Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
20 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Buechel v. Baingreen2 sentences2015The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has been necessarily decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling (see Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 NY3d 195, 199 [2008]; Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001]; Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp., 97 AD3d 619 [2012]; Mahler v Campagna, 60 AD3d 1009, 1011 [2009]; York v Landa, 57 AD3d 980 [2008]). 2014The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation in a subsequent action of an issue raised in a prior action and decided against that party (see Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303 [2001]; Zanani v Schvimmer, 117 AD3d 941 [2014]; Nappy v Nappy, 100 AD3d 843 [2012]). | 15 | 15 |
Tydings v. Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLPgreen2 sentences2016Thus, " [t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling'" ( Zanani v Schvimmer , 117 AD3d 941 , 943 [2d Dept 2014], quoting Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp. , 97 AD3d 619 , 621 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP , 11 NY3d 195 , 199 [2008]). 2016Thus, " [t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling'" ( Zanani v Schvimmer , 117 AD3d 941 , 943 [2d Dept 2014], quoting Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp. , 97 AD3d 619 , 621 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP , 11 NY3d 195 , 199 [2008]). | 11 | 11 |
Capellupo v. Nassau Health Care Corp.green2 sentences2018"The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling" ( Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp., 97 AD3d 619, 621 ; see Kaufman v Eli Lily & Co., 65 NY2d 449 , 455). 2016Thus, " [t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling'" ( Zanani v Schvimmer , 117 AD3d 941 , 943 [2d Dept 2014], quoting Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp. , 97 AD3d 619 , 621 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP , 11 NY3d 195 , 199 [2008]). | 6 | 9 |
United States Ex Rel. Swafford v. Borgess Medical Centergreen2 sentences2012The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling (see Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 NY3d 195, 199 [2008]; Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; Mahler v Campagna, 60 AD3d 1009, 1011 [2009]; York v Landa, 57 AD3d 980 [2008]). 2012The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue “which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues raised in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling” (Simpson v Alter, 78 AD3d 813, 814 [2010]; see Storman v Storman, 90 AD3d 895 [2011]; Leung v Suffolk Plate Glass Co., Inc., 78 AD3d 663 [2010]). “ ‘[It] is a flexible doctrine grounded in the facts and realities of a particular litigation which should not be rigidly or mechanically applied since it is, at | 5 | 10 |
Mahler v. Campagnagreen2 sentences2015The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has been necessarily decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling (see Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 NY3d 195, 199 [2008]; Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001]; Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp., 97 AD3d 619 [2012]; Mahler v Campagna, 60 AD3d 1009, 1011 [2009]; York v Landa, 57 AD3d 980 [2008]). 2012The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling (see Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 NY3d 195, 199 [2008]; Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; Mahler v Campagna, 60 AD3d 1009, 1011 [2009]; York v Landa, 57 AD3d 980 [2008]). | 5 | 6 |
City of New York v. College Point Sports Ass'ngreen2 sentences2016"The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, and is decisive of the present action" ( City of New York v College Point Sports Assn., Inc. , 61 AD3d 33 , 42 [2009]; see also Buechel v Bain , 97 NY2d 295, 304 [2001]; D'Arata v New York Cent. 2016"The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, and is decisive of the present action" ( City of New York v College Point Sports Assn., Inc. , 61 AD3d 33 , 42 [2009]; see also Buechel v Bain , 97 NY2d 295, 304 [2001]; D'Arata v New York Cent. | 4 | 5 |
Maiello v. Kirchnergreen2 sentences2013“The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, and is decisive of the present action” (City of New York v College Point Sports Assn., Inc., 61 AD3d 33, 42 [2009]; see Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 304 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; Maiello v Kirchner, 98 AD3d 481, 482 [2012]). 2013“The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, and is decisive of the present action” (City of New York v College Point Sports Assn., Inc., 61 AD3d 33, 42 [2009]; see Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 304 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; Maiello v Kirchner, 98 AD3d 481, 482 [2012]). | 2 | 2 |
