Petrocelli v. Daniel Woodhead Co., 993 F.2d 27, 31 (3d Cir.1993) (entire controversy doctrine does not require that all claims and parties culminate in one litigation; rather all claims and parties must initially be joined together for the court, which can then determine how to proceed with various claims and parties). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pillotgreen2 sentences1990See State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 704-707 , 563 A. 2d 1 (1989) and State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 567 , 560 A. 2d 634 (1989). 1990See State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 704-707 , 563 A. 2d 1 (1989) and State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 567 , 560 A. 2d 634 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Yoskowitzgreen2 sentences1989The Appellate Division reasoned that the facts do not fit squarely within either a double jeopardy or a mandatory joinder rule analysis, ... [but] that the law enforcement authorities’ failure to handle the municipal charges in one prosecution was contrary to the principles of fundamental fairness and reasonable expectations which are the underpinnings of both double jeopardy and the mandatory joinder rule. [ 224 N.J.Super. 375, 381 (1988).] The court found “the impingement on these principles * * * so significant and presently incapable of remedy” that it felt “constrained to dismiss Yoskowit 1989The Appellate Division reasoned that the facts do not fit squarely within either a double jeopardy or a mandatory joinder rule analysis, ... [but] that the law enforcement authorities' failure to handle the municipal charges in one prosecution was contrary to the principles of fundamental fairness and reasonable expectations which are the underpinnings of both double jeopardy and the mandatory joinder rule. [ 224 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Veney
green
1 sentence2015Williams, supra, 172 N.J. at 363 ; Veney, supra, 409 N.J. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Mello
green
2 sentences2009State v. Mello, 297 N.J.Super. 452, 464 , 688 A. 2d 622 (App.Div.1997); Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, comment 11 on N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8 (2009). 2009State v. Mello, 297 N.J.Super. 452, 464 , 688 A. 2d 622 (App.Div.1997); Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated, comment 11 on N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8 (2009). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Ragland
green
2 sentences2009We do not find any evidence of bad faith on the part of the State in dismissing Counts One and Two, and proceeding to trial on Count Three against defendant. [4] There is no support for the argument that the State attempted to circumvent the fundamental fairness principles established in State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189 , 519 A. 2d 1361 (1986). [5] See State v. Brown, 362 N.J.Super. 62, 69 , 826 A. 2d 813 (App.Div. 2003) (criticizing the State's administrative dismissal of the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon and proceeding to trial on the charge of possession of a weapon by a convicted 2009We do not find any evidence of bad faith on the part of the State in dismissing Counts One and Two, and proceeding to trial on Count Three against defendant. [4] There is no support for the argument that the State attempted to circumvent the fundamental fairness principles established in State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189 , 519 A. 2d 1361 (1986). [5] See State v. Brown, 362 N.J.Super. 62, 69 , 826 A. 2d 813 (App.Div. 2003) (criticizing the State's administrative dismissal of the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon and proceeding to trial on the charge of possession of a weapon by a convicted | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2009We do not find any evidence of bad faith on the part of the State in dismissing Counts One and Two, and proceeding to trial on Count Three against defendant. [4] There is no support for the argument that the State attempted to circumvent the fundamental fairness principles established in State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189 , 519 A. 2d 1361 (1986). [5] See State v. Brown, 362 N.J.Super. 62, 69 , 826 A. 2d 813 (App.Div. 2003) (criticizing the State's administrative dismissal of the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon and proceeding to trial on the charge of possession of a weapon by a convicted 2009We do not find any evidence of bad faith on the part of the State in dismissing Counts One and Two, and proceeding to trial on Count Three against defendant. [4] There is no support for the argument that the State attempted to circumvent the fundamental fairness principles established in State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189 , 519 A. 2d 1361 (1986). [5] See State v. Brown, 362 N.J.Super. 62, 69 , 826 A. 2d 813 (App.Div. 2003) (criticizing the State's administrative dismissal of the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon and proceeding to trial on the charge of possession of a weapon by a convicted | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences2009We do not find any evidence of bad faith on the part of the State in dismissing Counts One and Two, and proceeding to trial on Count Three against defendant. [4] There is no support for the argument that the State attempted to circumvent the fundamental fairness principles established in State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189 , 519 A. 2d 1361 (1986). [5] See State v. Brown, 362 N.J.Super. 62, 69 , 826 A. 2d 813 (App.Div. 2003) (criticizing the State's administrative dismissal of the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon and proceeding to trial on the charge of possession of a weapon by a convicted 2009We do not find any evidence of bad faith on the part of the State in dismissing Counts One and Two, and proceeding to trial on Count Three against defendant. [4] There is no support for the argument that the State attempted to circumvent the fundamental fairness principles established in State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189 , 519 A. 2d 1361 (1986). [5] See State v. Brown, 362 N.J.Super. 62, 69 , 826 A. 2d 813 (App.Div. 2003) (criticizing the State's administrative dismissal of the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon and proceeding to trial on the charge of possession of a weapon by a convicted | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cafferata v. Peyser
green
1 sentence1994Super. 256, 261 , 597 A. 2d 1101 (App.Div. 1991) (holding that a patient's settlement of a prior action brought against him by doctors for payment of a bill did not bar medical malpractice action against doctors). *260 Furthermore, the mandatory joinder rule of Cogdell is also limited when the joinder would result in significant unfairness or jeopardy to a clear presentation of the issues and just result.... | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.
