6 Alaska opinions name it 1 courts 1986–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sopko v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc.green2 sentences2009Because we conclude that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not preclude Pepper's UTPA claims, we do not need to decide whether the sham exception applies in this case. [40] Sopko v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc., 21 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Alaska 2001) ("[W]e can affirm a grant of summary judgment on alternative grounds, including grounds not advanced by the lower court or the parties. 2009Because we conclude that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not preclude Pepper's UTPA claims, we do not need to decide whether the sham exception applies in this case. [40] Sopko v. Dowell Schlumberger, Inc., 21 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Alaska 2001) ("[W]e can affirm a grant of summary judgment on alternative grounds, including grounds not advanced by the lower court or the parties. | 2 | 2 |
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2009Pepper also argues that Routh Crabtree's activity is exempt from Noerr-Pennington immunity under the "sham exception." The United States Supreme Court held in the antitrust context that activity "ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action" does not qualify for Noerr-Pennington iramunity if it is "a mere sham to cover an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor." Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 51 , 113 S.Ct. 1920 , 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993). 2009Pepper also argues that Routh Crabtree's activity is exempt from Noerr-Pennington immunity under the "sham exception." The United States Supreme Court held in the antitrust context that activity "ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action" does not qualify for Noerr-Pennington iramunity if it is "a mere sham to cover an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor." Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 51 , 113 S.Ct. 1920 , 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993). | 1 | 3 |
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.green2 sentences1995DISCUSSION The Noerr-Pennington doctrine evolved out of two United States Supreme Court cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 , 81 S.Ct. 523 , 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 , 85 S.Ct. 1585 , 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965). 1995DISCUSSION The Noerr-Pennington doctrine evolved out of two United States Supreme Court cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 , 81 S.Ct. 523 , 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 , 85 S.Ct. 1585 , 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965). | 1 | 2 |
Cornelison v. TIG Insurancegreen1 sentence2017Cornelison v. TIG Ins., 376 P.3d 1255, 1277 (Alaska 2016) (holding litigation privilege did not apply to Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act provision creating cause of action for misleading statements regarding workers’ compensation benefits); cf. Pepper v. Routh Crabtree, APC, 219 P.3d 1017, 1023 (Alaska 2009) (holding superior court erroneously applied Noerr-Pennington immunity to exempt litigation activities from UTPA liability). -20- 1659 V. | 1 | 1 |
Pepper v. Routh Crabtree, APCgreen1 sentence2017Cornelison v. TIG Ins., 376 P.3d 1255, 1277 (Alaska 2016) (holding litigation privilege did not apply to Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act provision creating cause of action for misleading statements regarding workers’ compensation benefits); cf. Pepper v. Routh Crabtree, APC, 219 P.3d 1017, 1023 (Alaska 2009) (holding superior court erroneously applied Noerr-Pennington immunity to exempt litigation activities from UTPA liability). -20- 1659 V. | 1 | 1 |
BE&K Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences2009See Sosa, 437 F.3d at 933 ("In analyzing this question, we must consider whether the demand letters constitute either protected petitioning activity or activity [incidental to petitioning]."). [32] Id. at 932. [33] Id. at 942. [34] See BE & K, 536 U.S. at 530 , 122 S.Ct. 2390 . [35] Sosa, 437 F.3d at 932. [36] AS 45.50.531(a); AS 45.50.537. [37] Berg v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, L.L.C., No. 07 C 4887, 2009 WL 901011 , at *6 (N.D.Ill., March 31, 2009); see also Gerber v. Citigroup, Inc., 2009 WL 248094 , at *5 (E.D.Cal., Jan.29, 2009) ("To find defendants immunized by the Noerr-Penn 2009See Sosa, 437 F.3d at 933 ("In analyzing this question, we must consider whether the demand letters constitute either protected petitioning activity or activity [incidental to petitioning]."). [32] Id. at 932. [33] Id. at 942. [34] See BE & K, 536 U.S. at 530 , 122 S.Ct. 2390 . [35] Sosa, 437 F.3d at 932. [36] AS 45.50.531(a); AS 45.50.537. [37] Berg v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, L.L.C., No. 07 C 4887, 2009 WL 901011 , at *6 (N.D.Ill., March 31, 2009); see also Gerber v. Citigroup, Inc., 2009 WL 248094 , at *5 (E.D.Cal., Jan.29, 2009) ("To find defendants immunized by the Noerr-Penn | 1 | 1 |
Gunderson v. University of Alaska, Fairbanksgreen1 sentence2009Cf. Gunderson v. Univ. of Alaska, Fairbanks, 902 P.2d 323, 329 (Alaska 1995) (quoting Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155 , 158 (9th Cir.1993)) (holding that "[a]llegations of fraud and misrepresentation in the judicial pro cess will only block Noerr-Pennington immunity when such allegations go 'to the core of a lawsuit’s legitimacy' see also Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119 (3d Cir.1999) (stating that "[w]hile we do not condone misrepresentations in a judicial setting, neither will we deprive litigants of immunity derived from the First Amendment’s right to peti | 1 | 1 |
Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc.green2 sentences2009See Sosa, 437 F.3d at 933 ("In analyzing this question, we must consider whether the demand letters constitute either protected petitioning activity or activity [incidental to petitioning]."). [32] Id. at 932. [33] Id. at 942. [34] See BE & K, 536 U.S. at 530 , 122 S.Ct. 2390 . [35] Sosa, 437 F.3d at 932. [36] AS 45.50.531(a); AS 45.50.537. [37] Berg v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, L.L.C., No. 07 C 4887, 2009 WL 901011 , at *6 (N.D.Ill., March 31, 2009); see also Gerber v. Citigroup, Inc., 2009 WL 248094 , at *5 (E.D.Cal., Jan.29, 2009) ("To find defendants immunized by the Noerr-Penn 2009See Sosa, 437 F.3d at 933 ("In analyzing this question, we must consider whether the demand letters constitute either protected petitioning activity or activity [incidental to petitioning]."). [32] Id. at 932. [33] Id. at 942. [34] See BE & K, 536 U.S. at 530 , 122 S.Ct. 2390 . [35] Sosa, 437 F.3d at 932. [36] AS 45.50.531(a); AS 45.50.537. [37] Berg v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, L.L.C., No. 07 C 4887, 2009 WL 901011 , at *6 (N.D.Ill., March 31, 2009); see also Gerber v. Citigroup, Inc., 2009 WL 248094 , at *5 (E.D.Cal., Jan.29, 2009) ("To find defendants immunized by the Noerr-Penn | 1 | 1 |
First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nat. Bankgreen1 sentence1995See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp. 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single action is sufficient to invoke the sham exception); Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single baseless suit may be held to constitute a sham so long as some abuse of process is alleged); First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat’l Bank, 482 F.Supp. 514, 520-21 (D.Minn.1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 , 101 S.Ct. 1761 , 68 L.Ed.2d 240 (1981) (holding that the filing of a single action may constitute a “sham” under | 1 | 1 |
Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc.green1 sentence1995See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp. 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single action is sufficient to invoke the sham exception); Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single baseless suit may be held to constitute a sham so long as some abuse of process is alleged); First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat’l Bank, 482 F.Supp. 514, 520-21 (D.Minn.1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 , 101 S.Ct. 1761 , 68 L.Ed.2d 240 (1981) (holding that the filing of a single action may constitute a “sham” under | 1 | 1 |
Aydin Corporation, a Delaware Corporation v. Loral Corporation, a New York Corporation, and Conic Corporation, a Delaware Corporationgreen1 sentence1995See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp. 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single action is sufficient to invoke the sham exception); Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single baseless suit may be held to constitute a sham so long as some abuse of process is alleged); First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat’l Bank, 482 F.Supp. 514, 520-21 (D.Minn.1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 , 101 S.Ct. 1761 , 68 L.Ed.2d 240 (1981) (holding that the filing of a single action may constitute a “sham” under | 1 | 1 |
Video International Production, Inc., Cross-Appellee v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., the City of Dallas, Cross-Appellantgreen2 sentences1995See Video Int’l Prod. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3189 , 105 L.Ed.2d 697 (1989) (holding that conduct protected from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is also shielded from business tort and § 1983 claims). 5 . 1995See Video Int’l Prod. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3189 , 105 L.Ed.2d 697 (1989) (holding that conduct protected from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is also shielded from business tort and § 1983 claims). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Wemhoff v. Floriagreen2 sentences1995See Video Int’l Prod. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3189 , 105 L.Ed.2d 697 (1989) (holding that conduct protected from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is also shielded from business tort and § 1983 claims). 5 . 1995See Video Int’l Prod. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3189 , 105 L.Ed.2d 697 (1989) (holding that conduct protected from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is also shielded from business tort and § 1983 claims). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Schoemehl v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences1995See Video Int’l Prod. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3189 , 105 L.Ed.2d 697 (1989) (holding that conduct protected from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is also shielded from business tort and § 1983 claims). 5 . 1995See Video Int’l Prod. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3189 , 105 L.Ed.2d 697 (1989) (holding that conduct protected from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is also shielded from business tort and § 1983 claims). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Video International Productions, Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc.green2 sentences1995See Video Int’l Prod. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3189 , 105 L.Ed.2d 697 (1989) (holding that conduct protected from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is also shielded from business tort and § 1983 claims). 5 . 1995See Video Int’l Prod. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 , 109 S.Ct. 3189 , 105 L.Ed.2d 697 (1989) (holding that conduct protected from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is also shielded from business tort and § 1983 claims). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Fairbanks Publishing Company v. Franciscogreen2 sentences1986Although Pearson involved a media defendant, we stated generally that the qualified privilege is necessary because "in certain situations there is a paramount public interest permitting persons to speak or write freely without being restrained by the possibility of a defamation action." Pearson, 413 P.2d at 713 (quoting Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 793 (Alaska 1964)) (emphasis added). 1986Although Pearson involved a media defendant, we stated generally that the qualified privilege is necessary because "in certain situations there is a paramount public interest permitting persons to speak or write freely without being restrained by the possibility of a defamation action." Pearson, 413 P.2d at 713 (quoting Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 793 (Alaska 1964)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vaska v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Moreover, we will consider any matter appearing in the record, even if not passed upon by the lower court, in defense of the judgment.") (emphasis added); Atcherian v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div., 14 P.3d 970 , 974 n. 8 (Alaska 2000); but see Vaska v. State, 135 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Alaska 2006) (declining to affirm on legal theories raised for first time on appeal and remanding for consideration by appeals court on those theories). [41] AS 45.50.481(a)(1) states that with limited exceptions (none of which is relevant here), the UTPA does not apply to an act or transact 2009Moreover, we will consider any matter appearing in the record, even if not passed upon by the lower court, in defense of the judgment.") (emphasis added); Atcherian v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div., 14 P.3d 970 , 974 n. 8 (Alaska 2000); but see Vaska v. State, 135 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Alaska 2006) (declining to affirm on legal theories raised for first time on appeal and remanding for consideration by appeals court on those theories). [41] AS 45.50.481(a)(1) states that with limited exceptions (none of which is relevant here), the UTPA does not apply to an act or transact | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United Mine Workers v. Pennington
green
2 sentences1995DISCUSSION The Noerr-Pennington doctrine evolved out of two United States Supreme Court cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 , 81 S.Ct. 523 , 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 , 85 S.Ct. 1585 , 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965). 1995DISCUSSION The Noerr-Pennington doctrine evolved out of two United States Supreme Court cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 , 81 S.Ct. 523 , 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 , 85 S.Ct. 1585 , 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965). | 2 | 1986–1995 |
Liberty Lake Investments, Inc. v. Harry F. Magnuson
green
1 sentence2009Cf. Gunderson v. Univ. of Alaska, Fairbanks, 902 P.2d 323, 329 (Alaska 1995) (quoting Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155 , 158 (9th Cir.1993)) (holding that "[a]llegations of fraud and misrepresentation in the judicial pro cess will only block Noerr-Pennington immunity when such allegations go 'to the core of a lawsuit’s legitimacy' see also Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119 (3d Cir.1999) (stating that "[w]hile we do not condone misrepresentations in a judicial setting, neither will we deprive litigants of immunity derived from the First Amendment’s right to peti | 1 | 2009–2009 |
No. 98-6004
green
1 sentence2009Cf. Gunderson v. Univ. of Alaska, Fairbanks, 902 P.2d 323, 329 (Alaska 1995) (quoting Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155 , 158 (9th Cir.1993)) (holding that "[a]llegations of fraud and misrepresentation in the judicial pro cess will only block Noerr-Pennington immunity when such allegations go 'to the core of a lawsuit’s legitimacy' see also Cheminor Drugs, Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119 (3d Cir.1999) (stating that "[w]hile we do not condone misrepresentations in a judicial setting, neither will we deprive litigants of immunity derived from the First Amendment’s right to peti | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Atcherian v. State, Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Division
green
2 sentences2009Moreover, we will consider any matter appearing in the record, even if not passed upon by the lower court, in defense of the judgment.") (emphasis added); Atcherian v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div., 14 P.3d 970 , 974 n. 8 (Alaska 2000); but see Vaska v. State, 135 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Alaska 2006) (declining to affirm on legal theories raised for first time on appeal and remanding for consideration by appeals court on those theories). [41] AS 45.50.481(a)(1) states that with limited exceptions (none of which is relevant here), the UTPA does not apply to an act or transact 2009Moreover, we will consider any matter appearing in the record, even if not passed upon by the lower court, in defense of the judgment.") (emphasis added); Atcherian v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div., 14 P.3d 970 , 974 n. 8 (Alaska 2000); but see Vaska v. State, 135 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Alaska 2006) (declining to affirm on legal theories raised for first time on appeal and remanding for consideration by appeals court on those theories). [41] AS 45.50.481(a)(1) states that with limited exceptions (none of which is relevant here), the UTPA does not apply to an act or transact | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Results, Inc. v. Lavalco, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995Id. 1995Id. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