Nappy v. Nappygreen2 sentences2014The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation in a subsequent action of an issue raised in a prior action and decided against that party (see Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303 [2001]; Zanani v Schvimmer, 117 AD3d 941 [2014]; Nappy v Nappy, 100 AD3d 843 [2012]). 2014“The litigant seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel must demonstrate that the decisive issue was necessarily decided in the prior action against a party,” and “[t]he party to be precluded from relitigating the issue bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination” (Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d at 304 ; see Nappy v Nappy, 100 AD3d at 845 ; Matter of Simmons v Simmons, 91 AD3d 960 [2012]; Nachum v Ezagui, 83 AD3d 1017 [2011]). | 1 | 1 |
Jespersen v. Li Sheng Lianggreen1 sentence2012A decision upon which no formal order or judgment has been entered lacks the conclusive character necessary to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel (see Jespersen v Li Sheng Liang, 68 AD3d 724, 725 [2009]; Towne v Asadourian, 277 AD2d 800, 801 [2000]; Ruben v American & Foreign Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Simpson v. Altergreen1 sentence2012The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue “which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues raised in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling” (Simpson v Alter, 78 AD3d 813, 814 [2010]; see Storman v Storman, 90 AD3d 895 [2011]; Leung v Suffolk Plate Glass Co., Inc., 78 AD3d 663 [2010]). “ ‘[It] is a flexible doctrine grounded in the facts and realities of a particular litigation which should not be rigidly or mechanically applied since it is, at | 1 | 1 |
Storman v. Stormangreen1 sentence2012The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue “which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues raised in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling” (Simpson v Alter, 78 AD3d 813, 814 [2010]; see Storman v Storman, 90 AD3d 895 [2011]; Leung v Suffolk Plate Glass Co., Inc., 78 AD3d 663 [2010]). “ ‘[It] is a flexible doctrine grounded in the facts and realities of a particular litigation which should not be rigidly or mechanically applied since it is, at | 1 | 1 |
Towne v. Asadouriangreen1 sentence2012A decision upon which no formal order or judgment has been entered lacks the conclusive character necessary to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel (see Jespersen v Li Sheng Liang, 68 AD3d 724, 725 [2009]; Towne v Asadourian, 277 AD2d 800, 801 [2000]; Ruben v American & Foreign Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co.green1 sentence2008Fund, 48 AD3d 400, 401-402 [2008]), the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of only those issues which were “actually litigated and necessarily decided” in the prior proceeding (Matter of Robert v O’Meara, 28 AD3d 567, 568 [2006]; see Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 349-350 [1999]; Martin v Geico Direct Ins., 31 AD3d 505, 506 [2006]). | 1 | 1 |
Robert v. O'Mearagreen1 sentence2008Fund, 48 AD3d 400, 401-402 [2008]), the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of only those issues which were “actually litigated and necessarily decided” in the prior proceeding (Matter of Robert v O’Meara, 28 AD3d 567, 568 [2006]; see Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 349-350 [1999]; Martin v Geico Direct Ins., 31 AD3d 505, 506 [2006]). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Geico Direct Insurancegreen1 sentence2008Fund, 48 AD3d 400, 401-402 [2008]), the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of only those issues which were “actually litigated and necessarily decided” in the prior proceeding (Matter of Robert v O’Meara, 28 AD3d 567, 568 [2006]; see Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 349-350 [1999]; Martin v Geico Direct Ins., 31 AD3d 505, 506 [2006]). | 1 | 1 |
Santo D'Angelo v. State Insurance Fundgreen1 sentence2008Fund, 48 AD3d 400, 401-402 [2008]), the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of only those issues which were “actually litigated and necessarily decided” in the prior proceeding (Matter of Robert v O’Meara, 28 AD3d 567, 568 [2006]; see Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 NY2d 343, 349-350 [1999]; Martin v Geico Direct Ins., 31 AD3d 505, 506 [2006]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
York v. Landa
green
2 sentences2015The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has been necessarily decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling (see Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 NY3d 195, 199 [2008]; Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001]; Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp., 97 AD3d 619 [2012]; Mahler v Campagna, 60 AD3d 1009, 1011 [2009]; York v Landa, 57 AD3d 980 [2008]). 2012The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling (see Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 NY3d 195, 199 [2008]; Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; Mahler v Campagna, 60 AD3d 1009, 1011 [2009]; York v Landa, 57 AD3d 980 [2008]). | 4 | 2009–2015 |
