Noerr-Pennington doctrine in New York

2020"The filing of litigation falls within the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which has been applied to bar claims of tortious interference predicated on the commencement of litigation" ( I.G. , 17 AD3d at 208 ).

2012Second Generation Partners, L.P. v Duane Reade, 17 AD3d 206, 208 [1st Dept 2005]; Concourse Nursing Home v Engelstein, 278 AD2d 35 [1st Dept 2000].) In other words, the “filing of litigation falls within the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which has been applied to bar claims of tortious interference predicated on the commencement of litigation.” (I.G.

2025Owners Assn., Inc. , 23 AD3d 160, 161 [1st Dept 2005]).

2025Owners Assn., Inc. , 23 AD3d 160, 161 [1st Dept 2005]).

2021"The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects the right under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to petition the government for governmental action, including through litigation and activity incidental to litigation" ( Matter of People v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc. , 193 AD3d 67 , 77 [citation omitted]; see Alfred Weissman Real Estate v Big V Supermarkets , 268 AD2d 101, 106-107 ).

2021"The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects the right under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to petition the government for governmental action, including through litigation and activity incidental to litigation" ( Matter of People v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc. , 193 AD3d 67 , 77 [citation omitted]; see Alfred Weissman Real Estate v Big V Supermarkets , 268 AD2d 101, 106-107 ).

2025NO. 868 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/16/2025 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine essentially stands for the proposition that parties may not be subjected to liability for petitioning the government (see United Mine Workers of Am. v Pennington, 381 US 657 [1965]; Eastern R.R.

2025NO. 868 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 05/16/2025 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine essentially stands for the proposition that parties may not be subjected to liability for petitioning the government (see United Mine Workers of Am. v Pennington, 381 US 657 [1965]; Eastern R.R.

2023Owners Assn., Inc. , 23 AD3d 160, 161 [1st Dept 2005]) and the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute ( see Hariri v Amper , 51 AD3d 146, 150-151 [1st Dept 2008]).

2023Owners Assn., Inc. , 23 AD3d 160, 161 [1st Dept 2005]) and the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute ( see Hariri v Amper , 51 AD3d 146, 150-151 [1st Dept 2008]).

2019The petition adequately alleges that the Northern Respondents' conduct falls within the "sham exception" to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine ( see Professional Real Estate Invs., Inc. v Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. , 508 US 49, 60 [1993]; Singh v Sukhram , 56 AD3d 187 , 192 [2d Dept 2008]; see also Eastern R.R.

2019The petition adequately alleges that the Northern Respondents' conduct falls within the "sham exception" to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine ( see Professional Real Estate Invs., Inc. v Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. , 508 US 49, 60 [1993]; Singh v Sukhram , 56 AD3d 187 , 192 [2d Dept 2008]; see also Eastern R.R.

2012The Icahn plaintiffs offer no support for their assertion that 1989’s filing of a Schedule 13D with the SEC in 2010 is not entitled to protection under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because the document was simply a “disclosure document.” The 13D was filed because the 2010 litigation was commenced, and thus, it was incidental to that litigation and falls squarely within the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (see Aircapital Cablevision, Inc. v Starlink Communications Group, Inc., 634 F Supp 316, 323-324 [D Kan 1986] [finding publicity that was “(c)learly . . . bully-type conduct” that

2012The Icahn plaintiffs offer no support for their assertion that 1989’s filing of a Schedule 13D with the SEC in 2010 is not entitled to protection under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine because the document was simply a “disclosure document.” The 13D was filed because the 2010 litigation was commenced, and thus, it was incidental to that litigation and falls squarely within the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (see Aircapital Cablevision, Inc. v Starlink Communications Group, Inc., 634 F Supp 316, 323-324 [D Kan 1986] [finding publicity that was “(c)learly . . . bully-type conduct” that

2012Corp. v Loral Corp., 974 F Supp 345 [SD NY 1997]; Concourse Nursing Home, 278 AD2d at 35 .) 3 In the instant case, plaintiff relies, inter alia, on Barq’s Inc. v Barq’s Beverages, Inc. ( 677 F Supp 449 [ED La 1987]) and Castaline v Aaron Mueller Arts ( 2010 WL 583944 , 2010 US Dist LEXIS 13111 [ND Cal 2010]) and maintains that under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, it had an absolute right to contact and even threaten third parties with litigation as an incident to the effective enforcement of its legal interests.