First National Bank Of Omaha v. The Marquette National Bank Of Minneapolis
green
1 sentence1995See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp. 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single action is sufficient to invoke the sham exception); Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single baseless suit may be held to constitute a sham so long as some abuse of process is alleged); First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat’l Bank, 482 F.Supp. 514, 520-21 (D.Minn.1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 , 101 S.Ct. 1761 , 68 L.Ed.2d 240 (1981) (holding that the filing of a single action may constitute a “sham” under | 1 | 1995–1995 |
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited
green
2 sentences1995In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 , 92 S.Ct. 609 , 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972), the Court extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to include attempts to influence adjudicatory proceedings before administrative agencies and the courts. 1995In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 , 92 S.Ct. 609 , 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972), the Court extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to include attempts to influence adjudicatory proceedings before administrative agencies and the courts. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Williamson v. Kimbrough
green
1 sentence1995See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp. 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single action is sufficient to invoke the sham exception); Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single baseless suit may be held to constitute a sham so long as some abuse of process is alleged); First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat’l Bank, 482 F.Supp. 514, 520-21 (D.Minn.1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 , 101 S.Ct. 1761 , 68 L.Ed.2d 240 (1981) (holding that the filing of a single action may constitute a “sham” under | 1 | 1995–1995 |
First National Bank v. Marquette National Bank
green
1 sentence1995See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp. 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single action is sufficient to invoke the sham exception); Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single baseless suit may be held to constitute a sham so long as some abuse of process is alleged); First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat’l Bank, 482 F.Supp. 514, 520-21 (D.Minn.1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 , 101 S.Ct. 1761 , 68 L.Ed.2d 240 (1981) (holding that the filing of a single action may constitute a “sham” under | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Carabbia v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1995See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp. 718 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single action is sufficient to invoke the sham exception); Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that a single baseless suit may be held to constitute a sham so long as some abuse of process is alleged); First Nat'l Bank v. Marquette Nat’l Bank, 482 F.Supp. 514, 520-21 (D.Minn.1979), aff'd, 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 , 101 S.Ct. 1761 , 68 L.Ed.2d 240 (1981) (holding that the filing of a single action may constitute a “sham” under | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co.
green
2 sentences1986Although Pearson involved a media defendant, we stated generally that the qualified privilege is necessary because "in certain situations there is a paramount public interest permitting persons to speak or write freely without being restrained by the possibility of a defamation action." Pearson, 413 P.2d at 713 (quoting Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 793 (Alaska 1964)) (emphasis added). 1986Although Pearson involved a media defendant, we stated generally that the qualified privilege is necessary because "in certain situations there is a paramount public interest permitting persons to speak or write freely without being restrained by the possibility of a defamation action." Pearson, 413 P.2d at 713 (quoting Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 793 (Alaska 1964)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
McDonald v. Smith
green
2 sentences1986In affirming, the Supreme Court did not even mention the defendant’s argument that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should be applied. 472 U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2794 , 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985). 15 . 1986In affirming, the Supreme Court did not even mention the defendant’s argument that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should be applied. 472 U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2794 , 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985). 15 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.
green
2 sentences1986In affirming, the Supreme Court did not even mention the defendant’s argument that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should be applied. 472 U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2794 , 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985). 15 . 1986In affirming, the Supreme Court did not even mention the defendant’s argument that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should be applied. 472 U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 2794 , 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985). 15 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.