prerequisite error in Illinois

2004In Voelker , the court explicitly stated: "The Magnuson-Moss Act allows a suit for breach of 'an implied warranty arising under State law (as modified by sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this title).' [Citation.] Because §§2308 and 2304(a) do not modify, or discuss in any way, a state's ability to establish a privity requirement, whether privity is a prerequisite to a claim for breach of implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act therefore hinges entirely on the applicable state law. [Citations.] Under the law of Illinois, privity of contract is a prerequisite to recover economic damages for bre

2004In Voelker, the court explicitly stated: “The Magnuson-Moss Act allows a suit for breach of ‘an implied warranty arising under State law (as modified by sections 2308 and 2304(a) of this title).’ [Citation.] Because §§ 2308 and 2304(a) do not modify, or discuss in any way, a state’s ability to establish a privity requirement, whether privity is a prerequisite to a claim for breach of implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act therefore hinges entirely on the applicable state law. [Citations.] Under the law of Illinois, privity of contract is a prerequisite to recover economic damages for bre

1993The court stated, “It is true that one may waive a defense of fraud by entering into a new contract; however, knowledge of the fraud at the time of signing the [second contract] is a prerequisite to such waiver.” (Emphasis in original.) (Ainsworth Corp. v. Cenco, Inc., 107 Ill.

1993The court stated "It is true that one may waive a defense of fraud by entering into a new contract; however, knowledge of the fraud at the time of signing the [second contract] is a prerequisite to such waiver." (Emphasis in original.) ( Ainsworth Corp. v. Cenco, Inc., 107 Ill.

2025“Once it is determined that the error affected a substantial right, the reviewing court may then proceed in determining whether the error is excusable ***.” Id. (citing People v. Heron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 185 (2005)). ¶ 31 “The first step in a plain-error analysis is to determine whether a clear and obvious error occurred. [Citation.] If a clear and obvious error occurred, we then consider whether either of the two prongs of the plain-error doctrine has been satisfied.” (Emphases added.) People v. Henderson, 2017 IL App (3d) 150550, ¶ 37 .

2025Accordingly, we specifically overruled a case—People v. - 32 - Haley, 2011 IL App (1st) 093585—that had held that consideration of an improper sentencing factor is cognizable as prong two plain error on the basis that it affects a defendant’s fundamental right to liberty.

2022(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 27 For these reasons, a court’s inquiry is not complete once it finds the prerequisite factors of judicial estoppel are met.

2020We rejected a similar argument in Dismuke, holding that “a waste of judicial resources occurs when, as a result of an attorney’s deficient certificate, an appellate court must scour through the record to determine whether that attorney actually complied with Rule 604(d), even though strict compliance with that rule’s certification requirements would prevent such waste.” Id. at 609 . ¶ 20 The State quotes the following passage from People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 369 (1998): “Where, as here, the defendant was afforded a full and fair second opportunity to present a motion for reduced senten

2000Syck, 138 Ill.2d at 276, 149 Ill.Dec. 710 , 562 N.E.2d 174 .

1994(Ramage, 229 Ill.

1982App. 3d 82 , 94 , 379 N.E.2d 1307 , succinctly stated: “It is true that one may waive a defense of fraud by entering a new contract; however, knowledge of the fraud at the time of signing the [second contract] is a prerequisite to such waiver. [Citations.] The representation in this case was of a continuing character, and [the injured party] was entitled to rely upon it until informed otherwise.

1967See People v. Webb, 60 Ill App2d 365, 208 NE2d 639 (1st Dist 1965); People v. Poland, 22 Ill2d 175, 174 NE2d 804 (1961).

1961American Cereal Co. v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 211 Fed 96 (7th Cir 1914); London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. American Cereal Co., 159 Ill App 537, reversed on other grounds, 251 Ill 123, 95 NE 1064 .

1949(Madsen v. Industrial Com. 383 Ill. 590 ; Stromberg Motor Device Co. v. Industrial Com. 305 Ill. 619 .) In the present case there was no agreement, nor was there an award, for, at the original proceeding, it was judicially determined by the circuit court that there was no causal connection between the industrial accident and the disability for which compensation was sought, and the award made by the commission was set aside.

1949(Madsen v. Industrial Com. 383 Ill. 590 ; Stromberg Motor Device Co. v. Industrial Com. 305 Ill. 619 .) In the present case there was no agreement, nor was there an award, for, at the original proceeding, it was judicially determined by the circuit court that there was no causal connection between the industrial accident and the disability for which compensation was sought, and the award made by the commission was set aside.