2012Second Generation Partners, L.P. v Duane Reade, 17 AD3d 206, 208 [1st Dept 2005]; Concourse Nursing Home v Engelstein, 278 AD2d 35 [1st Dept 2000].) In other words, the “filing of litigation falls within the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which has been applied to bar claims of tortious interference predicated on the commencement of litigation.” (I.G.

2021"There is a 'sham' exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine which applies in 'situations in which persons use the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon'" ( Singh v Sukhram , 56 AD3d 187 , 192 [emphasis omitted], quoting Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. , 499 US 365, 380 ; see Alfred Weissman Real Estate v Big V Supermarkets , 268 AD2d at 107 ).

2021"There is a 'sham' exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine which applies in 'situations in which persons use the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an anticompetitive weapon'" ( Singh v Sukhram , 56 AD3d 187 , 192 [emphasis omitted], quoting Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. , 499 US 365, 380 ; see Alfred Weissman Real Estate v Big V Supermarkets , 268 AD2d at 107 ).

2026The MCAs were also procedurally and substantively unconscionable ( see generally Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank , 73 NY2d 1, 10-12 [1988]).

2026The MCAs were also procedurally and substantively unconscionable ( see generally Gillman v Chase Manhattan Bank , 73 NY2d 1, 10-12 [1988]).

2026LLC v Pilevsky , 189 AD3d 726, 728 [1st Dept 2020]), plaintiff's allegations that defendant filed the Hodges Action despite its awareness of evidence disproving the allegations therein were sufficient to invoke the "sham exception" to that doctrine ( see Matter of People v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc. , 169 AD3d 527 , 530 [1st Dept 2019]; Singh v Sukhram , 56 AD3d 187 , 192 [2d Dept 2008]).

2026LLC v Pilevsky , 189 AD3d 726, 728 [1st Dept 2020]), plaintiff's allegations that defendant filed the Hodges Action despite its awareness of evidence disproving the allegations therein were sufficient to invoke the "sham exception" to that doctrine ( see Matter of People v Northern Leasing Sys., Inc. , 169 AD3d 527 , 530 [1st Dept 2019]; Singh v Sukhram , 56 AD3d 187 , 192 [2d Dept 2008]).

2025Nonetheless, even where federal courts have not expressly applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, most of the courts that have addressed the issue have determined that, in order to form the basis for an employment-related retaliation claim, the party claiming retaliation must still establish that an employer’s counterclaim was objectively baseless or brought in bad faith to deter claimants from exercising their rights (see Castro-Jaques v Lang- Nelson Assocs., Inc., No. 18-cv-3376 (PAM/LIB), 2020 US Dist LEXIS 268649 , *17-19, 2020 WL 1360993 , *7 [D Minn., Jan. 2, 2020]; Melendez v Poy Loung D

2025Nonetheless, even where federal courts have not expressly applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, most of the courts that have addressed the issue have determined that, in order to form the basis for an employment-related retaliation claim, the party claiming retaliation must still establish that an employer’s counterclaim was objectively baseless or brought in bad faith to deter claimants from exercising their rights (see Castro-Jaques v Lang- Nelson Assocs., Inc., No. 18-cv-3376 (PAM/LIB), 2020 US Dist LEXIS 268649 , *17-19, 2020 WL 1360993 , *7 [D Minn., Jan. 2, 2020]; Melendez v Poy Loung D

2025Bedell Wholesale Co., Inc. v Philip Morris Inc., 263 F3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 US 1081 , 122 SCt 813 , 151 LEd 2d 697 (2002) (quoting Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v Ethyl Corp., 168 F3d 119, 122 (3d Cir 1999), cert denied, 528 US 871 , 120 SCt 173 , 145 LEd 2d 146 (1999); see E.R.R.