Zanani v. Schvimmer
neutral
2 sentences2016Thus, " [t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling'" ( Zanani v Schvimmer , 117 AD3d 941 , 943 [2d Dept 2014], quoting Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp. , 97 AD3d 619 , 621 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP , 11 NY3d 195 , 199 [2008]). 2016Thus, " [t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling'" ( Zanani v Schvimmer , 117 AD3d 941 , 943 [2d Dept 2014], quoting Capellupo v Nassau Health Care Corp. , 97 AD3d 619 , 621 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP , 11 NY3d 195 , 199 [2008]). | 2 | 2014–2016 |
Wheeler v. Del Duca
green
1 sentence2017The issue of the plaintiff Sandra Wheeler’s standing to enforce the restrictive covenants was raised and decided against her on the merits in a separate action (see Wheeler v Del Duca, 151 AD3d 1005 [2017] [decided herewith]). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Nachum v. Ezagui
green
1 sentence2014“The litigant seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel must demonstrate that the decisive issue was necessarily decided in the prior action against a party,” and “[t]he party to be precluded from relitigating the issue bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination” (Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d at 304 ; see Nappy v Nappy, 100 AD3d at 845 ; Matter of Simmons v Simmons, 91 AD3d 960 [2012]; Nachum v Ezagui, 83 AD3d 1017 [2011]). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Simmons v. Simmons
green
1 sentence2014“The litigant seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel must demonstrate that the decisive issue was necessarily decided in the prior action against a party,” and “[t]he party to be precluded from relitigating the issue bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination” (Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d at 304 ; see Nappy v Nappy, 100 AD3d at 845 ; Matter of Simmons v Simmons, 91 AD3d 960 [2012]; Nachum v Ezagui, 83 AD3d 1017 [2011]). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re the Estate of Hunter
green
1 sentence2012The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue “which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues raised in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling” (Simpson v Alter, 78 AD3d 813, 814 [2010]; see Storman v Storman, 90 AD3d 895 [2011]; Leung v Suffolk Plate Glass Co., Inc., 78 AD3d 663 [2010]). “ ‘[It] is a flexible doctrine grounded in the facts and realities of a particular litigation which should not be rigidly or mechanically applied since it is, at | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Leung v. Suffolk Plate Glass Co.
green
1 sentence2012The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue “which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues raised in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling” (Simpson v Alter, 78 AD3d 813, 814 [2010]; see Storman v Storman, 90 AD3d 895 [2011]; Leung v Suffolk Plate Glass Co., Inc., 78 AD3d 663 [2010]). “ ‘[It] is a flexible doctrine grounded in the facts and realities of a particular litigation which should not be rigidly or mechanically applied since it is, at | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In re the Estate of Hunter
green
1 sentence2012The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue “which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues raised in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling” (Simpson v Alter, 78 AD3d 813, 814 [2010]; see Storman v Storman, 90 AD3d 895 [2011]; Leung v Suffolk Plate Glass Co., Inc., 78 AD3d 663 [2010]). “ ‘[It] is a flexible doctrine grounded in the facts and realities of a particular litigation which should not be rigidly or mechanically applied since it is, at | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Altegra Credit Co. v. Tin Chu
green
1 sentence2010“The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue which has necessarily been decided in a prior action and is determinative of the issues disputed in the present action, provided that there was a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now alleged to be controlling” (Mahler v Campagna, 60 AD3d 1009, 1011 [2009]; see Tydings v Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 11 NY3d 195, 199 [2008]; Buechel v Bain, 97 NY2d 295, 303-304 [2001], cert denied 535 US 1096 [2002]; Altegra Credit Co. v Tin Chu, 29 AD3d 718 [2006]). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
McGrath v. Gold
green
1 sentence1984Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 ; Matter of McGrath v Gold, 36 NY2d 406, 411 ). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Ryan v. New York Telephone Co.
green
1 sentence1984Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 ; Matter of McGrath v Gold, 36 NY2d 406, 411 ). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.