prerequisite claim in New York

2013While a notice of claim is not a prerequisite for such a claim (see Wanczowski v City of New York, 186 AD2d 397 [1st Dept 1992]), the allegations failed to state a viable section 1983 claim.

2013While a notice of claim is not a prerequisite for such a claim (see Wanczowski v City of New York, 186 AD2d 397 [1st Dept 1992]), the allegations failed to state a viable section 1983 claim.

2021Federal courts have held that since fraud is not an element or a prerequisite to such a claim, ordinary notice pleading standards apply ( see Litwin v Blackstone Group., L.P. , 634 F3d 706, 716 [2d Cir 2011], cert denied 565 US 878 [2011]; Rombach v Chang, 355 F3d 164, 171 [2d Cir 2004]; NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v Goldman Sachs & Co. , 693 F3d 145, 157 [2d Cir 2012]; Lindsay v Morgan Stanley [In re Morgan Stanley Info.

2013(See Austin v Board of Higher Educ. of City of N.Y., 5 NY2d 430, 443-444 [1959]; Meyers v City of New York, 208 AD2d 258, 265 [2d Dept 1995]; Feraca v Town of Esopus, 63 AD2d 771 [3d Dept 1978].) Specifically, “[a] public employer may abolish civil service positions for the purpose of economy or efficiency, as long as the position is not abolished as a subterfuge to avoid statutory protection afforded civil servants before they are discharged.” (Matter of Chandler v Village of Spring Val., 104 AD3d 847 [2d Dept 2013], quoting Matter of Civil Serv.

2013(See Austin v Board of Higher Educ. of City of N.Y., 5 NY2d 430, 443-444 [1959]; Meyers v City of New York, 208 AD2d 258, 265 [2d Dept 1995]; Feraca v Town of Esopus, 63 AD2d 771 [3d Dept 1978].) Specifically, “[a] public employer may abolish civil service positions for the purpose of economy or efficiency, as long as the position is not abolished as a subterfuge to avoid statutory protection afforded civil servants before they are discharged.” (Matter of Chandler v Village of Spring Val., 104 AD3d 847 [2d Dept 2013], quoting Matter of Civil Serv.

2011As to its claimed entitlement to an easement by prescription, even if plaintiff made a prima facie showing that it used the gate openly, notoriously, and continuously for the statutory period, and adversely to Brecevich’s interests, Brecevich raised a triable issue of fact through his affidavit stating that plaintiff had never used the gate, that the gate was always padlocked, and that only he had a key (see Jhae Mook Chung v Maxam Props., LLC, 73 AD3d 505 [2010]).

2005Assoc. v Keebler-Beretta, 284 AD2d 109 [2001]), particularly on this record, which, as the trial court appropriately recognized, contains no countervailing testimonial evidence “from building staff or neighbors regarding how often [tenant] is seen at the subject premises.” Moreover, the filing of a New York City resident income tax return is not a prerequisite to a claim of primary residence (see West 157th St.

2004Finally, we conclude that there was “literal compliance” with the requirements of section 190.45 (3) (Stewart, 92 NY2d at 967 ).

2000Because the rule ceases to operate when these considerations no longer prevail (see, 260 AD2d, at 55 ), courts have recognized the client’s continuing trust and confidence as a prerequisite to the rule’s application (see, Pittelli v Schulman, 128 AD2d 600, 601 ; see also, Coyne v Bersani, 61 NY2d 939 ) and we believe it is the controlling factor here.

2000Because the rule ceases to operate when these considerations no longer prevail (see, 260 AD2d, at 55 ), courts have recognized the client’s continuing trust and confidence as a prerequisite to the rule’s application (see, Pittelli v Schulman, 128 AD2d 600, 601 ; see also, Coyne v Bersani, 61 NY2d 939 ) and we believe it is the controlling factor here.

1999This Court’s prior decisions herein ( 208 AD2d 301 ; 224 AD2d 125 ) did not direct that the arbitrators hear and decide plaintiffs claim of wrongful termination on the merits, and plaintiff otherwise fails to show that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law in determining that the prior 1993 arbitration award had found against plaintiff on the issue of wrongful termination, a prerequisite to his claim for punitive damages.

1999This Court’s prior decisions herein ( 208 AD2d 301 ; 224 AD2d 125 ) did not direct that the arbitrators hear and decide plaintiffs claim of wrongful termination on the merits, and plaintiff otherwise fails to show that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law in determining that the prior 1993 arbitration award had found against plaintiff on the issue of wrongful termination, a prerequisite to his claim for punitive damages.

1997Commn., 85 NY2d 423, 441 ; Balsamo v New York City Tr.

1995(See, e.g., Matter of Johnson v Adduci, 198 AD2d 352 [2d Dept 1993].) However, before an officer may deem conduct a refusal, the prerequisite warnings must be given, and the defendant must persist in her refusal, after being offered at least two opportunities to submit to the chemical test, "at least one of which must take place after being advised of the sanctions for refusal”.

1991(Conboy, McKay, Bachman & Kendall v Armstrong, 110 AD2d 1042, 1043 .) Similarly, there must be a "clear manifestation of intent by one tendering less than full payment of an unliquidated claim that the payment has been sent in full satisfaction of the disputed claim”.

1986The Court of Appeals has recognized that the availability of another suitable forum is not a prerequisite for applying the doctrine, but a " 'pertinent factor’ ” and "a most important factor” to be considered in ruling upon a motion to dismiss (Islamic Republic of Iran v Pahlavi, 62 NY2d 474, 481 , cert denied 469 US 1108 ).

1980It may well be that in the context of settlement negotiations an intent to defraud or mislead is not a prerequisite for a claim of equitable estoppel (see, e.g., Dupuis v Van Natten, 61 AD2d 293, 295 ; Robinson v City of New York, 24 AD2d 260, 263 ), but these cases do not involve professional medical opinions.

1980It may well be that in the context of settlement negotiations an intent to defraud or mislead is not a prerequisite for a claim of equitable estoppel (see, e.g., Dupuis v Van Natten, 61 AD2d 293, 295 ; Robinson v City of New York, 24 AD2d 260, 263 ), but these cases do not involve professional medical opinions.

1978The first part of this section, the equal protection clause, like section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code, requires "state action” as a prerequisite to a claim (Dorsey v Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 NY 512, 530 ) and as indicated, the court finds that the adoption of Resolution No. 17 did not involve "state action”.