Noerr-Pennington doctrine in West Virginia

2010In the instant action, the Court admitted evidence of DuPont's communications with regulatory agencies because such communications confirmed the existence and the magnitude of the contamination, were admissions made by a party opponent, rebutted DuPont's claims that there is no off-site contamination and no need for remediation, and rebutted DuPont's defense/reliance on regulatory agencies' findings of no unreasonable risk of off-site contamination. "[T]he Noerr-Pennington doctrine, . . . was established in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 , 81

2010In the instant action, the Court admitted evidence of DuPont's communications with regulatory agencies because such communications confirmed the existence and the magnitude of the contamination, were admissions made by a party opponent, rebutted DuPont's claims that there is no off-site contamination and no need for remediation, and rebutted DuPont's defense/reliance on regulatory agencies' findings of no unreasonable risk of off-site contamination. "[T]he Noerr-Pennington doctrine, . . . was established in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 , 81

1993Such *468 immunity is not limited to attempts to influence legislative and executive functions but extends as well to protect ‘the use of administrative or judicial process-es_’ Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 380 , 93 S.Ct. 1022, 1031 , 35 L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1973)[,] rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 , 93 S.Ct. 1523 , 36 L.Ed.2d 201 [,] on remand, 360 F.Supp. 451 , aff'd[,] 417 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 2594 , 41 L.Ed.2d 207 .” 167 W.Va. at 445 , 282 S.E.2d at 35 .

1993Such *468 immunity is not limited to attempts to influence legislative and executive functions but extends as well to protect ‘the use of administrative or judicial process-es_’ Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 380 , 93 S.Ct. 1022, 1031 , 35 L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1973)[,] rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 , 93 S.Ct. 1523 , 36 L.Ed.2d 201 [,] on remand, 360 F.Supp. 451 , aff'd[,] 417 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 2594 , 41 L.Ed.2d 207 .” 167 W.Va. at 445 , 282 S.E.2d at 35 .

1993Such *468 immunity is not limited to attempts to influence legislative and executive functions but extends as well to protect ‘the use of administrative or judicial process-es_’ Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 380 , 93 S.Ct. 1022, 1031 , 35 L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1973)[,] rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 , 93 S.Ct. 1523 , 36 L.Ed.2d 201 [,] on remand, 360 F.Supp. 451 , aff'd[,] 417 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 2594 , 41 L.Ed.2d 207 .” 167 W.Va. at 445 , 282 S.E.2d at 35 .

1993Such *468 immunity is not limited to attempts to influence legislative and executive functions but extends as well to protect ‘the use of administrative or judicial process-es_’ Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 380 , 93 S.Ct. 1022, 1031 , 35 L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1973)[,] rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 , 93 S.Ct. 1523 , 36 L.Ed.2d 201 [,] on remand, 360 F.Supp. 451 , aff'd[,] 417 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 2594 , 41 L.Ed.2d 207 .” 167 W.Va. at 445 , 282 S.E.2d at 35 .

1993Such *468 immunity is not limited to attempts to influence legislative and executive functions but extends as well to protect ‘the use of administrative or judicial process-es_’ Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 380 , 93 S.Ct. 1022, 1031 , 35 L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1973)[,] rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 , 93 S.Ct. 1523 , 36 L.Ed.2d 201 [,] on remand, 360 F.Supp. 451 , aff'd[,] 417 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 2594 , 41 L.Ed.2d 207 .” 167 W.Va. at 445 , 282 S.E.2d at 35 .

1993Such *468 immunity is not limited to attempts to influence legislative and executive functions but extends as well to protect ‘the use of administrative or judicial process-es_’ Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 380 , 93 S.Ct. 1022, 1031 , 35 L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1973)[,] rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 , 93 S.Ct. 1523 , 36 L.Ed.2d 201 [,] on remand, 360 F.Supp. 451 , aff'd[,] 417 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 2594 , 41 L.Ed.2d 207 .” 167 W.Va. at 445 , 282 S.E.2d at 35 .

1993Such *468 immunity is not limited to attempts to influence legislative and executive functions but extends as well to protect ‘the use of administrative or judicial process-es_’ Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 380 , 93 S.Ct. 1022, 1031 , 35 L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1973)[,] rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 , 93 S.Ct. 1523 , 36 L.Ed.2d 201 [,] on remand, 360 F.Supp. 451 , aff'd[,] 417 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 2594 , 41 L.Ed.2d 207 .” 167 W.Va. at 445 , 282 S.E.2d at 35 .

1993Such *468 immunity is not limited to attempts to influence legislative and executive functions but extends as well to protect ‘the use of administrative or judicial process-es_’ Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 380 , 93 S.Ct. 1022, 1031 , 35 L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1973)[,] rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 , 93 S.Ct. 1523 , 36 L.Ed.2d 201 [,] on remand, 360 F.Supp. 451 , aff'd[,] 417 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 2594 , 41 L.Ed.2d 207 .” 167 W.Va. at 445 , 282 S.E.2d at 35 .

1993Such *468 immunity is not limited to attempts to influence legislative and executive functions but extends as well to protect ‘the use of administrative or judicial process-es_’ Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 380 , 93 S.Ct. 1022, 1031 , 35 L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1973)[,] rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 , 93 S.Ct. 1523 , 36 L.Ed.2d 201 [,] on remand, 360 F.Supp. 451 , aff'd[,] 417 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 2594 , 41 L.Ed.2d 207 .” 167 W.Va. at 445 , 282 S.E.2d at 35 .