green
2 sentences1994Adopting Justice Handler's concurring opinion in Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, 96 N.J. 336 , 476 A. 2d 250 (1984), the Cogdell Court addressed this concern: [The limits of the mandatory joinder rule] are reached when the joinder would result in significant unfairness or jeopardy to a clear presentation of the issues and just result. 1994Adopting Justice Handler's concurring opinion in Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, 96 N.J. 336 , 476 A. 2d 250 (1984), the Cogdell Court addressed this concern: [The limits of the mandatory joinder rule] are reached when the joinder would result in significant unfairness or jeopardy to a clear presentation of the issues and just result. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Nazareth
neutral
2 sentences1989The Appellate Division reasoned that the facts do not fit squarely within either a double jeopardy or a mandatory joinder rule analysis, ... [but] that the law enforcement authorities’ failure to handle the municipal charges in one prosecution was contrary to the principles of fundamental fairness and reasonable expectations which are the underpinnings of both double jeopardy and the mandatory joinder rule. [ 224 N.J.Super. 375, 381 (1988).] The court found “the impingement on these principles * * * so significant and presently incapable of remedy” that it felt “constrained to dismiss Yoskowit 1989Super. 375, 381 (1988).] The court found "the impingement on these principles * * * so significant and presently incapable of remedy" that it felt "constrained to dismiss Yoskowitz' indictment and to vacate his guilty plea for theft by deception." *689 We granted the State's petition for certification, 111 N.J. 608 (1988), but denied defendant's cross-petition. 111 N.J. 648 (1988). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Decker v. Princeton Packet, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989The Appellate Division reasoned that the facts do not fit squarely within either a double jeopardy or a mandatory joinder rule analysis, ... [but] that the law enforcement authorities’ failure to handle the municipal charges in one prosecution was contrary to the principles of fundamental fairness and reasonable expectations which are the underpinnings of both double jeopardy and the mandatory joinder rule. [ 224 N.J.Super. 375, 381 (1988).] The court found “the impingement on these principles * * * so significant and presently incapable of remedy” that it felt “constrained to dismiss Yoskowit 1989Super. 375, 381 (1988).] The court found "the impingement on these principles * * * so significant and presently incapable of remedy" that it felt "constrained to dismiss Yoskowitz' indictment and to vacate his guilty plea for theft by deception." *689 We granted the State's petition for certification, 111 N.J. 608 (1988), but denied defendant's cross-petition. 111 N.J. 648 (1988). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.
green
1 sentence1989Co., 9 N.J. 194 (1952) survived the passage of the Code, and in which we held that for purposes of a mandatory joinder rule it is "clear that in enacting the Code, the Legislature abandoned *416 the `transaction' test in favor of a test that focuses on the offense"). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1989In State v. Lewis, 223 N.J. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Warren
green
1 sentence1985The difficulties in applying this rule and lack of universal acceptance of a single test to determine whether multiple prosecutions for "the same offense" are precluded under particular circumstances are also analyzed in State v. Warren, 186 N.J. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.