2025Bedell Wholesale Co., Inc. v Philip Morris Inc., 263 F3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001), cert denied, 534 US 1081 , 122 SCt 813 , 151 LEd 2d 697 (2002) (quoting Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v Ethyl Corp., 168 F3d 119, 122 (3d Cir 1999), cert denied, 528 US 871 , 120 SCt 173 , 145 LEd 2d 146 (1999); see E.R.R.

2025Second Generation Partners, L.P. v Reade, 17 AD3d 206, 208 [1st Dept 2005]), as does the interposition of counterclaims in a pending action (see Sosa v DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F3d 923, 933 [9th Cir 2006]; Freeman v Lasky, Haas & Cohler, 410 F3d 1180, 1184 [9th Cir 2005]; Porous Media Corp. v Pall Corp., 186 F3d 1077 , 1080 n 4 [8th Cir 1999], affg No. 97-2084 [ADM/AJB], 1998 US Dist LEXIS 23651 , *4-8 [D Minn., Jun. 3, 1998]; Warner v Sims Metal Mgt., Ltd., No. C-13-02190 WHA, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 151815 , *7- 8, 2013 WL 5754403 , *3 [ND Cal., Oct. 21, 2013]).

2025Second Generation Partners, L.P. v Reade, 17 AD3d 206, 208 [1st Dept 2005]), as does the interposition of counterclaims in a pending action (see Sosa v DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F3d 923, 933 [9th Cir 2006]; Freeman v Lasky, Haas & Cohler, 410 F3d 1180, 1184 [9th Cir 2005]; Porous Media Corp. v Pall Corp., 186 F3d 1077 , 1080 n 4 [8th Cir 1999], affg No. 97-2084 [ADM/AJB], 1998 US Dist LEXIS 23651 , *4-8 [D Minn., Jun. 3, 1998]; Warner v Sims Metal Mgt., Ltd., No. C-13-02190 WHA, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 151815 , *7- 8, 2013 WL 5754403 , *3 [ND Cal., Oct. 21, 2013]).

2025The Third Circuit first noted that the United States Supreme Court, in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v National Labor Relations Bd. ( 461 US 731, 741 [1983]), had applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to bar an employee’s claims of retaliation under the National Labor Relations Act that had been premised upon an employer’s post-termination commencement of lawsuits against that employee.

2025The Third Circuit first noted that the United States Supreme Court, in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v National Labor Relations Bd. ( 461 US 731, 741 [1983]), had applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to bar an employee’s claims of retaliation under the National Labor Relations Act that had been premised upon an employer’s post-termination commencement of lawsuits against that employee.

2025Nonetheless, even where federal courts have not expressly applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, most of the courts that have addressed the issue have determined that, in order to form the basis for an employment-related retaliation claim, the party claiming retaliation must still establish that an employer’s counterclaim was objectively baseless or brought in bad faith to deter claimants from exercising their rights (see Castro-Jaques v Lang- Nelson Assocs., Inc., No. 18-cv-3376 (PAM/LIB), 2020 US Dist LEXIS 268649 , *17-19, 2020 WL 1360993 , *7 [D Minn., Jan. 2, 2020]; Melendez v Poy Loung D

2025Nonetheless, even where federal courts have not expressly applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, most of the courts that have addressed the issue have determined that, in order to form the basis for an employment-related retaliation claim, the party claiming retaliation must still establish that an employer’s counterclaim was objectively baseless or brought in bad faith to deter claimants from exercising their rights (see Castro-Jaques v Lang- Nelson Assocs., Inc., No. 18-cv-3376 (PAM/LIB), 2020 US Dist LEXIS 268649 , *17-19, 2020 WL 1360993 , *7 [D Minn., Jan. 2, 2020]; Melendez v Poy Loung D

2021It is well established that the duty of zealous representation has its limits ( see Honzawa v Honzawa , 268 AD2d 327, 331 [1st Dept 2000]).

2021It is well established that the duty of zealous representation has its limits ( see Honzawa v Honzawa , 268 AD2d 327, 331 [1st Dept 2000]).

2000Prod. v Warner-Amex Cable Communications, supra, at 1084; see also, Weiss v Willow Tree Civic Assn., supra, at 807; Hotel St.

2000Prod. v Warner-Amex Cable Communications, supra, at 1084; see also, Weiss v Willow Tree Civic Assn., supra, at 807; Hotel St.