1993Such *468 immunity is not limited to attempts to influence legislative and executive functions but extends as well to protect ‘the use of administrative or judicial process-es_’ Otter Tail Power Co. v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366, 380 , 93 S.Ct. 1022, 1031 , 35 L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1973)[,] rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 , 93 S.Ct. 1523 , 36 L.Ed.2d 201 [,] on remand, 360 F.Supp. 451 , aff'd[,] 417 U.S. 901 , 94 S.Ct. 2594 , 41 L.Ed.2d 207 .” 167 W.Va. at 445 , 282 S.E.2d at 35 .

2021Further, in Baldau we noted that the Supreme Court, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 , 92 S.Ct. 609 (1972), extended Noerr-Pennington immunity to citizens engaged in petitioning activities aimed at state and federal agencies, 19 and courts.

2021Further, in Baldau we noted that the Supreme Court, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 , 92 S.Ct. 609 (1972), extended Noerr-Pennington immunity to citizens engaged in petitioning activities aimed at state and federal agencies, 19 and courts.

1993We also concluded in Webb that “the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its application to the facts of this case leads us to conclude that the petitioners’ activities involve the exercise of the right to petition” and were, therefore, absolutely protected. 167 W.Va. at 459 , 282 S.E.2d at 43 .

1993We also concluded in Webb that “the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its application to the facts of this case leads us to conclude that the petitioners’ activities involve the exercise of the right to petition” and were, therefore, absolutely protected. 167 W.Va. at 459 , 282 S.E.2d at 43 .

1993We also concluded in Webb that “the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its application to the facts of this case leads us to conclude that the petitioners’ activities involve the exercise of the right to petition” and were, therefore, absolutely protected. 167 W.Va. at 459 , 282 S.E.2d at 43 .

1993We also concluded in Webb that “the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and its application to the facts of this case leads us to conclude that the petitioners’ activities involve the exercise of the right to petition” and were, therefore, absolutely protected. 167 W.Va. at 459 , 282 S.E.2d at 43 .

1981In Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F.Supp. 934 (1972), the district court applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to a common law tortious business interference counter-claim brought by a lumber company against the Sierra Club and others which alleged that the counter-claim defendants had instituted administrative appeals and "other acts" with the intention of inducing the government to breach a contract it had to sell to the lumber company timber from a stand of trees near a "primitive" area.

1981In Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F.Supp. 934 (1972), the district court applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to a common law tortious business interference counter-claim brought by a lumber company against the Sierra Club and others which alleged that the counter-claim defendants had instituted administrative appeals and "other acts" with the intention of inducing the government to breach a contract it had to sell to the lumber company timber from a stand of trees near a "primitive" area.

1981In Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 580 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1978), the plaintiff, a commuter airline, alleged that certain scheduled air carriers had undertaken a publicity campaign intended to prevent the plaintiff from having free access to the city authority charged with ruling on the plaintiff's application for airport space.

1981In Mark Aero, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 580 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1978), the plaintiff, a commuter airline, alleged that certain scheduled air carriers had undertaken a publicity campaign intended to prevent the plaintiff from having free access to the city authority charged with ruling on the plaintiff’s application for airport space.

2021Pa. 2006) (boroughs brought action against utility companies, alleging, among other claims, breach of contract for petitioning activity before FERC and Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission; the court rejected the “sham” exception to Noerr-Pennington, finding no evidence that the petitioning activity was not genuine); TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir. 1996), opinion modified on reh’g, 86 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996) (utility’s activities in lobbying county commission against construction of transmission line was constitutionally protected under Noerr-Pe

2021Pa. 2006) (boroughs brought action against utility companies, alleging, among other claims, breach of contract for petitioning activity before FERC and Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission; the court rejected the “sham” exception to Noerr-Pennington, finding no evidence that the petitioning activity was not genuine); TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir. 1996), opinion modified on reh’g, 86 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996) (utility’s activities in lobbying county commission against construction of transmission line was constitutionally protected under Noerr-Pe

2021Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 , 113 S.Ct. 1920 (1993).

2021Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 , 113 S.Ct. 1920 (1993).

2021The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that Noerr-Pennington immunity extends to those engaged in “the pursuit of litigation, . . . and, although originally developed in the antitrust context, the doctrine has now universally been applied to business torts.” IGEN Int’l, Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 335 F.3d 303 , 310 (4th Cir.2003) (citations omitted).

2021Cal. 1994) (actions of electric and natural gas utilities before state and federal commissions were protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine); Transphase Sys., Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 839 F. Supp. 711 (C.D.

2021Cal. 1994) (actions of electric and natural gas utilities before state and federal commissions were protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine); Transphase Sys., Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 839 F. Supp. 711 (C.D.

2021This Court discussed the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in Baldau v. Jonkers, 229 W.

2021This Court discussed the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in Baldau v. Jonkers, 229 W.

1993The United States Supreme Court refused this invitation, explaining that “[t]he right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First Amendment], and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression.” 472 U.S. at 482 , 105 S.Ct. at 2789 , 86 L.Ed.2d at 388 .

1993The United States Supreme Court refused this invitation, explaining that “[t]he right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First Amendment], and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression.” 472 U.S. at 482 , 105 S.Ct. at 2789 , 86 L.Ed.2d at 388 .