doctrine rests upon principle in New York

1992In short, 'where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position’ (Davis v Wakelee, 156 US 680, 689 )” (see also, Kimco of N. Y. v Devon, 163 AD2d 573, 574-575 ; Neumann v Metropolitan Med.

1985The doctrine rests upon the principle that a litigant 'should not be permitted * * * to lead a court to find a fact one way and then contend in another judicial proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise’ (Note, op cit, 59 Harv L Rev 1132). " 'The policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are "general consideration^] of the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings.” ’ (State of Arizona v Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F2d 1208, 1215, quoting from IB Moore’s Fed Prac, par 405 [8], p 767.) In short, 'where a party assumes a certain

1860The first is .that of *561 Van Bracklin v. Fonda ( 12 John., 468 ), which was an action to recover damages for selling a quantity of beef as ■ “ good and sound,’’ which proved “ bad and unwholesome.” There was in that case some evidence that the defendant knew the animal to be diseased before it was slaughtered; but the court, in giving judgment, say that “ in the sale of provisions for domestic use, the vendor is bound to know that they are sound and wholesome, at his peril.” Although what the court here says is that the vendor is bound to know the condition of what he sells, yet the subseque

1860The first *s °f * Van Bracklin v. Fonda ( 12 Johns. 468 ), which was an action to recover damages for selling a quantity of beef as'“ good and sound,” which proved “bad and unwholesome.” There was, in that case, some evidence that the defendant knew the animal to be diseased, before it was slaughtered; but the court, in giving judgment, say, that “in the sale of provisions for domestic use, the vendor is hound-to know that they are sound and wholesome, at his peril.” 1 Although what the court here says is, that the vendor is hound to know the condition of what he sells, yet, the subsequent cas

1860The first is .that of *561 Van Bracklin v. Fonda ( 12 John., 468 ), which was an action to recover damages for selling a quantity of beef as ■ “ good and sound,’’ which proved “ bad and unwholesome.” There was in that case some evidence that the defendant knew the animal to be diseased before it was slaughtered; but the court, in giving judgment, say that “ in the sale of provisions for domestic use, the vendor is bound to know that they are sound and wholesome, at his peril.” Although what the court here says is that the vendor is bound to know the condition of what he sells, yet the subseque

1860The first *s °f * Van Bracklin v. Fonda ( 12 Johns. 468 ), which was an action to recover damages for selling a quantity of beef as'“ good and sound,” which proved “bad and unwholesome.” There was, in that case, some evidence that the defendant knew the animal to be diseased, before it was slaughtered; but the court, in giving judgment, say, that “in the sale of provisions for domestic use, the vendor is hound-to know that they are sound and wholesome, at his peril.” 1 Although what the court here says is, that the vendor is hound to know the condition of what he sells, yet, the subsequent cas

2025Contrary to the objectant's contention, the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not bar the co-executors from asserting during the accounting proceedings that the objectant was not the residuary beneficiary ( see Ghatani v AGH Realty, LLC , 181 AD3d 909, 911-912 ).

2025Contrary to the objectant's contention, the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not bar the co-executors from asserting during the accounting proceedings that the objectant was not the residuary beneficiary ( see Ghatani v AGH Realty, LLC , 181 AD3d 909, 911-912 ).

2019The doctrine rests upon the principle that a litigant should not be permitted to lead a court to find a fact one way and then contend in another judicial proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise (<a href="../2004/2004_00621.htm" target="_blank"><i>see Leonia Bank v Kouri</i>, 3 AD3d 213</a>, 219 [2004]).</p> <p>At the trial of the underlying action, plaintiff argued that he suffered grievously as a result of Placeres' legal malpractice in the underlying immigration matter, which malpractice resulted in plaintiff spending fourteen months confined by immigration authorities, durin

2019The doctrine rests upon the principle that a litigant should not be permitted to lead a court to find a fact one way and then contend in another judicial proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise (<a href="../2004/2004_00621.htm" target="_blank"><i>see Leonia Bank v Kouri</i>, 3 AD3d 213 </a>, 219 [2004]).</p> <p>At the trial of the underlying action, plaintiff argued that he suffered grievously as a result of Placeres' legal malpractice in the underlying immigration matter, which malpractice resulted in plaintiff spending fourteen months confined by immigration authorities, duri

2008(Black v White & Case, 280 AD2d 407 [1st Dept 2001]; McCaffrey v Schaefer, 251 AD2d 300 [2d Dept 1998].) “The doctrine rests upon the principle that a litigant ‘should not be permitted ... to lead a court to find a fact one way and then contend in another judicial proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise’ (Note, op. cit., 59 Harv L Rev 1132).” (Environmental Concern v Larchwood Constr.

2008(Black v White & Case, 280 AD2d 407 [1st Dept 2001]; McCaffrey v Schaefer, 251 AD2d 300 [2d Dept 1998].) “The doctrine rests upon the principle that a litigant ‘should not be permitted ... to lead a court to find a fact one way and then contend in another judicial proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise’ (Note, op. cit., 59 Harv L Rev 1132).” (Environmental Concern v Larchwood Constr.

1992In short, 'where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position’ (Davis v Wakelee, 156 US 680, 689 )” (see also, Kimco of N. Y. v Devon, 163 AD2d 573, 574-575 ; Neumann v Metropolitan Med.